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Abstract	
In this thesis, I present selected works I conducted in my Master of Philosophy Applied 
Epidemiology (MAE) placement at the Vaccine Preventable Disease Surveillance 
(VPDS) Section of the Office of Health Protection (OHP), at the Australian Government 
Department of Health from March 2013 to November 2014. The works presented 
comprise my MAE requirements and describe my experiences as an MAE. 
I discuss my role in the day-the-day activities of the VPDS section, including the 
surveillance of notifiable diseases, being the secretariat for the rotavirus working group, 
writing annual reports and editing Communicable Disease Intelligence Journal 
submissions. I also describe my role as a Watch Officer for the National Incident Room 
within the OHP. 
I investigated a foodborne outbreak of gastroenteritis at a Mother’s Day buffet luncheon 
in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), where curried prawns and Caesar salad were 
the suspected cause of the outbreak. The investigation was unable to determine the 
aetiological cause of illness but highlighted the risk often associated with serving buffet 
style meals.   
I present two epidemiological studies. The first is an analysis of notified Legionella 
infections from 2001 and 2012. Describing the epidemiology of legionellosis in 
Australia, the analysis found rates of infection are low and more likely to affect males 
and vulnerable populations such as the elderly. Comparing these results to a previous 
review of legionellosis in Australia (1991-2000), we found age, sex and season of 
infection were consistent, but notification rates were stable and higher compared with 
rates from 1991 to 2000, and Legionella longbeachae was notified more than 
Legionella pneumophila. I presented the findings of my analysis in an oral presentation 
at the 2014 Public Health Association of Australia 43rd Annual Conference in Perth. 
The second epidemiological project I undertook examined why Indigenous status was 
underreported in National Human Papillomavirus Vaccination Register (NHVPR). 
Analysing female vaccination records from 2007 to 2012, we identified 46% were 
missing Indigenous status. We reviewed the literature, examined register data and 
consulted with jurisdictional health departments to identify what barriers exist that 
potentially prevent the reporting of Indigenous status to the NHVPR.   
 
x 
 
I evaluated the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) as a 
surveillance system for influenza. The evaluation found that the NNDSS is an 
acceptable, simple and useable system that provides high quality data for the national 
surveillance of laboratory-confirmed influenza. However, improvements in the systems 
flexibility and sensitivity would ensure higher quality surveillance data continues to be 
available. 
Lastly, to fulfil my teaching requirements I prepared a ‘Lessons From the Field’ case 
study on how to work with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander data and conducted a 
teaching session on measurement and information biases as part of a half day training 
session undertaken for the MAE cohort of 2014.  
This thesis describes my experiences in my MAE placement, the fulfilment of 
requirements and the findings of my investigations. The work presented in this thesis 
contributes to the work of VPDS section by improving our understanding of 
communicable disease surveillance in Australia. 
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1.1 Overview 
My field placement for the Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) commenced on 25 
February 2013, in the Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance section (VPDS), Health 
Emergency and Management Branch (HEMB), Office of Health Protection (OHP), 
Australian Department of Health (the Department of Health). My field supervisor was the 
director of VPDS, Ms Rhonda Owen. During this time I worked on diseases managed by 
this section including influenza, Human Pappillomavirus (HPV) and legionellosis. 
Collaboration and supervision was provided for each project by specialists in their fields 
including Dr. Julia Brotherton from the Victorian Cytology Service (VCS), Christina Bareja 
(VPDS), Kate Pennington (VPDS) and Amy Bright (VPDS). As part of my placement I also 
worked with the Australian Capital Territory Health Protection Service (HPS) to investigate 
an outbreak of gastroenteritis. I was seconded to HPS for 2 weeks to assist with the 
investigation. 
This chapter briefly describes: (1) my work placement; (2) my MAE core activity 
requirements; (3) public health impacts of the projects; and (4) the structure of the bound 
volume. 
1.2 Placement -Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance section 
The Department of Health vision is for “better health and wellbeing for all Australian’s”. 
This outcome is reached through a series of ten goals that are integrated across the 
division, branch and section structure of the Department of Health. The goals of the Office 
of Health Protection (OHP) are to prevent, detect, and respond to communicable diseases 
in the Australian population. OHP contributes to the sustainability of the Australian health 
system by reducing preventable illness and mortality due to communicable diseases. It 
achieves this by designing and implementing evidence-based and targeted programs 
through four separate branches: (1) the Health Protection Policy Branch; (2) the 
Immunisation Branch; (3) the Medical and Scientific Advisory Unit; and (4) the Health 
Emergency Management Branch. 
The Health Emergency Management Branch (HEMB) is responsible for risk assessments 
and coordination of the national response to public health events occurring naturally or 
deliberately introduced biological and emerging threats. The Vaccine Preventable 
Diseases Surveillance Section (VPDS) is responsible for monitoring, analysing and 
reporting on vaccine preventable disease and some bacterial, blood-borne and sexually-
transmissible infections. The section provides advice to inform policy on vaccines and 
pandemic planning, relevant information on VPDs to national and international 
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stakeholders, and provides epidemiological advice to Communicable Disease Network 
Australia (CDNA). 
1.3 Summary of core activities 
During the MAE, I have undertaken four specific projects that have enabled me to 
systematically examine a variety of infectious diseases with respect to: (1) distribution and 
characteristics in regards to person, place and time; (2) the determinants of risk and 
probability of being a disease causing agent; and (3) the quality and accuracy of national 
notification data. This placement developed my skills through practical experience and 
underpinned the key messages of: (1) putting it into context; (2) looking at the big picture; 
and (3) ask ‘so what’ factor.  
The projects and activities I completed in order to satisfy the requirements of the MAE 
were as follows: 
1.3.1 Field investigation of a public health problem (outbreak investigation) 
This project investigated a small outbreak of gastroenteritis that occurred in the Australian 
Capital Territory in May 2013. Working with members of HPS, ACT Health, I was one of 
the primary investigators for the outbreak. This work is presented in chapter 2. 
1.3.2 Analysis of public health data 
This project involved the analysis legionellosis notifications to examine the epidemiology of 
this disease. As part of my work on this project, I was the primary author for the 
legionellosis sections for the 2012 and 2013 Annual Report of the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). The combination of these projects established 
the burden of legionellosis in Australia from 2001-2012, and identified specific changes in 
the epidemiology of legionellosis over time. This work is presented in chapter 3. 
1.3.3 Conduct and interpret and epidemiological study 
This investigation identified potential barriers that affected the completion of Indigenous 
status within the National Human papillomavirus Vaccination Program Register (NHVPR). 
The project was requested by the Victorian Cytological Service (VCS) and is presented in 
chapter 4. 
1.3.4 Evaluating a public health surveillance system 
This project undertook an evaluation of laboratory-confirmed influenza in the NNDSS. The 
project examined the quality, efficiency and usefulness of the data collected using the 
evaluation framework developed by the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, 
Atlanta, US, and is presented in chapter 5. 
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1.3.5 Critical review of scientific literature 
All the projects required a critical review of the literature to ensure context and scope prior 
to starting the project. At the beginning of each chapter a brief contextual introduction is 
provided. A focused literature review was conducted for the work reviewing barriers to the 
completion of Indigenous status for the NHVPR and is presented in chapter 4. All four 
major projects discuss the results in light of current literature. 
1.3.6 Scientific manuscript for a peer-reviewed journal  
One project resulted in a scientific manuscript published in the Communicable Diseases 
Intelligence Journal. 
 Timothy S. Sloan-Gardner, Anna-Jane Glynn-Robinson, April Roberts-Witteveen, 
Radomir Krsteski, Keith Rogers, Andrew Kaye & Cameron Moffatt. An outbreak of 
gastroenteritis linked to a buffet lunch served at a Canberra restaurant. (Chapter2 
Appendix 10.3) 
1.3.7 Reports for a public health publications and scientific audiences 
 Legionellosis, Other bacterial infections Chapter, Annual report of the National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, 2012 and 2013 (Chapter 3 Appendix 12.3 
and 12.4) 
 Data analysis of rotavirus notifications within the NNDSS; Rotavirus working group 
paper (Chapter 6 Appendix 6.3) 
1.3.8 Reports on projects for non-scientific audience 
 Summary notes of consultations with key jurisdictional stakeholders regarding the 
collection of Indigenous status for HPV vaccinations (Chapter 5 Appendix 8.3). 
 Minute  to the Assistant Secretary of the Health Emergency Management Branch  
Investigating the utility of laboratory data for influenza surveillance activities 
(Chapter 5 Appendix 9.10) 
1.3.9 Presentations conferences and other events 
During my placement I undertook a number of oral presentations. These included: 
National conference 
 Anna Glynn-Robinson, Martyn Kirk, Rhonda Owen and Timothy Dobbins. Who is at 
risk of Legionella infection in Australia?, PHAA 43rd Annual Conference, 15-17 
September 2014 (Chapter 3 Appendix 12.2) 
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National meetings and other events 
 Anna Glynn-Robinson and Timothy Sloan-Gardener.  Using EpiInfo 7 to investigate 
a large outbreak of gastroenteritis at a Mother’s Day Lunch, OzFoodNet Face to 
Face Meeting, 15-16 October 213 (Chapter 2 Appendix 10.4) 
 Anna Glynn-Robinson and Rhonda Owen, National Communicable Disease 
Surveillance: The National Notifiable Surveillance System,  presentation to a 
delegation from Bangladesh, 4 September 2014 (Chapter 6, Appendix 6.5) 
1.3.10 Teaching including lesson from the field 
I participated in seven lessons from the field, including preparing one which explored 
issues of Working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander data (Chapter 6 Appendix 
6.1). 
I also contributed to and participated in a half-day teaching exercise conducted for first 
year MAE scholars in March 2014. This teaching session aimed to provide the first years 
with knowledge and practical experience in four major epidemiological concepts. 
My contributions can be found in Chapter 6, and included: 
 Developing a 40 minute session that explored the concepts of selection and 
measurement bias;  
 Developing a teaching plan (Chapter 6 Appendix 6.2a); 
 Developing and editing session presentation slides (Appendix 6.2b);  
 Contributing to the instructor guide (Appendix 6.2c); 
 Presenting information about measurement bias;  
 Developing a participant feedback form (Chapter 6  Appendix 6.2d); and  
 Providing feedback to two fellow MAEs on their presentation, delivery and teaching 
skills. 
1.4 Public health impact of major projects 
1.4.1 The problem with buffet meals- investigation into an outbreak of 
gastroenteritis Canberra, May 2103 
This investigation contributes to the discussion about food hygiene, preparation and 
handling, by emphasizing how breakdowns in these processes can result in disease. In 
particular, the finding from this investigation demonstrated that inefficient temperature 
control and poor handling of food resulted in a preventable outbreak of gastroenteritis. A 
direct result of this investigation was the implementation of food management plans and 
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training of employees to prevent outbreaks of foodborne disease occurring in the future. 
The investigation resulted in a manuscript being submitted to the Communicable Disease 
Intelligence journal adding to the knowledge of foodborne outbreaks in Australia. 
1.4.2 Legionellosis in Australia: a review of notified legionellosis from 2001 to 2012  
This project has two main public health impacts. Reporting the burden of Legionellosis, as 
part of the NNDSS annual reports of 2012 and 2013, provides information of this disease 
to decision makers in the Australian Government Department of Health, jurisdictional 
health Departments and the general public.  
This data analysis contributes to the discussion about legionellosis in Australia describing 
the epidemiology and identifying changes in the disease epidemiology over time. The 
analysis identified there are inconsistencies in the application of the national surveillance 
case definition, which may have resulted in the potential over-representative of Legionella 
longbeachae notifications during the period. This analysis showed notification rates in 
Australia were stable for the period during 2001 to 2012, but were high compared to the 
previous ten year period of 1991 to 2000. 
This project resulted in the findings being presented at the Public Health Association 
Australia (PHAA) 43rd Annual conference, 15-17 September 2013. 
1.4.3 Evaluation of Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination amongst Indigenous 
females: A review of current issues impacting upon the accuracy of 
estimates 
This project provides insight into some of the barriers encountered when collecting 
Indigenous status information, and highlights the complexities in addressing these barriers. 
The study provides simple and useful recommendations to assist national and 
jurisdictional health authorities in improving the completion on Indigenous status on HPV 
vaccine notifications.  
Consultations with jurisdictional health departments resulted in three jurisdictions 
reviewing and updating the Indigenous status question on their HPV vaccine consent 
forms, complying with the recommended national standards. Additionally, a number of 
jurisdictions have taken action to address the incompletion of Indigenous status, including 
regular reviews of data, providing information to vaccine providers about the importance of 
collecting this information, and designing databases to prompt for the follow-up of missing 
information.  
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1.4.4 Evaluation of the NNDSS: a focus on influenza  
This study is the first to review the surveillance of laboratory-confirmed influenza collected 
through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). Outcomes of this 
study have provided the Australian Department of Health with recommendations to 
improve the analysis and use of laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications. Results of the 
report are to be presented to the National Influenza Surveillance Committee in 2015 and 
will provide the basis for decisions to improve the data quality, reporting and analysis of 
laboratory-confirmed influenza in the NNDSS.  
1.5 Structure of the bound volume 
This bound volume is presented in six chapters, with specific content provided in the 
appendices found at the end of appropriate chapters. The first chapter provides an 
overview of my field placement and structure of the bound volume. Chapters two through 
to five provide the detail of the major projects I undertook in my MAE placement. Chapter 
six details my teaching experiences (including a lesson from the field) and provides an 
overview of other public health experiences undertaken as part of my work in the VPDS 
section of OHP. Each chapter addresses more than one competency required to complete 
the MAE program and Table 1 summaries how each chapter relates to these 
competencies.
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Table 1: Relationship between chapters in this bound volume and the required MAE competencies 
 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 
The problem with 
buffet meals: An 
investigation into 
a gastroenteritis 
outbreak 
associated with a 
buffet lunch in 
Canberra, 
Australian Capital 
Territory, 2013 
Chapter 3 
Epidemiology of 
legionellosis in 
Australia: 
An analysis of 
notified cases 
from 2001 to 
2012 
Chapter 4 
Evaluation of 
Human 
Papillomavirus 
(HPV) vaccination 
amongst 
Indigenous 
females: 
A review of current 
issues affecting the 
accuracy of 
vaccination 
estimates 
Chapter 5 
Evaluation of 
laboratory-
confirmed 
influenza 
notifications in 
the National 
Notifiable 
Disease 
Surveillance 
System 
(NNDSS) 
Chapter 6 
Teaching and 
dissemination 
of information 
Analysis of public health data       
Field investigation of a public 
health problem (outbreak 
investigation) 
      
Conduct and interpret an 
epidemiological study       
Evaluation of a public health 
surveillance system       
Critical review of scientific 
literature       
Scientific manuscript for a peer-
reviewed journal 
See section 
1.3.6.      
Report for government or public 
health publication 
See section 
1.3.7 .      
Report on projects for non-
scientific audience 
See section 
1.3.8  
     
Oral presentation at a national 
conference 
See section 
1.3.9.      
Oral presentation at national 
meetings and other events 
See section 
1.3.9.      
Teaching and lessons from the 
field       
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1. Prologue 
1.1. Investigatory Role 
My role in this outbreak investigation was to assist the lead epidemiologist at the 
Communicable Diseases Control (CDC) section, Health Protection Service (HPS), ACT 
Health, with an investigation into a gastroenteritis outbreak that occurred in Canberra in 
May of 2013. HPS contacted OzFoodNet on 13 May 2013 seeking assistance and 
extra resources to investigate concurrent outbreaks that had occurred in Canberra over 
the same weekend. Fellow MAE, Timothy Sloan-Gardner, and I were asked to assist. 
HPS was first alerted to this outbreak after receiving a number of complaints from the 
public who become ill a few hours after attending a luncheon held in a restaurant in 
Canberra on Sunday 12 May. During the course of the investigation I conducted 
hypothesis generating interviews, developed a standard questionnaire, completed 
interviews with patrons, planned patron call-backs and contract tracing, entered 
interview data and provided descriptive and analytical information for daily Acute 
Response Team (ART) meetings and the final ACT health report.  
I used Epi Info version 7.14.1 for the descriptive analysis and Stata version 13.1 for the 
multivariable analysis. An outcome of this investigation was a paper produced for the 
Communicable Disease Intelligence journal. 
1.2. Lessons Learnt 
During the investigation, I gained experience in performing an outbreak investigation 
and learnt a number of valuable lessons, including how to communicate, work in 
pressurised situations, how to develop case definitions and the importance of study 
analysis plans. As this investigation was conducted concurrently with a second larger 
and more serious foodborne outbreak, communication was vital to ensuring this 
investigation ran smoothly. During this investigation I learnt the importance of working 
well within a team and acknowledging the contribution each team member makes to 
the investigation.  
Reflecting on this investigation there were a number of aspect that could have been 
undertaken to improve the outcomes. Firstly, after completing the investigation I 
realised the case definition we used was too broad and should have been refined 
during the investigation. Revising the case definition during the outbreak investigation 
would have further minimising misclassification bias.  
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Our investigation did not have a clear study plan developed when it was initiated. 
Whilst we had broadly outlined how the investigation would be conducted, having a 
written study plan would have guided the investigation and ensured all members of the 
team were clear on the studies objectives and methodologies.  
Finally, this investigation would have been improved if we had been able to collect 
more environmental and human faecal samples. By gathering more samples 
conclusions about the cause of the outbreak would have been stronger. Additionally, if 
we had been able to collect more human faecal samples, we may have been able to 
definitively confirm the aetiological cause of the outbreak. Improving the collection of 
samples could have been achieved by better engagement with the environmental 
health officers and asking all ill respondents for faecal samples during the telephone 
interviews. 
During the data analysis phase of the investigation I encountered a number of issues in 
using Epi Info. Whilst the system has the ability to quickly produce basic statistics, on a 
number of occasions I had to re-start the analysis as the canvas would freeze, collapse 
or develop errors in recoding. After the investigation was compete, I spent a lot of time 
trying to figure out how to conduct more complex statistical analyses in Epi Info. After 
much frustration, I ended up conducting complex statistical analysis (logistic 
regressions) and statistical tests in Stata. From this experience I have learnt how to 
use two different statistical software systems and be able to judge which systems I 
should use in varying situations. I believe overall this experience has given me skills to 
undertake outbreak investigations and provided me the confidence to analyse data in 
both Epi Info and Stata.  
1.3. Public Health Implications 
This investigation contributes to the discussion about food hygiene, preparation and 
handling, by emphasizing how breakdowns in these processes can result in disease. In 
particular, the findings from this investigation demonstrate inefficient temperature 
control and poor handling of food resulted in a preventable outbreak of gastroenteritis. 
A direct result of this investigation was the implementation of food management plans 
and the training of employees, to prevent foodborne disease occurring in the future. 
The investigation resulted in a manuscript being submitted to and published in the 
Communicable Disease Intelligence journal adding to the knowledge of foodborne 
outbreaks in Australia. 	
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2. Abstract 
On 13 May 2013 a complaint of food related illness were received by the ACT Health 
Protection Service (HPS). The complainant reported becoming unwell after eating a 
buffet style meal at a restaurant in Canberra. On 13 May 2013, another compliant was 
received with the complainant reporting similar symptoms after attend the same 
restaurant on the same day. To identify the likely cause of illness, an outbreak 
investigation was launched. We conducted a retrospective cohort study using a 
standard questionnaire developed from the restaurants buffet menu. The restaurant 
booking list was used to conduct telephone interviews, and a case was defined as 
someone who ate the buffet lunch served at the restaurant on 12 May 2013 and 
developed symptoms of gastroenteritis (such a diarrhoea, abdominal pain and nausea) 
following the consumption of food.   
We identified 225 of the 303 known patrons (74%), of which 56% (125/225) reported to 
be ill.  The median incubation period was 13 hours, while the median duration of illness 
was 19 hours. The most common symptoms reported were diarrhoea (94%, 118/125), 
abdominal pain (84%, 103/125) and fatigue (32%, 40/125). Of the 118 ill patrons 
reporting diarrhoea, 93 reported having 3 or more diarrhoeal episodes in a 24 hour 
period.  
Our multivariable analysis illustrated that illness was significantly associated with 
consuming curried prawns (adjusted RR 18.1, 95%CI 8.4-38.6, p <0.001) and Caesar 
salad (adjusted OR 3.9, 95% CI 1.9-7.9, p <0.001). Enterotoxin-producing Bacillus 
cereus and staphylococci (S. aureus) were detected in samples of cooked food, but 
were not present in stool samples provided by patrons. Samples of the curried prawns 
and Caesar salad were not available for laboratory testing. 
The results of our investigation suggested consuming food at the buffet lunch on 12 
May 2013 led to patrons becoming ill. Laboratory testing identified S. aureus, B. cereus 
and their enterotoxins in food samples and epidemiological evidence suggested 
enterotoxin poisoning. However, due the lack human and buffet food samples we were 
unable to definitively conclude if these pathogens were responsible for the outbreak. 
The implication of multiple foods for the multivariable analysis and evidence from the 
interviews with kitchen staff suggest that failures in cleanliness, temperature control 
and food handling practices resulted in the contamination of the food. Our investigation 
highlights how cross-contamination, temperature abuse and/or poor food handling 
practices increase the risk of foodborne illness occurring. This outbreak may have been 
prevented if the restaurant had used appropriate temperature controls and food 
handling practices when preparing and serving the buffet style food. 
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3. Introduction 
3.1. Foodborne Gastroenteritis 
Foodborne gastroenteritis is a significant public health problem in Australia. 
Estimations suggest that approximately 5.4 million cases occur every year, costing 
around $1.2 billion dollars annually.(1) Characterised by a combination of symptoms 
such as diarrhoea, vomiting, abdominal pain and cramping, symptoms of 
gastroenteritis are often mild and self-limiting with illness usually lasting between 3 to 5 
days.(2, 3) However, in some cases illness can be more serious requiring hospitalisation 
and can occasionally lead to death.(2) Caused by multiple pathogens, bacterium and 
viruses, gastroenteritis can be transmitted to humans through contaminated food and 
water, and by direct and indirect contact with an infected person or animal.(2, 4)  
The Australian foodborne disease surveillance network, OzFoodNet, monitors the 
incidence of foodborne related illness and disease in Australia. Between the years 
2000 to 2010, OzFoodNet assisted in the investigation of 1,179 outbreaks associated 
with contaminated food, of which 18,557 people were reported to be affected including 
1,745 hospitalisations and 53 deaths. (5, 6)   
3.2. Outbreak description 
On Monday 13 2013, the Health Protection Service (HPS) at Act Health was notified of 
a potential outbreak of foodborne gastroenteritis through a complaint made by a 
member of the public. The complainant reported that they, and other members of their 
table had become ill after consuming food served at a Mother’s day buffet lunch at a 
restaurant in Canberra on 12 May 2013. On Tuesday 14 May 2013 HPS received three 
more complaints (from separate bookings) of gastroenteritis, from patrons who 
attended the same event at the restaurant. 
A hypothesis generating questionnaire was used to interview the complainants and 
members of their tables to determine if there were any common risk factors associated 
with the reported illness. From these interviews one common exposure was identified, 
the attendance at a Mother’s Day buffet lunch on Sunday 12 May between 12:00 and 
15:30 at a venue in Canberra. At the Acute Response Team (ART) meeting held on 13 
May 2013 at ACT Health an outbreak investigation was launched to identify the cause 
of illness and determine what public health measures were required to prevent further 
disease. 
The investigation team consisted of ACT HPS and ACT Government Analytical 
Laboratory (ACTGAL) staff, ACT Environmental Health Officers (EHO) and Master of 
Applied Epidemiology Scholars Timothy Sloan-Gardner and me. 
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1. Prologue 
1.1. My Role 
I was the lead author and investigator in this review. My role involved extracting data 
from the National Notifiable Diseases surveillance System (NNDSS) to analyse and 
describe the epidemiology of legionellosis in Australia from 2001 to 2012, analyses 
changes in the reporting of confirmed and probable legionellosis from 2004 to 2012 
and write a report for the Australian Government Department of Health. Working 
closely with contacts in each of these departments, I examined the number of 
outbreaks and clusters that occurred during the surveillance period and acquired 
\legionellosis surveillance case definitions used by each jurisdiction to investigate if 
differences in legionellosis surveillance case definitions existed between jurisdictions. 
1.2. Lessons Learnt 
By undertaking this analysis, I learnt how to extract data from the NNDSS Discover 
database, perform complex analytical analyses using Stata™ and manipulate data in 
Microsoft Excel™ to provide appropriate tables and graphs. Additionally, this analysis 
has improved my knowledge of legionellosis epidemiology, biology, illness and 
diagnostic testing methods. I have learnt the value of national notification data and the 
limits that are often associated with its use and how difference in case definitions can 
influence national analyses.  
1.3. Public Health Implications 
This data analysis contributes to the discussion about legionellosis in Australia by 
identifying changes in the disease epidemiology over time.  The analysis identified there 
are inconsistencies in the application of the national surveillance case definition across 
Australia, which may have resulted in the potential over-representation of Legionella 
longbeachae notifications during the period of 2001 to 2012. This analysis shows 
legionellosis notification rates are at their highest since reporting began in 1991, with 
eh with the exception of the notifications rates in 2000.  The national notifications rates 
remained above 1.3 per 100,000popluaion, which is inconsistent with the patterns seen 
previously in Australia and internationally.  
The results of this project were presented at the Public Health Association Australia 
(PHAA) 43rd Annual conference, 15 to 17 September 2014. 
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A final outcome of this project was the review of legionellosis notifications in the 
Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania. Both jurisdictions identified a number of 
legionellosis notifications that have been misclassified or did not meet the national 
surveillance case definition. These review resulted in both jurisdiction’s reclassifying 
and deleting incorrect notifications from there notification database and the NNDSS, 
improving the quality of legionellosis data in the NNDSS. This particular outcome 
supports my findings that the use of the national surveillance case definition is 
inconsistently applied across jurisdictions, impacting the quality of legionellosis data in 
the NNDSS. 
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2. Abstract 
Legionella causes atypical pneumonia after susceptible people inhale the bacteria in 
soil or water. Two main species cause infection in Australia – Legionella pneumophila 
and Legionella longbeachae. In 2002, a review of notified legionellosis from the 
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) examined the 
epidemiology of the disease in Australia for the period 1991 to 2000. The review found 
that notification rates for legionellosis were rising in Australia, with older males most at 
risk of infection, particularly in the Summer and Autumn months. To determine if these 
epidemiological trends are still consistent in Australia, I reviewed the epidemiology of 
legionellosis in Australia from 2001 to 2012 and explored how variations in the 
applications of national surveillance case definitions affect the reporting of legionellosis 
Australia. 
Notifications of legionellosis were extracted from NNDSS for the period of 2001 to 
2012. Descriptive analysis was undertaken to examine the distribution of Legionella 
infection by age, sex, and jurisdiction, and describe the seasonality and rates over 
time. Negative binomial regression was used to examine Notification Rate Ratios 
(NRR) of Legionella pneumophila and Legionella longbeachae by jurisdiction, age, sex, 
season and year. L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae notifications were analysed by 
confirmation status (confirmed or probable casse) and laboratory diagnosis method 
and jurisdictional surveillance case definitions were collected to analyses the change in 
reporting of legionellosis case over the surveillance period. 
From 2001 to 2012 there were 3,862 notifications of legionellosis in Australia. 
Notification rates remained relatively stable for the period at 1.3 to 1.7 per 100,000 
population. The populations at highest risk of legionellosis were males over 50 years of 
age. Fifty percent of all legionellosis notifications were attributed to infection with 
L. longbeachae and 45% with L. pneumophila. The median age of L. pneumophila 
cases was 60 years (range 1 to 97 years), 69% were male and rates were highest in 
Autumn and in Victoria (NRR 1.64, 95%CI 1.44 -1.86).  The median age of L. 
longbeachae cases was 63 years (range 13 to 99 years), 60% were male and rates 
were highest in Spring (NRR 1.24, 95%CI 1.1-1.4) and in Western Australia (NRR 5.24, 
95%CI 5.0-6.5). 
From 2001 to 2012 legionellosis notification rates remained stable but were but were 
higher than the previous 10 years with the exception of 2000. This rise in notification 
rates, variations in causative species between jurisdictions and its propensity for  
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L. pneumophila to cause outbreaks, demonstrates why legionellosis remains and 
important disease in Australia. In order to better understand this disease and it impact 
on the Australian society, enhanced routine national reporting should be undertaken to 
identify common risk factors and sources of exposure (community, nosocomial and 
travel), improve information regarding laboratory confirmation methods and promote 
consistency in the application of the national legionellosis surveillance case definition. 
3-5 
 
3. Background 
Legionellosis is an atypical pneumonia caused by the bacteria Legionella, which was 
first identified in 1977 following an outbreak of severe respiratory disease at an 
American Legion convention in 1976.(1) Commonly found in water, Legionella are 
ubiquitous in manmade environments and natural habitats. Humans are infected with 
Legionella via contaminated aerosols, with common sources of infection including 
cooling towers, hot water systems, swimming pools and spas.(2)  
Legionellosis is characterised by a non-productive cough accompanied by symptoms 
such as malaise, myalgia, headache, fever, abdominal pain and diarrhoea.(3) Its 
incubation period ranges from 2 to 10 days,(3-5) and common risk factors associated 
with infection include being male, being older in age, smoking and having chronic 
conditions such as chronic lung disease, diabetes, immunosuppression and renal 
failure.(6-8) Epidemiological studies from Canada and Europe have estimated Legionella 
is responsible for approximately 2% to 9% of all community acquired sporadic 
pneumonia.(9, 10) Less than 5% of people exposed to this bacteria will develop 
legionellosis and the estimated case fatality rate rages between 3% and 15% of people 
who develop pneumonia.(3) There are 55 species and 70 distinct subgroups of 
Legionella recognised internationally.(2) However, only a few species are known to 
cause illness in humans. 
The majority of human cases of legionellosis are caused by infection with either 
L. pneumophila,(11) but other species such as L. longbeachae can also cause infection, 
particularly in Australia and New Zealand.(12) L. pneumophila is primarily aquatic and 
the organism is ubiquitous within warm water in manmade and natural environments.(8) 
It is transmitted to humans via aerosolised water droplets from poorly maintained man-
made water systems such as water cooling towers, spas and hot water systems.(1, 9, 10, 
13) In comparison, infection with L. longbeachae is linked to the inhalation of 
commercial potting soil and other decomposing materials such as bark and sawdust.(11, 
12, 14, 15)  
Legionellosis notifications have been collected in Australia since 1991, with all 
jurisdictions providing data to the Australian Department of Health (the Department of 
Health) through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). The 
national objectives of legionellosis surveillance in Australia are to monitor the 
epidemiology of the disease, including trends in incidence, and the detection of clusters 
and outbreaks.  
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A review of legionellosis surveillance in Australia from 1991 to 2000 found that the 
majority of notified cases were aged 50 years or over (73%), more likely to be male 
(ratio 2:1) and commonly notified in the Summer and Autumn months.(5) The review 
also identified an upward trend in legionellosis notification rates between 1997 and 
2000, attributed to two large L. pneumophila outbreaks that occurred in Australia.(5) 
To review the current epidemiology of legionellosis in Australia, I examined national 
notification data from 2001 to 2012, explored the variations in the application of 
national surveillance case definitions across jurisdictions and analysed how 
legionellosis notifications were confirmed through laboratory testing. 
4. Methods 
4.1. Collection of notifications in the NNDSS 
Legionellosis is a notifiable disease in all states and territories across Australia and 
under the provisions of jurisdictions public health legislation is required by law to be 
notified to the jurisdictional health departments. All laboratory-confirmed infections of 
legionella are notified by treating doctors, diagnostic laboratories or hospitals to the 
health department within their jurisdiction. Once these notifications have been 
processed and uploaded into the jurisdictions notifiable disease surveillance system, 
de-identified data is provided electronically to the NNDSS on a daily basis. 
4.2. Legionellosis surveillance case definition 
The current case definition used of the national surveillance for legionellosis includes 
confirmed and probable legionellosis cases as outlined below. 
A confirmed case requires both laboratory definitive evidence AND clinical evidence 
Laboratory definitive evidence Clinical evidence 
Isolation of Legionella 
OR 
Presence of Legionella urinary antigen 
OR 
Seroconversion or a significant increase in antibody level 
or a fourfold or greater rise in titre to Legionella. 
Fever; 
OR 
Cough; 
OR 
Pneumonia 
 
 
A probable case requires both laboratory suggestive evidence AND clinical evidence. 
Laboratory suggestive evidence Clinical evidence  
Single high antibody titre to Legionella; 
OR 
Detection of Legionella by nucleic acid testing; 
OR 
Detection of Legionella by direct fluorescence assay. 
Fever; 
OR 
Cough; 
OR 
Pneumonia 
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4.3. Statistical analyses 
I extracted legionellosis notifications with a diagnosis date between 1 January 2001 
and 31 December 2012 from NNDSS. Diagnosis date is a field derived by the NNDSS 
from date of onset or where the date of onset is not known, the earliest of the specimen 
collection date, notification date (date when a health professional signed the notification 
or the laboratory issued the result), or the notification received date (date the 
notification was received by jurisdictional health authority). These data were analysed 
using Stata™ version 13.1 (StataCorp., USA) and Microsoft Excel™.  
Annual notification rates were calculated using Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
mid-year populations for the years 2001 to 2012 as the denominator. The average 
notification rates for age, sex and jurisdiction were calculated using an average of ABS 
mid-year populations for the years 2001 to 2012 as the denominator. 
To estimate the impact outbreaks or clusters had on national notification rates, a rate of 
sporadic infections was calculated by identifying and removing outbreak and cluster-
associated cases from the outbreak reference field in NNDSS. As this field is 
intermittently completed, I reviewed jurisdictional annual reports and communicable 
disease bulletins from 2001 to 2013, the National Notifiable Diseases Annual Reports 
from 2001 to 2012 and consulted with jurisdictional health departments to confirm the 
number of clusters or outbreaks reported during the period.  
The Australian Statistical Geography Standards (ASGS) was used to examine the 
geographical distribution of legionellosis and of L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae. 
The ASGS consists of five remoteness areas; Major Cities, Inner Regional, Outer 
Regional, Remote and Very Remote. For the purposes of this report these areas have 
been grouped into Major Cities, Regional (inner and outer regional combined) and 
Remote (remote and very remote combined). ASGS was mapped using the ABS ASGS 
correspondence files and the cases’ residential postcode.  If a postcode was mapped 
to more than one ASGS area, then the postcode was allocated to the area with the 
highest percentage as per the ABS correspondences. If a residential postcode could 
not be mapped to an ASGS area (such as post office or business centre) the ASGS of 
the case was classified as unknown.  
Pearson’s Chi-square statistic was used to examine the relationships between the 
number of notifications and the risk factors of age, sex, season, jurisdiction and year. 
To examine the seasonal changes, the median number of notifications by season and 
species was calculated and of onset. Un-paired t- tests were used to compare the 
mean number of notifications in autumn with all other seasons for legionellosis and L. 
pneumophila, and spring with all other seasons for L. longbeachae. I used negative 
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binomial regression to examine the relationship between significant factors identified in 
the Chi squared tests (age, sex, jurisdiction, season and year) and notifications rates of 
L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae. 
Confirmation status is the categorisation of legionellosis notifications to either a 
confirmed or probable case according to the national surveillance case definition as. I 
examined changes in the proportions of confirmed and probable L. pneumophila and 
L. longbeachae notifications by analysing the confirmation status by year, species and 
jurisdiction.  
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5. Results 
Between 2001 and 2012, 3,862 notifications of legionellosis were reported to the 
NNDSS. Of these 75% (2,912/3,862) were confirmed cases. Place of acquisition was 
available for 55% (2,105/3,862) of all notifications. Ninety-six percent of these 
notifications acquired infection within Australia and 4% overseas. Of those acquired 
overseas, Indonesia (34%), Italy (9%) and China (9%) were the most common 
countries reported. Mortality data were available for 57% (2,206/3,862) of all 
notifications, of which 6% (125/2,206) died as a result of infection with legionellosis. 
The highest rate of deaths occurred in males aged 75 to 79 years at 1.3 per 100,000 
population.  
The annual national notification rates for legionellosis were relatively consistent over 
the surveillance period, ranging between 1.3 to 1.7 per 100,000 population (Figure 1). 
Rates declined slightly in 2008 to 1.3 per 100,000 population, and increased from 2009 
to 1.7 per 100,000 population in 2012. 
Figure 1: Annual notification rates per 100,000 population for legionellosis, by year, 
2001 to 2012, Australia  
 
The annual notification rates of legionellosis in major cities displayed small variations, 
ranging between 1.4 per 100,000 population to 1.9 per 100,000 population from 2001 
to 2012 (Appendix Figure 1). Notification rates in regional areas displayed a similar 
trend, with small variations ranging from 1 per 100,000 population to 1.6 per 100,000 
population. Due to the small number of notifications in cases residing in remote areas, 
there were greater variations in notification rates. Over the surveillance period 
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notification rates in remote areas ranged from 1.2 per 100,000 population in 2007 to 
3.9 per 100,000 population in 2005. 
The majority (94%) of legionellosis notifications from 2001 to 2012 were classified as 
sporadic (Figure 1). There were 40 outbreaks and clusters (230 cases) of legionellosis 
reported to the NNDSS during the surveillance period, of which one was 
multijurisdictional (Appendix Table 1). The multijurisdictional outbreak associated with 
travel to Kuta, Bali and consisted of 14 cases; 4 from Victoria and 10 from Western 
Australia. Whilst the majority of outbreaks and clusters reported during the surveillance 
period were attributed to L. pneumophila, one cluster from South Australia in 2002 was 
attributed to infection with L. longbeachae. The largest outbreak reported during the 
surveillance period occurred in Sydney, New South Wales in 2011. There were 29 
cases associated with this outbreak, but no common source of infection was identified. 
(NSW Department of Health, personal communication, 18 June 2014) 
The most common species notified during the surveillance period were L. pneumophila 
and L. longbeachae. L. longbeachae was the most common species notified in all but 4 
years, with 40% to 60% of all notifications attributed to this species, while 37% to 56% 
were attributed to for L pneumophila (Table 1). Subtyping information was available for 
58% (996/1736) of L. pneumophila notifications of which 94% (939/996) were subtyped 
to L. pneumophila serogroup 1. Subtyping information was available for 6% (124/1931) 
of L. longbeachae notifications, of which all but one were subtyped to L. longbeachae 
serogroup 1.  
Table 1: Notifications for Legionella infections, by species and year of notification, 
2001 to 2012, Australia  
Year 
L. pneumophila L. longbeachae All other species & unspecified 
N %  n %  n %  
2001 173 56.0 123 39.8 13 4.2 
2002 144 45.6 161 50.9 11 3.5 
2003 133 39.9 191 57.4 9 2.7 
2004 156 50.0 145 46.5 11 3.5 
2005 154 47.4 154 47.2 18 5.5 
2006 156 45.1 179 51.6 12 3.5 
2007 140 46.2 136 44.9 27 8.9 
2008 101 37.1 163 59.9 8 2.9 
2009 113 37.7 172 57.3 15 5.0 
2010 135 44.3 144 47.2 26 8.5 
2011 169 47.2 175 48.9 14 3.9 
2012 164 43.0 188 49.3 29 7.6 
Total 1,738  1,931  193  
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Of the other species notified during the surveillance period 75% were L. micdadei 
(24/32), 19% were L .bozemanii (6/32), 3% were L. cherri (1/32), and 3% were 
L. wadworthii (1/32). In 4% (161/3862) of notifications the species was unspecified.  
The annual national notification rates of L. longbeachae remained relatively stable over 
the surveillance period between 0.7 per 100,000 population and 0.9 per 100,000 
population. In comparison, the annual national notifications rates for L. pneumophila 
declined between 2001 and 2008, falling from 0.9 per 100,000 population in 2001 to 
0.5 per 100,000 population in 2008. Rates for this species increased between 2009 
and 2012, but remained lower than the notification rates of L. longbeachae. 
Figure 2: Annual notification rates for L. longbeachae and L. pneumophila, by year 
2001 to 2012, Australia 
 
Annual notification rates by jurisdiction ranged from 0 per 100,000 population in 
Tasmania (2002) and the Australian Capital Territory (2005) to 4.4 per 100,000 
population in Western Australia (2006). South Australia and Western Australia had the 
highest average notification rates (2001-2012) at 3.2 and 3.3 per 100,000 population 
respectively, with the majority of notifications attributed to infection with L. longbeachae 
(Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Notification rates for legionellosis, by jurisdiction and species, 2001 to 2012, 
Australia 
 
I analysed reported laboratory confirmation method to examine the difference in the 
notification rate of by Legionella species. Data for laboratory confirmation method were 
available for 77% (2,970/3,862) of all notifications. Of these cases, 50% were identified 
using serology (1,476/2,970), 26% were identified using antigen detection (762/2,970) 
and 19% were identified using combinations (more than one test reported) of tests 
(575/2,970). Other laboratory methods used included 3% for culture (85/2,970) and 3% 
for Nucleic Acid Amplification (NAAT) (69/2,970).  
By species, the most common laboratory method used to confirm infection with 
L. pneumophila was antigen detection (40%) followed by a mixture of tests (30%). For 
infections of L. longbeachae serology was the most common method, with 70% of 
notifications identified using this form of laboratory testing.  
Table 2: Counts and proportions for legionellosis notifications by laboratory 
confirmation method and species, Australia, 2001 to 2012  
 Laboratory 
confirmation 
method 
Species 
Total Pneumophila 
n (%) 
Longbeachae 
n (%) 
Other 
n (%) 
Unspecified 
n (%) 
Missing 
n (%) 
Antigen 571 131 8 52 0 762 
Serology 319 1,105 1 51 0 1476 
Culture 36 43 5 1 0 85 
Other 26 41 0 5 0 72 
Mixture of tests* 420 129 11 15 0 575 
Unknown/missing 366 482 7 35 2 892 
Total 1,738 1,931 32 159 2 3,862 
Note: *“Mixture of tests” comprises of all cases with more than one laboratory confirmation method reported to the  
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5.1. Legionella longbeachae 
There were 1,931 cases of L. longbeachae notified in Australia between 2001 and 
2012. Of these 1,241 (64%) were reported as confirmed cases of infection. Mortality 
data were available for 68% (1,318/1,931). The case fatality rate of L. longbeachae 
during the surveillance period was 3.8% (50/1,318), with the highest rates of death in 
males aged 84 years and over at 0.9 per 100,000 population. The male to female ratio 
was 1.7:1 and the highest age-specific rates were in males aged 75 to 79 years at  
5.6 per 100,000 population. 
Figure 4: Notification rates for L. longbeachae, by age and sex, Australia, 2001 to 
2012 
 
Spring was the most common season in which L. longbeachae was notified (Figure 5). 
By jurisdiction, South and Western Australia had the highest notification rates at  
2.6 per 100,000 population and 2.9 per 100,000 population respectively (Figure 3). 
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Figure 5: Quartiles, median, minimum and maximum of L. longbeachae notifications, 
by season, Australia, 2001 to 2012 
 
My multivariable model for L. longbeachae included 1,905 notifications and was 
adjusted for age, sex, year, jurisdiction and season. L. longbeachae was significantly 
higher in older age groups. Compared with the 0 to 49 years age group, notification 
was 5.8 times higher in the 50 to 59 years age group, 10.1 times higher in the 60 to 69 
years age group, 15.6 times higher in the 70-79 years age groups and 13.9 times 
higher in the 80 years and over age group. All of these results were statistically 
significant (p value <0.05) (Table 3). The NRR for males was 1.8 times higher 
compared with females (p value <0.05). 
Notifications of L. longbeachae were higher in Spring (NRR 1.24) when compared with 
Autumn and notification rates for were 5.7 times higher in Western Australia, 4 times 
higher in South Australia and 2.7 times higher in the Northern Territory when compared 
with New South Wales (p <0.05). Whilst the notification rates in all other jurisdictions 
were lower compared with New South Wales, this difference was only significantly for 
Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory. Notification rates of L. longbeachae were 
higher in every year except 2007 and 2010 when compared with 2001, but only 
reached statistical significance for the year 2003. 
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Table 3: Risk factors for L. longbeachae notification from multivariable model, 
Australia, 2001 to 2012  
  
Notifications 
(%) 
Notification 
Rate Ratio 
(NNR) 95% CI p value 
Sex         
Female 701 (36.8) ref     
Males 1,204 (63.2) 1.9 1.7-2.1 <0.001 
Year       
2001 123 (6.5) ref     
2002 161 (8.5) 1.26 1.0 - 1.6 0.07 
2003 191 (10.0) 1.47 1.2 - 1.9 0.00 
2004 145 (7.6) 1.09 0.8 - 1.4 0.52 
2005 153 (8.0) 1.12 0.9 - 1.4 0.37 
2006 179 (9.4) 1.27 1.0- 1.6 0.06 
2007 136 (7.1) 0.94 0.7 - 1.2 0.62 
2008 163 (8.6) 1.09 0.9 - 1.4 0.50 
2009 171 (8.9) 1.15 0.9 - 1.5 0.26 
2010 125 (6.6) 0.82 0.6 - 1.1 0.15 
2011 173 (9.1) 1.10 0.9 - 1.4 0.46 
2012 185 (9.7) 1.16 0.9 - 1.5 0.25 
Age group        
0-49 years 357 (18.7) ref     
50-59 years 381 (20.0) 5.77 4.9 - 6.7 <0.001 
60-69 years 471 (24.7) 10.31 8.8 - 12.0 <0.001 
70-79 years 462 (24.3) 15.69 13.5 - 18.2 <0.001 
80 years and over 234 (12.3) 14.07 11.8- 16.8 <0.001 
Season       
Autumn 447 (23.5) ref     
Winter 465 (24.4) 1.03 0.9 - 1. 2 0.72 
Spring 565 (29.6) 1.24 1. 1 - 1.4 0.001 
Summer 428 (22.4) 0.95 0.8 - 1.1 0.41 
State       
NSW 418 (21.9) ref     
VIC 159 (8.4) 0.51 0.4 - 0.6 <0.001 
QLD 199 (10.5) 0.84 0.7 - 1.0 0.06 
SA 408 (21.4) 4.00 3.5 - 4.6 <0.001 
WA 671 (35.2) 5.56 4.9 - 6.3 <0.001 
TAS 19 (1.0) 0.59 0.4 - 0.9 <0.001 
NT 24 (1.3) 2.77 1.8 - 4.2 <0.001 
ACT 7 (0.4) 0.40 0.2 - 0.9 0.03 
Note: 
One case was dropped from the model as sex was unknown. 
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5.2. Legionella pneumophila 
There were 1,738 notifications of L. pneumophila from 2001 to 2012, of which 88% 
(1,531/1,788) were reported as confirmed cases of infection. Mortality data were 
available for 44% (789/1738) of notifications and the case fatality rate of was 3.8% 
(66/789). Males aged 84 years and over had the highest rates of death at 1.2 per 
100,000 population. Rates of infection were higher in males compared with females, 
with a ratio 2.2:1. The highest age-specific notification rate was reported in males aged 
80 to 84 years (4.4 per 100, 000 population).  
Figure 6: Notification rates of L. pneumophila, by age and sex, Australia, 2001 to 2012 
 
L. pneumophila was more likely to be diagnosed in the months of Autumn with the 
majority notified cases reported in April (13%, 228/1,738) and May (10.5%, 182/1,738) 
(Figure 7). By jurisdiction, the highest L. pneumophila notification rates were in Victoria 
and South Australia at 1.3 per 100,000 population and 0.8 per 100,000 population 
respectively (Figure 3).  
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Figure 7: Quartiles, median, minimum and maximum for L. pneumophila notifications, 
by season, Australia, 2001 to 2012 
 
My multivariable analysis included 1,686 L. pneumophila notifications and adjusted for 
age, sex, season, jurisdiction and year. The analysis showed that the notification rates 
were significantly higher in older age groups (Table 4). Compared with those in the 0 to 
49 years age group, notification was 5.0 times higher in the 50 to 59 years age group, 
7.1 times higher in the 60-69 years age group, 9.6 times higher in the 70 to 79 years 
age group and 9.9 times higher in the 80 years and over age group. When comparing 
notifications rates by sex, infection was significantly higher in males (NNR 1.8) 
compared with females.  
Comparing notification rates by jurisdiction, I found that rates for L. pneumophila were 
1.64 times higher in Victoria compared with New South Wales (p value <0.05). Rates in 
Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory were also found to be significant, 
but were lower when compared with New South Wales (Table 4). Differences by 
season were also identified. Notifications of L. pneumophila was significantly lower in 
winter (p value <0.001), Spring and Summer when compared with Autumn. When I 
compared rates of notifications by year, I found that 2001 had the highest rates during 
surveillance period compared with every other year, reaching statistical significance for 
the years 2003, and 2007 to 2012.  
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Table 4: Risk factors for L. pneumophila notification from multivariable model, 
Australia, 2001 to 2012  
  
Notifications 
(%) 
Notification 
Rate Ratio 
(NNR) 95% CI p value 
Sex     
Female 524 (31.8) ref     
Males 1,162 (68.9) 2.4 2.2 - 2.7 <0.001 
Year          
2001 173 (10.3) ref     
2002 143 (8.5) 0.82 0.6-1.1 0.11 
2003 133 (7.9) 0.76 0.6-0.9 0.03 
2004 156 (9.2) 0.86 0.7-1.1 0.21 
2005 153 (9.1) 0.84 0.7-1.1 0.17 
2006 156 (9.2) 0.84 0.7-1.1 0.16 
2007 139 (8.2) 0.73 0.6-0.9 0.01 
2008 99 (5.9) 0.50 0.4-0.7 <0.001 
2009 113 (6.7) 0.58 0.4-0.8 <0.001 
2010 113 (6.7) 0.55 0.4-0.7 <0.001 
2011 152 (9.0) 0.72 0.6-0.9 0.01 
2012 156(9.2) 0.74 0.6-0.9 0.02 
Age group          
0-49 years 413 (24.5) ref     
50-59 years 380 (22.5) 5.0 4.3-5.9 <0.001 
60-69 years 372(22.1) 7.10 6.1-8.3 <0.001 
70-79 years 329 (19.5) 9.55 8.1-11.2 <0.001 
80 years and over 192 (11.4) 9.99 8.3-12.0 <0.001 
Season          
Autumn 577 (34.2) ref     
Winter 339 (20.1) 0.60 0.5-0.7 <0.001 
Spring 344 (19.5) 0.60 0.5-0.7 <0.001 
Summer 440 (26.1) 0.77 0.7-0.9 <0.001 
State         
NSW 552 (32.7) ref     
VIC 662 (39.3) 1.62 1.4-1.8 <0.001 
QLD 254 (15.1) 0.81 0.7-0.9 0.013 
SA 118 (7.0) 0.89 0.7-1.1 0.303 
WA 69 (4.1) 0.43 0.3-0.6 <0.001 
TAS 18 (1.1) 0.44 0.3-0.7 0.001 
NT 8 (0.5) 0.65 0.3-1.3 0.226 
ACT 5 (0.3) 0.21 0.1-0.5 <0.001 
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6. Analysis of confirmed and probable legionellosis 
notifications 
Confirmation status was analysed to measure if changes had occurred in the reporting 
of confirmed and probable notifications for L. longbeachae and L. pneumophila during 
the period of 2001 to 2012. Prior to 2004, the national surveillance case definition for 
legionellosis did not differentiate between a confirmed and probable case. In 2004, the 
Communicable Disease Network Australia Case Definition Working Group amended 
the surveillance case definition for legionellosis to include criteria for a confirmed or 
probable case of legionellosis. For this reason I have analysed the confirmation status 
of L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae from 2004 to 2012. 
Over the period of 2004 to 2012, confirmed L. pneumophila notifications increased 
slowly, rising from 79% of all L. pneumophila notifications in 2004 to 90% in 2012 
(Figure 8). In comparison, probable L. pneumophila notifications displayed the inverse 
trend, falling from 62% of all L. pneumophila notifications in 2004 to 39% in 2012. The 
notifications of confirmed and probable L. longbeachae displayed opposing trends to  
L. pneumophila over the surveillance period. From 2009 probable L. longbeachae 
notifications displayed a rising trend, increasing from 34% of all L. longbeachae 
notifications in 2009 to 61% in 2012, while confirmed L longbeachae notifications 
displayed the opposite, falling from 66% of all L. longbeachae notifications in 2009 to 
39% in 2012. 
To assess if national trends were reflected in the jurisdictions, I analysed the frequency 
of confirmed and probable L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae notifications in each 
jurisdiction. The majority of notifications for L. pneumophila reported by New South 
Wales, Queensland and Victoria were confirmed. Whilst probable notifications were 
reported in these jurisdictions, they were considerably lower in comparison (Figure 9). 
The frequency of confirmed and probable L. pneumophila notifications in the five 
remaining jurisdictions shifted more frequently. For L. longbeachae the majority of 
notifications reported in South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia were 
probable (Figure 10). Similar to the trends seen for L. pneumophila, the majority 
notifications for L. longbeachae reported by Queensland and Victoria were confirmed
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Figure 8: Proportions of confirmed and probable notifications for L. longbeachae and 
L. pneumophila, by year, Australia, 2001 to 2012 
 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of confirmed and probable notifications for L. pneumophila, by 
jurisdiction and year, Australia, 2004 to 2012 
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Figure 10: Comparison of confirmed and probable notifications for L. longbeachae by 
jurisdiction and year, Australia, 2004 to 2012 
 
Use of the national surveillance case definition for legionellosis 
Although the national surveillance case definition for legionellosis is used by all 
jurisdictions, a number have defined the titre cut-offs for single high antibody results as 
they are currently not defined by the national surveillance case definition (Table 5).  
Five jurisdictions have defined these cut offs. The Northern Territory, Tasmania and 
Victoria apply a titre cut off ≥ 1:512 probable L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae 
notifications. South Australia applies a titre cut off of ≥ 1:256 for probable L.  
pneumophila notifications and ≥ 1:256 for probable L. longbeachae notifications. 
Western Australia only applies a titre cut off of ≥ 1:512 to probable L. longbeachae 
notifications. The remaining three jurisdictions, the Australian Capital Territory, New 
South Wales and Queensland do not specify titre cut offs for probable notifications for 
either L. pneumophila or L. longbeachae. 
My consultations with the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania lead to the review 
of legionellosis notifications in their jurisdictions from 2010 to 2012 and 2001 to 2012 
respectively. From this review, both jurisdictions identified a number of L. pneumophila 
and L. longbeachae notifications that had either been misclassified or did not meet the 
national surveillance case definition. As a result of this review, these notifications were 
updated and either reclassified or deleted from the jurisdictional notification system and 
the NNDSS.  
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Table 5: Use of the national legionellosis surveillance case definition and details of 
additional specifications for confirmed or probable cases of legionellosis, by jurisdiction 
(as of 18 June 2014) 
Jurisdiction 
Uses National Case 
definition  Has 
additional 
specifications 
Detail of specification 
Confirmed 
Case 
Probable 
Case 
ACT        No jurisdictional specifications. Rely on Laboratories to determine if case should be reported. 
NT        Single high antibody titre ≥ 1:512 for both L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae 
NSW       
No jurisdictional specifications at public health unit 
level. Laboratories in NSW (does not include test 
conducted in laboratories in other jurisdictions) 
thought to use titre ≥ 1:128 for both L. pneumophila 
and L. longbeachae. 
QLD        No jurisdictional specifications. Rely on Laboratories to determine if case should be reported. 
SA       
Single high antibody titre for: 
L. pneumophila ≥ 1:256 
L. longbeachae ≥ 1:1024 
TAS        Single high antibody titre of ≥ 1:512 for both L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae 
VIC        Antibody titre of ≥ 1:512 for both L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae 
WA       
Antibody titre ≥ 1:512 for L. longbeachae, unless there 
is good clinical or radiographic evidence of 
pneumonia. 
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7. Discussion 
This analysis of legionellosis notification data shows that there have been two changes 
in the epidemiology of legionellosis in Australia from 2001 to 2012 – high, but stable 
notifications rates and a shift in the principal species notified. From 2001 to 2012 
notifications rates of legionellosis in Australia have remained constant at around 1.6 
per 100,000 population, much higher than the rates seen in the previous 10 years. This 
is inconsistent with earlier epidemiological studies in Australia, (5) the United States,  
(16, 17) Italy (2) and France (18-20) in which rates have displayed a rising trend over time.  
There are two factors that may have contributed to the high stable rates since 2001. 
The first is the introduction and use of Urinary Antigen Test (UAT) for 
L. pneumophila. Since the mid 1990’s, UATs have become the most widely used test 
for initial laboratory notifications of L. pneumophila. The rise in legionellosis 
notifications from 1991 to 2000 was partly attributed to increases in the use of UAT,(10, 
21) which became favoured as a test for L. pneumophila during this period as it is easier 
to perform and results were received on average 5 days earlier compared to other 
Legionella testing methods.(22)  Over this surveillance period, 2001 to 2012, 40% of all 
L. pneumophila cases were detected using UAT, suggesting the use of this testing 
method is now standard for L. pneumophila and has contributed to steadier levels of 
reporting. 
The second is the rise in public and clinical awareness and understanding of 
legionellosis from increasing media attention and the recent growth in epidemiological 
knowledge about the disease. The 2000 legionellosis outbreak at Melbourne aquarium 
in Victoria,.(23) Australia’s largest recorded outbreak, received significant publicity, (24-26) 
bringing legionellosis in the conscious mind of the general public and clinicians. This 
growing awareness of legionellosis has likely resulted in more frequent testing being 
undertaken by clinicians, which in turn has potentially resulted in more cases being 
identified and regularly reported.  
From 1996 to 2000, L. pneumophila was the most common species to be to be notified 
in Australia accounting for 51% of all notifications.(5) However, I found that between 
2001 and 2012 the proportion of legionellosis notifications attributed to L. pneumophila 
declined to 45%, while notifications of L. longbeachae increased from 42% in 1996-
2000 (5) to 50% in 2001 to 2012. This rise in L. longbeachae notifications can be 
attributed to the rise in the notification of probable cases.  
The national surveillance case definition for legionellosis includes single serum 
serology for the notification of probable legionellosis cases. My analysis identified 70% 
of probable L. longbeachae were confirmed using single serum samples. Whilst 
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serology based testing for Legionella is considered confirmatory when both acute and 
convalescent-phase serum samples are tested in parallel, results from single serum 
samples need to be interpreted with caution.(24) Considering the potential for cross-
reactions with other legionellae and other organisms, are common in serology based 
testing, (24, 25) the observed rise in L. longbeachae probable notifications may be a 
result of false positives occurring due to the use of single serum serology.  
The observed rise in L. longbeachae notifications may also be a result of the changing 
laboratory criteria used to report probable cases. Changes in the surveillance case 
definition in 2004 seemed to have a greater effect on the reporting of L. longbeachae 
than L. pneumophila. It is possible that the use of a single high titre as a confirmation 
method for probable cases has increased the likelihood of L. longbeachae notifications 
being reported. Additionally, differences in the surveillance case definition applied by 
jurisdictions may have also affected this reporting, as there is currently no consistency 
in the cut offs for single high titre results. Although the Public Health Laboratory 
Network of Australia has recommended that a single high titre of 1:512 both 
L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae as a sensitive indicator of infection, they 
acknowledge that the actual cut-off titre may vary by laboratory, based on local 
evaluation of the tests. (25)  
Despite these changes, the age, sex and seasonal distribution of legionellosis did not 
change over time. For the period 2001 to 2012, the male to female was 2:1 and less 
than 3% of all notifications were reported in people under the age of 30 years. These 
findings are consistent with the recognised epidemiology of the disease, (2, 18-20) and are 
similar to the age and sex distribution identified in the 1991 to 2000 review.(5) Males 
and the elderly are considered to be greater risk of Legionella infection for a number of 
reasons. It is commonly thought males are more prone to infection with Legionella, as 
they are more likely to be heavy smokers, and as a result may have poorer respiratory 
and overall general health. (27) People of older age are thought to be at greater risk, as 
advancing age sees the deterioration of general health, increasing the prevalence of 
co-morbid conditions and use of immunosuppressive treatments, which make these 
populations more vulnerable to infection when exposed to Legionellae in the 
environment. 
Seasonally, the majority of legionellosis notifications were reported in the months of 
Autumn, When I analysed season by species, I found that L.  pneumophila infections 
were significantly more likely to be diagnosed in the Autumn months and L. 
longbeachae infections were more common in the months of Spring. This difference in 
seasonality is attributed to the likely source of infection. L. longbeachae infection is 
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commonly associated with the use of potting mixture while for L. pneumophila sources 
of infection are commonly associated with air conditioning cooling towers, spa baths 
and hot water tanks.(12,14) As the transmission of this L. longbeachae is closely 
associated with gardening activities it is not surprising notifications of  this species  are 
more common in Spring when this activity is more predominant. (14, 15, 31-33) 
Previous epidemiological studies have identified the rise in the prevalence of sporadic 
and outbreak related cases of L. pneumophila coincide with late Summer and Autumn. 
(34,35) Colonisation of Legionella within cooling towers occurs in seasonal patterns. Two 
Australian studies examined Legionella colonisation in cooling towers. The first 
reviewed cooling tower water samples from New South Wales, Queensland and the 
Northern Territory and identified seasonal trends in L. pneumophila colonisation with 
peaks occurring in the Summer and Autumn. (36) The second study involved testing 30 
cooling towers around Adelaide, and investigators found 80% of these towers were 
colonised with Legionella in the Summer months. (37) 
There were 40 outbreaks and clusters that occurred during the surveillance period 
resulting in 230 notified cases of legionellosis. Although the vast majority of 
notifications were sporadic, the large number of outbreaks and clusters highlights the 
outbreak potential of this disease remains relatively high in Australia, particularly for 
infections with L. pneumophila.  
There are number of limitation with this analysis. Whilst legionellosis is a notifiable 
disease in all jurisdictions, information provided to the NNDSS only represents a 
proportion (the ‘notified fraction’) of the total cases occurring in the community. Both 
probable and confirmed legionellosis notifications require laboratory evidence. Testing 
is at the discretion of the attending medical practitioner and they may preferentially test 
people they consider to be at more risk of infection. These assumptions may bias 
notification data towards sub-populations who are perceived to be at greater risk of 
infection, such as the elderly, and under-represent other populations groups such as 
children or young adults. Whilst I was aware of this bias associated with the NNDSS 
data, I was unable to quantify the degree of under-representation. 
The analysis of legionellosis notifications by ASGS was mapped using residential 
postcode and not by postcode of exposure. As an environmentally acquired bacteria 
cases may be exposed to legionella outside of the locality in which they reside. 
Analysing notifications by postcode of residence may attribute risk of infection to areas 
in which the bacteria is not present. 
3-26 
 
The study was unable to account for all notifications associated with outbreaks and 
clusters. Whilst we endeavoured to confirm all cases associated with an outbreak or 
clusters, some cases may have been missed due to changes to notification systems, 
fluctuations in staff and limited resources. However, by cross checking outbreak or 
cluster cases identified with the NNDSS outbreak reference field with jurisdictional 
health departments and public health publications, I believe this limitation has been 
minimised. 
Although data from the NNDSS can be used to monitor of incidence of legionellosis 
and provide long-term epidemiological analyses, data on risk factors are not routinely 
collected and could not be analysed. Studies conducted in Europe, (9) United Kingdom, 
(38, 39) and the United States, (40) indicate the ecology of legionellosis varies by type of 
infection (communities, nosocomial, outbreak and travel related). Australia’s inability to 
differentiate between sources of infection limits the practicality of understanding how 
this disease is acquired in Australia. Additionally the lack of risk factor information such 
as smoking status, presence of co-morbid conditions and immunosuppression, further 
restricts epidemiological analyses.  
European studies have found that travel-associated legionellosis represents a 
significant cause of travel-associated respiratory tract infections, and impacts 
disproportionately on otherwise healthy individuals as a consequence of their travel 
abroad or within their own country. (41) Although place of acquisition was reported in 
55% all notifications in the NNDSS, improving its completion provides opportunities to 
assess the impact of travel-associated legionellosis in Australia and develop, design 
and implement of prevention strategies to reduce its burden. 
A final limitation with this study was in inability to examine the affect testing practices 
have had on notifications. Although 77% of all notifications were reported as confirmed 
cases the information provided was counterintuitive, with a number of  
L. longbeachae notifications confirmed only using antigen detection methods. There is 
currently no urinary antigen detection for L. longbeachae, and whilst Direct Fluorescent 
Antigen (DFA) can be used it is generally only used in outbreak situations. (20) 
Consultations with jurisdictions suggested they were likely to be a result of errors made 
at the data entry stage or the wrong fields being transferred to the NNDSS.  
8. Conclusion 
From 2001 to 2013 notification rates remained stable but were the highest recorded, 
expect for 2000, since reporting began in 1991. This rise in notification rate in the past 
10 years, variations between jurisdictions in causative species and its propensity for L 
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pneumophila to cause outbreaks highlight legionellosis remains an important disease in 
Australia. To enhance national reporting and provide a more accurate picture of 
legionellosis in Australia, NNDSS surveillance should include the routine collection of 
risk factors and sources of exposure (community, nosocomial and travel), as well as 
improving information regarding laboratory confirmation methods and promoting 
consistency in the application of the national surveillance case definition. 
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9. Recommendations 
Based on my analysis of NNDSS legionellosis notifications from 2001 to 2012, I 
recommend the following: 
1. Review of the national surveillance case definition for legionellosis: I 
recommend the case definition for legionellosis be reviewed by the Case 
Definitions Working Group (CDWG) of CDNA to consider either the removal of 
single high titre laboratory results for probable legionellosis cases or the 
inclusion of titre cut-offs that are agreed and applied by all jurisdictions. 
2. The Australia Government Department of Health should work with jurisdictions 
to improve the information reported in the outbreak reference field. 
3. The Australia Government Department of Health should consider collecting 
enhanced data on travel related cases and risk factors such a smoking history, 
presence of chronic conditions such a lung disease, diabetes and 
immunosuppression for legionellosis. This should be done in consultation with 
jurisdictions as it could add a significant burden to the jurisdiction’s in collecting 
the information.  
4. The jurisdictions and the Australian Government Department of Health to 
consider collecting routine data on source of infection to differentiate between 
community, nosocomial and travel acquired cases in NNDSS.  
5. Jurisdictions to investigate the potential to collect molecular strain 
characterization of Legionella to help identify multi-jurisdictional cases of 
infection. 
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12. Appendix 
Appendix12.1 – Additional Figures and tables 
 
Appendix Figure 1: Crude rates of Legionellosis per 100,000 population, by ASGS 
and year, Australia, 2001-2012 
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Appendix 12.2 – Known outbreaks and clusters of Legionellosis, by 
jurisdiction and year, Australia, 2001-2012 
 
No. Year Month Season Case no. Place 
Area of 
acquisition Likely source Species Ref. 
1 2002 Apr Autumn 8 Melbourne CBD, Vic Visitors Centre 
Water cooling 
towers 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(42) 
2 2002 May Autumn 8 
Inner West 
Melbourne, 
Vic 
Shopping 
district 
Water cooling 
towers 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(43) 
3 2002 Aug-Sep 
Winter/ 
Spring 3 Brunswick, Vic  
Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(43) 
4 2002 Sep-Oct Spring 2 
South East 
Qld 
Recreational 
Club Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila 
(44) 
5 2002 Oct Spring 3 Clayton, Vic 
 
Water cooling 
towers 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(45) 
6 2003 Mar Autumn 2 Dandenong, Vic  
Water cooling 
towers 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(46) 
7 2003 Dec Summer 5 SA 
 
Potting mix L. longbeachae 
(47) 
8 2004 Feb-Mar 
Spring/ 
Autumn 3 
Melbourne, 
Vic 
South-eastern 
suburb Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(48) 
9 2004 Mar Autumn 7 Sydney, NSW CBD Unknown L. pneumophila 
(49) 
10 2004 Mar-Apr Autumn 2 
Melbourne, 
Victoria  
Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(50) 
11 2004 Apr Autumn 2 
Metropolitan 
Melbourne, 
Vic  
Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(49) 
12 2004 Apr Autumn 12 Sydney, NSW South -eastern Unknown L. pneumophila 
(48) 
Comms 
NSW 
Health, 18 
June 2014 
13 2004 June Autumn/Winter 5 Cobham, Vic Town 
Water cooling 
towers 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(48) 
14 2005 Jan Summer 2 Vic 
 
Spot welding 
cooling system 
reservoir 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(51) 
15 2005 Feb Summer 13 Wollongong, NSW CBD Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila 
(52) 
16 2005 Oct Spring 5 Melbourne, Vic 
South-eastern 
suburbs Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(53)  
Comms 
NSW 
Health, 18 
June 2014 
17 2006 Jan Summer 4 Blacktown, NSW 
Shopping 
district Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(54) 
18 2006 Jan Summer 2 Vic Hospital Unknown L. 
(54) 
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No. Year Month Season Case no. Place 
Area of 
acquisition Likely source Species Ref. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
19 2006 Jan Summer 2 Vic Suburban Street Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(55) 
20 2006 Feb Summer 3 Vic Tertiary institute Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(56) 
21 2006 Feb-Mar 
Spring/ 
Autumn 11 
Preston, 
Melbourne, 
Vic 
Shopping 
centre Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(56) 
22 2006 Mar Autumn 6 
Northern 
Sydney/ 
central coast, 
NSW 
Chatswood 
area 
 
 
Unknown 
 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(57) 
23 2006 June Winter 2 Northbridge, NSW 
shopping 
centre Unknown 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
Comms 
NSW 
Health, 18 
June 2014 
24 2006 Nov Spring 3 Central, Qld Mine Cooling Tower L. pneumophila 
(45) 
25 2007 Jan Summer 6 Sydney, NSW Circular Quay Cooling Tower L. pneumophila 
(58) 
26 2007 May-June 
Autumn/
Winter 6 
Melbourne, 
Vic 
Inner-western 
metropolitan 
area 
Cooling Tower 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(59) 
27 2007 Dec Summer 2 Melbourne. Vic Industrial area 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(60) 
28 2008 Apr-May Autumn 7 
Melbourne, 
Vic 
Suburban Car 
wash 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(61) 
29 2009 Oct-Nov Spring 5 SA  
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(62) 
30 2010 May Autumn 4 Melbourne, Victoria, Vic South-east Cooling Tower 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(63) 
31 2010 Aug-Dec - 4 Vic 
Kuta Bali, 
Indonesia 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
Coms- Vic 
Health & 
(64) 
32 2010 -11 
Aug 
10- 
Jan11 
- 10 Western Australia 
Kuta, Bali, 
Indonesia 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(64) 
33 2011 Mar-May Autumn 29 Sydney, NSW  
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila 
Comms 
NSW 
Health, 18 
June 2014 
34 2011 July Winter 1 SA 
 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(65) 
35 2012 Feb-April 
Summer
/Autumn 14 
Western 
Sydney/ 
Nepean, NSW 
 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(66) 
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No. Year Month Season Case no. Place 
Area of 
acquisition Likely source Species Ref. 
36 2012 Nov-Dec 
Spring/ 
Summer 4 
Northern 
Beaches, 
NSW 
St Leonards, 
Warringah 
Mall 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
Comms 
NSW 
Health, 18 
June 2014 
37 2012 Dec Summer 5 
Melbourne, 
Northern & 
Western metro 
region, VIC  
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
(67) 
38 2012 Nov Summer 2 
Melbourne, 
Northern & 
Western metro 
region, VIC  
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila 
(67) 
39 2012 Dec Summer 2 SA 
 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila, 
sero-group 1 
Comms, 
SA Health, 
9 January 
2014 
40 2012 
Dec 
2011 -
Jan 
2012 
Summer 2 South East QLD 
Retirement 
village 
Unknown 
 
L. 
pneumophila 
(67) 
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Appendix 12.3 - Presentation slides for PHAA 43rd Annual 
Conference, Perth 15-17th September 2014  
Who is at risk of Legionella infection 
in Australia?
Ms. Anna Glynn-Robinson*, Dr. Martyn Kirk, Ms. Rhonda 
Owen and Dr. Timothy Dobbins
*Masters of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology Scholar 
Australian National University 
 
• What is legionellosis and Legionella
• Aim and methods 
• Results 
• Discussion
• Question
Overview
 
What is legionellosis?
• Environmentally acquired pneumonia 
• Caused by bacteria Legionella spp.
• Infection - inhalation of contaminated aerosols
• Symptoms: non-productive cough, headache, fever 
& abdominal pain
• Common risk factors
– Elderly 
– Male
– Chronic conditions
– Smoking Legionella sp. colonies growing on an agar plate and illuminated using ultraviolet 
light; By CDC/James Gathany ; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legionella#mediaviewer/File:Legionella_Plate_01.pngLicenced 
by  PD-USGOV-HHS-CDC.
 
Legionella
• Ubiquitous in manmade and natural environments
• Common in water and potting mixture
• 55 known species and 70 known serogroups
• Common species in Australia
– L. pneumophila - air conditioning cooling towers
– L. longbeachae - commercial potting mixture
 
Aim
Describe  the epidemiology of notified legionella 
infection 2001- 2012
 
Methods
• Data from NNDSS
• Stata 13.1 & ExcelTM
• Descriptive analysis
• Negative binomial regression
• Case definition
• Confirmed – definitive laboratory and clinical 
• Probable – suggestive laboratory and clinical
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Legionellosis 2001-2012
• 3,362 notifications 
• Majority male (65%)
• Highest age-specific rates 75-79 years
• 4% resulted in death 
• 40 clusters/outbreaks identified
– majority L. pneumophila
IXS_9390; By Leon Brocard on on Flicker 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/acme/4236379085/in/photolist-
6LybXt-6Lyceg-fDFM2N-7smxUH-fGpY8p-8yyPti-f7Vc7N-
f7FRuX-5GuofH-8da7Ca-nGFZTx-nxKyAV-ngnyJ5
 
 
L. longbeachae 
• 1,932 notifications
• Rates 1.9 higher in males 
• Notifications highest in Spring 
• Compared to NSW: 
5.5 times higher in WA 
4.0 times higher in SA 
2.8 times higher in NT 
Hands sifting through potting soil in a garden bed. By M Tullottes; 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HandsInSoil.jpg; Licenced: Open Content
  
L. pneumophila 
• 1,731 notifications
• Males 2.4 times higher than females
• Notifications highest in Autumn 
• Compared to NSW
1.6 times higher in VIC
Cenk Endustri Field Erected Cooling Tower by Cenk Endustri - Own work. Licensed: Creative 
Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cenk_Endustri_Field_Erected_Cooling_Tower.JPG#m
ediaviewer/File:Cenk_Endustri_Field_Erected_Cooling_Tower.JPG
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Discussion
• Older males highest at risk 
• Notifications 
– L. longbeachae in Spring
– L. pneumophila in Autumn
• Geographical differences
– L. pneumophila predominate in east 
– L. longbeachae predominate in west
 
• L. longbeachae most common
• Different tests and criteria between species 
• Notifications rates stable
Discussion
Legionella sp. colonies growing on an agar plate 
and illuminated using ultraviolet light; By 
CDC/James Gathany; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legionella#mediaviewer/File:
Legionella_Plate_01.pngLicenced by  PD-USGOV-HHS-
CDC.
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Questions
Question Mark Sign; By Colin Kinner on Flicker
https://www.flickr.com/photos/colinkinner/2200500024/in/photolist-4ms8ZA-5DeuzB-4cqfT-7ssZNn-8JkcMH-8p2AtP-bwjggh-9rnT91-5huQJc-93aPCq-5CCQse-FEdBM-6nCmik-
gXid4m-7CR24t-azGM3y-7Er6af-bP1BNF-ediLaQ-9o5yon-5UnDmk-6Vmcpf-7kZ57d-bEVLmG-ca9sc5-cDeCGs-sQzvg-7ZiTgV-bgGa4c-9v3xhu-5YpgQU-drshVo-do8JVU-do8Bez-
6GykqW-ngJbMi-7Co7Fm-bEVLmS-bTQwf4-do8JT3-5Ttgxf-4Thsd9-hcEYDX-2RF5eT-dPu18T-56eXRT-6JgzGj-cxUcBu-59WvCM-7LXgpi
 
Surveillance case definition
Confirmed Case Probable Case
Laboratory evidence Clinical 
evidence
Isolation of Legionella
OR
Presence of Legionella 
urinary antigen
OR
Seroconversion or a 
significant increase in 
antibody level or a 
fourfold or greater rise 
in titre to Legionella.
Fever;
OR
Cough;
OR
Pneumonia
Laboratory evidence Clinical 
evidence 
Single high antibody 
titre to Legionella;
OR
Detection 
of Legionella by nucleic 
acid testing;
OR
Detection 
of Legionella by direct 
fluorescence assay.
Fever;
OR
Cough;
OR
Pneumonia
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Multivariable analysis
L. longbeachae L. pneumophila 
Variable NRR 95% CI Compared to Variable NRR 95% CI 
Males 1.9 1.7 - 2.1 Females Males 2.4 2.2 - 2.7 
50-59 years 5.8 4.9 - 6.7 
0-49 years
50-59 years 5.2 4.4 - 6.0 
60-69 years 10.3 8.8 - 11.9 60-69 years 7.1 6.1 - 8.3 
70-79 years 9.5 8.1 - 11.1 70-79 years 15.7 13.5 - 18.2 
80 years and over 14.1 11.8 - 16.8 80 years and over 9.9 8.2 - 11.9 
Winter 1.03 0.9 -1.2
Autumn
Winter 0.6 0.5 - 0.7
Spring 0.6 0.5  -0.7 Spring 1.2 1.1 - 1.4 
Summer 0.7 0.7 - 0.9 Summer 0.95 0.8 – 1.1
WA 5.5 4.9 - 6.3 
NSW
VIC 1.6 1.4 - 1.9 
SA 4 3.5 - 4.6 SA 0.9 0.7 - 1.1
NT 2.8 1.8 - 4.2 QLD 0.8 0.7 - 0.9
QLD 0.8 0.7 - 1.0 NT 0.7 0.3 – 1.3
TAS 0.6 0.4 - 0.9 WA 0.4 0.3 - 0.6
VIC 0.5 0.4 - 0.6 TAS 0.4 0.3 - 0.7 
ACT 0.4 0.2 - 0.8 ACT 0.2 0.1 - 0.5 
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Appendix 12.4 - Legionellosis, Other bacterial infections: Annual 
report of the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, 2012 
– (In Press) 
Legionellosis 
 A total of 382 cases of legionellosis were notified in 2012. 
 Since 1991, the number of legionellosis notifications has continued to rise. 
 Legionella longbeachae, traditionally associated with potting mix, was more 
frequently reported as the causative species in 2012. 
 In 2012 there were five clusters and an outbreak of legionellosis reported to the 
NNDSS. 
Legionellosis, caused by the bacterium Legionella, can take the form of either 
Legionnaires’ disease, a severe form of infection of the lungs or Pontiac fever, a milder 
influenza-like illness.  The species that are most commonly associated with human 
disease in Australia are Legionella pneumophila and Legionella longbeachae. 
Legionella bacteria are found naturally in low levels in the environment.  In the absence 
of effective environmental treatment Legionella organisms can breed to high numbers 
in air conditioning cooling towers, hot water systems, showerheads, spa pools, 
fountains or potting mix. 
Epidemiological situation in 2012 
A total of 382 cases of legionellosis were notified in 2012, representing a rate of 1.7 
cases per 100,000.  Compared with the previous reporting period the overall number of 
legionellosis cases increased in 2012 by 7%.  This number of annual notifications was 
the highest since 2007 (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Notified cases of legionellosis, Australia, 2007-2012, by species 
 
Data on the causative species were available for 93% (n=355) of cases reported in 
2012.  Of the cases with a reported species, proportionally there were slightly more 
cases of L. longbeachae (54%) than L. pneumophila (46%). Single cases of L. 
micdadei and L. micdadei or L. pneumophila were also reported. The case reported 
with a species of either L. micdadei or L. pneumophila was confirmed to be 
legionellosis but serology was unable to determine which species caused infection.  Of 
the 163 L. pneumophila notifications, serogroup data were available on 121 cases 
(74%); 119 (98%) of those serogrouped were L. pneumophila serogroup 1, the 
remaining were serogroup 2. 
Over the period 2007 to 2012, annual notifications of L. longbeachae ranged from 136 
to 190 cases while annual notifications of L. pneumophila ranged from 101 to 169 
cases (Figure 11).  When compared with 2011, the number of cases of L. pneumophila 
decreased by 4% whilst case numbers of L. longbeachae increased by 11%. 
Mortality data were available for 66% (n=252) notifications in 2012.  There were 11 
deaths reported due to legionellosis, a slight increase on the 10 deaths reported in 
2011.  The majority of deaths were attributed to L. pneumophila (82%, n=9) infection 
(Table 6).  However, mortality data should be interpreted with caution given 34% of 
cases were reported without death data to the NNDSS. 
Geographical distribution 
Jurisdictional-specific rates of legionellosis in 2012 varied from 0.5 per 100,000 in the 
Australian Capital Territory to 3.5 per 100,000 in Western Australia (Table 6). 
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The geographical distribution of L. longbeachae and L. pneumophila across 
jurisdictions in 2012 mirrored 2011, with the exception of Queensland.  In 2012, the 
majority of notifications in South Australia, Queensland and Western Australia were 
attributed to L. longbeachae, whilst in New South Wales and Victoria L. pneumophila 
was the most common infecting species. 
Table 6: Case of legionellosis, Australia, 2011, by species and state or territory 
 State or territory   
Species ACT NSW NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA 
Australi
a 
Deaths due 
to 
legionellosi
s 
L. longbeachae 1 29 3 37 26 5 16 73 190 2
L. pneumophila 0 64 0 23 13 6 45 12 163 9
L. micdadei 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
L. micdadei OR 
pneumophila 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Unknown species 1 9 0 10 0 0 7 0 27 0
Total 2 102 3 70 39 12 69 85 382 11
Rate (per 
100,000 
population) 
0.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.4 2.3 1.2 3.5 1.7
Age and sex distribution 
In 2012, legionellosis was predominantly seen in older males. Males accounted for the 
majority (61%) of the notifications resulting in a male to female ratio of 1.6:1.  There 
were no notifications in people under the age of 15 years in 2012.  Overall, the age 
group with the highest notification rate was the 85 years and over (7.5 per 100,000).  
The highest age and sex specific rates were observed in men aged 85 years and over 
(10.7 per 100,000, 16 notifications) and women aged 74 to 79 years (5.9 per 100,000, 
18 notifications) (Figure 12). The 11 cases that were reported to have died due to 
legionellosis ranged in age between 38 and 87 years (median 70 years); nine deaths 
were male and two were female.  
An infecting species analysis by age group shows that 93% of L. longbeachae 
notifications were reported in persons 40 years or older and was most predominant in 
the 70 to 79 year age groups (3.7 per 100,000 for both groups).  Similarly 95% of L. 
pneumophila infections notified were in person aged 40 years or older and was most 
predominant in the 85 years and over age group (3.3 per 100,000). 
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Figure 12: Rate of legionellosis, Australia, 2012, by age group and sex 
 
Seasonality 
In 2012, diagnoses of legionellosis were highest in July, with 46 cases notified (Figure 
13). L. pneumophila occurred most frequently in the summer months, with 51 cases 
reported over the months January, February and December. L. longbeachae cases 
occurred most frequently in spring with 56 cases reported over the months September 
to November; however, the highest number of cases reported in any one month 
occurred in July (n=26) of which half (n=13) were notified in WA.  The seasonal pattern 
of L. longbeachae in 2012 was similar to the peaks in notifications experienced in the 
previous 5 years.  However, in 2012 the seasonal peak of L. pneumophila differed, with 
the majority of cases diagnosed in the summer months in 2012 compared with the 
autumn months of the previous 5 years (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Notified cases of legionellosis, Australia, 2007-2012 by month of diagnosis 
and species 
 
Place of acquisition 
Place of acquisition was reported in 73% (n=280) of notified legionellosis cases in 
2012.  Of these cases 96% (n=267) were reported to be acquired within Australia and 
4% (n=13) were reported as overseas acquired.  Of these Indonesia (n=3) and 
Thailand (n=2) were the most commonly reported place of acquisition. 
Outbreaks and clusters 
In 2012, there were five L. pneumophila clusters and one outbreak of L. pneumophila 
notified to NNDSS.  Two clusters were reported in New South Wales, one in 
Queensland, Victoria and South Australia and an outbreak reported by Victoria. 
In NSW, 14 legionellosis notifications due to L. pneumophila serogroup 1 were reported 
from February to April in Western Sydney and Nepean Blue Mountains Local Health 
Districts, approximately twice the number of cases usually seen in this period. The 
cases were clustered in three time periods; early February, mid-March and late April.  
Extensive investigations into these clusters were unable to determine any common 
sources for the infections 154.  An additional cluster in NSW was identified November 
and December (four notified cases) but no common source was identified. One cluster 
and one outbreak were reported in Victoria in 2012, involving a total of seven cases 
from the Northern and Western Metropolitan region.  Both investigations were unable 
to definitively identify sources of infection 155. 
The Queensland cluster consisted of two cases diagnosed in January and February of 
2012.  The cases were identified in residents of a retirement village in South East 
Queensland. An environmental investigation of the facility was undertaken with water 
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samples collected from the spa, pool and resident showers.  The water samples were 
negative for L. pneumophila and no source of the infection was identified during the 
investigation.   
The cluster in South Australia formed part of an investigation that was conducted from 
January 2013 to March 2013.  In total there were 13 cases identified as the same 
cluster from South Australia (3 of which were notified in 2012) and 3 cases from 
Victoria. 
Change in the epidemiology of species from 1991 to 2012 
Since 1991 the number of legionellosis notifications has continued to rise (Figure 14).  
Before 1998 legionellosis notifications were more likely to be attributed to L. 
pneumophila. However since 1998, the most common infective species has alternated 
between L. pneumophila and L. longbeachae.  
Figure 14: Notified cases of legionellosis, Australia, 1991-2012 by year of diagnosis 
and species 
 
Discussion 
Since reporting began in 1991, the number of notifications reported annually for 
legionellosis has increased by two thirds from 122 notifications in 1991 to 382 
notifications in 2012. The increased use of more sensitive diagnostic testing may have 
contributed to this rise in notifications.  The demographic profile of legionellosis since 
1991 has remained consistent with the recognised epidemiology of the disease 
156,157,158. Less than 7% of notified cases attributed to person under the age of 30 years 
and over 70% attributed to persons aged 50 years and older.  However, since reporting 
began in 1991 there has been a change in the type of notified species.  Whilst L. 
pneumophila was the predominate species notified between the years 1991 and 1997, 
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since 1998 (with the exception of the 2000 L. pneumophila outbreak) the most 
commonly reported species of legionella has alternated between L. pneumophila and 
L. longbeachae. Reasons for the emergence L. longbeachae as a most commonly 
reported species is unclear and will require further investigation. 
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Appendix 12.5 - Legionellosis, Other bacterial infections: Annual 
report of the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, 2013 
– (unpublished) 
Legionellosis 
 A total of 505 cases of legionellosis were notified in 2013. 
 Compared with 2012, notifications of legionellosis increased by 32% in 2013. 
 Legionella pneumophila, commonly associated with man-made water systems, was 
the most frequently reported causative species in 2013. 
 Five clusters and three outbreaks of legionellosis were reported in 2013 
Legionellosis is an environmentally acquired pneumonia caused by the bacteria 
Legionella. It can take the form of either Legionnaires’ disease, a severe form of 
infection of the lungs, or Pontiac fever, a milder influenza-like illness. The species most 
commonly associated with human disease in Australia are Legionella pneumophila and 
Legionella longbeachae. Legionella bacteria are found naturally in low levels in the 
environment. In the absence of effective environmental treatments Legionella 
organisms can breed in air conditioning cooling towers, hot water systems, 
showerheads, spa pools, fountains, commercial potting mix and other decomposing 
material such as bark and sawdust. Legionella is generally transmitted to humans 
through contaminated water or dust aerosols.  
Epidemiological situation in 2013 
There were 505 notifications of legionellosis in 2013, representing a rate of 2.2 
notifications per 100,000. Compared with the previous reporting period notifications of 
legionellosis increased in 2013 by 32% and were the highest since 2008 (Figure 11). It 
is likely that at least half of the increase in 2013 can be attributed to the outbreak at the 
Wesley Hospital in Queensland and the subsequent increase in serological testing 
during that period. This outbreak received significant media coverage and resulted in 
Queensland issuing public health alerts to the community.  
In 2013, data on the causative species were available for 88% (n=444) of notifications 
reported. Proportionally, there were slightly more notifications of L. pneumophila (51%) 
than L. longbeachae (48%). A single notification of Legionella anisa and two 
notifications of Legionella micdadei were also reported (Table 6). Serogroup 
information was only reported for 70% of L. pneumophila notifications and 17% of L. 
longbeachae notifications. Of these, 91% of L. pneumophila notifications were typed to 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 and all L. longbeachae notifications were typed to L. 
longbeachae serogroup 1. 
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Over the period of 2008 to 2013, the notified cases of L. pneumophila ranged from 101 
to 228, whilst notified cases of L. longbeachae ranged from 144 to 213 (Figure 15). 
When compared with 2012, notifications of L. pneumophila increased by 40% and L. 
longbeachae by 13%. 
In 2013, mortality data was available for 71% (n=358) of notifications. Of these 3% 
(n=15) were reported to have died due to legionellosis. This proportion is equivalent to 
the proportion of notifications reported to have died in 2012 (3%, n=11). The majority of 
deaths were attributed to infection with L. pneumophila (80%, n=12) (Table 6). Over the 
last five years (2008 to 2013) the mortality data of legionellosis notification has 
improved with the proportion of cases reported with death information increasing from 
49% in 2008 to 71% in 2013.  
Figure 15: Notified cases for legionellosis, by species, Australia, 2008-2013 
 
Geographic description 
In 2013, Jurisdictional-specific rates of legionellosis varied from 0.3 per 100,000 in the 
Australian Capital Territory to 3.8 per 100,000 in South Australia (Table 6). 
In 2013, L. pneumophila was the most notified infecting species in the Australian 
Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Victoria, while L. 
longbeachae was more common in the Northern Territory and Western Australian. 
Tasmania reported and equal number of notifications of both species. The geographic 
distribution in 2013 differed from 2012 in that L. pneumophila was the most commonly 
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notified species in only New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria, with L. longbeachae 
being more commonly notified in all other remaining states and territories. 
Table 7: Notifications, rates and deaths for legionellosis, by species and jurisdiction, Australia, 
2013 
 State or territory   
Species ACT NSW NT Qld SA Tas. Vic. WA Australia 
Deaths due 
to 
legionellosis 
L. longbeachae 0 38 4 45 31‡ 3 13‡ 79 213 2 
L. pneumophila 1 54* 1 73* 32† 3 50† 14† 228 12 
L. anisa 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
L. micdadei 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 
Unknown species 0 13 1 46† 0 0 1 0 61 1 
Total 1 105 6 165 63 6 66 93 505 15 
Rate (per 
100,000) 0.3 1.4 2.5 3.5 3.8 1.2 1.2 3.7 2.2  
* 3 deaths.  
† 2 deaths. 
‡ 1 death. 
Age and sex distribution 
In 2013, legionellosis was predominantly seen in older males. Males accounted for the 
majority (54%) of the notifications resulting in a male to female ratio of 1.2:1. There 
were no notifications in people under the age of 10 years. The highest age and sex 
specific rates were observed in men and women aged 75-79 years and over at 8.7 per 
100,000 and 8.6 per 100,000, respectively (Figure 12). The ages of the 15 cases 
reported to have died due to legionellosis in 2013 ranged between 38 and 96 years 
(median 72 years); 11 deaths were male and 4 were female. In 2013, the demographic 
profile of legionellosis remained consistent with the recognised epidemiology of the 
disease. (64-66) 
Analysis by infecting species and age group identified that 93% of L. longbeachae 
notifications were reported in persons aged 40 years or older and was the predominant 
species reported in the 75 to 79 year age groups (4.6 per 100,000). Similarly, 85% of 
notified L. pneumophila infections were in persons aged 40 years or older and was the 
predominant species in the 85 years and over age group (3.2 per 100,000). 
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Figure 16: Notification rate for legionellosis, by age group and sex, Australia, 2013 
 
Seasonality 
In 2013, diagnoses of legionellosis were highest in September, with 60 notified cases 
(Figure 13). In 2013, the seasonal pattern of L. pneumophila and for L. longbeachae 
differed from the seasonal patterns seen in the previous five years. From 2008 to 2012, 
the diagnosis of L. pneumophila commonly occurred in the autumn and summer 
months, whilst a diagnosis of L. longbeachae was more common in the spring months. 
In 2013, the diagnosis of both species peaked in winter, with 70 L. pneumophila cases 
and 71 L. longbeachae cases notified in June, July and August (Figure 13). It is unclear 
why this change is seasonality occurred, but it may be the result of the increase in 
legionellosis testing in Queensland between June and September 2013 following the 
Wesley Hospital Outbreak. 
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Figure 17: Notified cases for legionellosis, by month of diagnosis and species, 
Australia, 2008-2013 
 
Place of acquisition 
In 2013, a place of acquisition was reported in 80% (n=402) of legionellosis 
notifications. Of these, 94% (n=379) were reported to be acquired within Australia and 
6% (n=23) were reported to be acquired overseas. Of the overseas acquired 
notifications, Thailand (17%, n=4) and Indonesia (13%, n=3) were the most commonly 
reported places of acquisition. 
Outbreaks 
In 2013, there were five clusters and three outbreaks of legionellosis notified to the 
NNDSS. All were attributed to L. pneumophila serogroup 1 and occurred in three 
jurisdictions; Queensland, South Australia and Victoria. 
There was one outbreak reported in Queensland. On 5 June 2013, the Wesley Hospital 
notified Queensland Health of two legionellosis cases, one resulting in death. 
Environmental investigations identified the most probable source of infection for this 
outbreak of L. pneumophila was contamination of the hospitals heated water systems. 
(67) In 2013, Victoria reported four clusters and two outbreaks, involving a total of 26 
cases, and South Australia reported one cluster involving 12 cases. The sources of 
infection of these clusters and outbreaks were not determined. 
Reference  
128. Queensland Health. Review of the prevention and control of Legionella 
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1. Prologue 
1.1 My role 
As a lead investigator for this project I was responsible for data analysis, collection and 
interpretation of data from the consultations, undertaking the focused literature review 
and authoring the report.  To undertake this project I submitted and gained ethical 
approval from the Australian Government Department of Health Human Research 
Ethics Committee (DEC) and the Australian National University Science and Medical 
Delegated Ethics Review Committee. I submitted a data request to National Human 
Papillomavirus Vaccination Programme Register (NHVPR) and used Stata™ version 
13.1 (StataCorp, USA) and Microsoft Excel™ to examine incompletion of Indigenous 
status in the NHVPR. 
 In collaboration with Dr. Julia Brotherton, I consulted with jurisdictional health 
departments to explore the barriers to collecting Indigenous status. As part of the 
consultations I also wrote and distributed a summary of the consultation findings to 
stakeholders. 
1.2 Lessons learned 
Undertaking this project has taught me a number of key lessons. By going through the 
ethical approval process, I learnt how to develop and write ethics documentation, and 
how to work with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander data. In particular, learning about 
cultural safety has helped me to better understand the complexity involved with 
collecting Indigenous status and ensure my analysis and interpretation was respectful.  
I learnt to be persistent and flexible. There were a number of different processes I had 
to go through to gain access to data in the NHVPR. Unlike my other projects where 
access to the data was relatively straight forward, this project required a number of 
different stages and a high degree of complexity. By undertaking a data request I 
refined the project aims and objectives and clearly identify how this data related to the 
overall research question. This enabled me to plan the data analysis component more 
effectively, and better utilise the data. I also learnt how to analyses large datasets in 
Stata, gaining expertise in merging data and undertake a complex cleaning processes  
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1.2 Public health implications 
This project provides insight into some of the barriers encountered when collecting 
Indigenous status information, and highlights the complexities in addressing these 
barriers. The study provides simple and useful recommendations to assist national and 
jurisdictional health authorities in improving the completion on Indigenous status for not 
only HPV vaccinations, but also other disease collections and vaccination programs.  
Consultations with jurisdictional health departments resulted in three jurisdictions 
updating Indigenous status on their HPV vaccine consent forms to align with the 
national Guidelines. Following the consultations, a number of jurisdictions undertook 
actions to address the incompletion of Indigenous status within their HPV vaccination 
collections. These included regularly reviewing the data, informing vaccine providers 
about the importance of collecting Indigenous status and amending vaccination 
databases to prompt for the follow up of missing information.  
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2. Abstract 
Genital Human Papillomavirus (HPV) is a viral infection occurring in both males and 
females. In April 2007 Australia launched the National HPV Vaccination Program (the 
Program) for females. To monitor the coverage of the Program, the National HPV 
Vaccination Program Register (NHVPR) was established to collect data on HPV 
vaccinations administered in Australia.  
Although data from the NHVPR is used to estimate HPV vaccination coverage among 
females, estimates by Indigenous status are difficult to calculate due to the insufficient 
reporting of these data. Incomplete Indigenous status in Australian healthcare datasets 
is a common issue. The purpose of this study is to identify the barriers to the collection 
of Indigenous status for females in the NHVPR and provide recommendations to 
reduce these barriers and improve Indigenous status identification. 
To analyse the completeness of Indigenous status for females in the NHVPR and 
identify likely barriers to its collection, I undertook a review of the literature; conducted 
consultations; and reviewed female vaccination records from 2007 to 2012. 
The analysis of the NHVPR data identified gaps in the current reporting of Indigenous 
status by jurisdiction, and highlighted the Northern Territory and Queensland were the 
only jurisdictions providing sufficient data for Indigenous status. Barriers identified 
through the literature and consultations included misconceptions about Indigenous 
status; the presentation of Indigenous status questions on healthcare forms; and 
variations in data collection methodology and administration of school-based HPV 
vaccination programs. 
Understanding the barriers encountered when collecting Indigenous status for the 
NHVPR is complex. The findings of my report has identified some of these barriers, but 
as this is issue is often impacted by a vast range of factors, it has only scratched the 
surface. Working towards improving statistical information about Indigenous health not 
only requires national standards to guide information collection but also requires 
research into issues that prevent the disclosure or the request of Indigenous 
information. To completely understand the issues relating the completion of Indigenous 
status in the NHVPR, broader consultations with vaccine providers and consumers and 
ongoing reviews and evaluations of collection methodologies need to be undertaken. 
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3. Background 
Genital Human Papillomavirus (HPV) is a viral infection occurring in the anogenital 
region of both males and females. Transmission occurs through close skin to skin or 
mucosa to mucosa contact and commonly occurs through sexual intercourse. It is 
estimated that between 50% and 80% of anogenital HPV transmission occurs after a 
person has engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse.(1-3) Cases of perinatal 
transmission can also occur, but is relatively infrequent.(4)  
There are over 100 HPV genotypes, but only 40 are sexually transmissible.(5) HPV 
associated anogenital infections are considered to be a normal part of being sexually 
active. As the majority of infections are asymptomatic, most people will have a HPV 
infection at some time in their lives and be unaware they have had it. The vast majority 
(70 to 90%) of HPV infections resolve spontaneously, approximately 12 to 24 months 
after infection.(6) On occasion, when a HPV infection has not been resolved, there is an 
increased risk of developing high grade pre-neoplastic abnormalities.(7) A small 
proportion of persistent HPV infections (around 3% to 10%) may progress to cancers of 
the anogenital tract. (8) 
The four most common HPV genotypes infecting the anogenital areas are HPV 6, 11, 
16 and 18. Genotypes 6 and 11 can cause benign or low-grade non-carcinogenic 
changes in the cervix, anogenital warts and in rare cases recurrent respiratory 
papillomatosis (RRP). Genotype 16 and 18 are considered to be high-risk, as a small 
proportion of all infections can progress to cervical, vulvar, vaginal, penile, and anal 
cancers as well as some oropharyngeal cancers (9, 10) Cervical cancer is the most 
common HPV-associated cancer in Australia. (11)  
The National HPV Vaccination Program (the Program) was introduced for females in 
April 2007 Australia.(12) The Program initially consisted of two components: an ongoing 
school-based program for females aged 12 to 13 years and a 2-year catch-up program 
for females aged 13 to 26 years, which ceased on 31 December 2009. Between 2007 
and 2009 around 83% of females aged 12 to 17 years were vaccinated with at least 
one dose, and 70% completed all three doses. (13) In 2013, the Program was extended 
to include males, with vaccine made available through school-based programs for 
males aged 12 to 13 years and a time-limited catch-up program for males aged 14 to 
15 years, which concluded at the end of 2014.(12) 
There are two HPV vaccines are currently registered in Australia: the bivalent vaccine, 
Cervarix® and the quadrivalent vaccine, Gardasil®. Cervarix® provides protection 
against genotypes 16 and 18 and Gardasil® protects against genotypes 16, 18, 11 and 
6. (12)  
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The current vaccination schedule requires a course of three doses, administered within 
a 12 month period. The administration of these vaccines is recommended as follows: 
 Cervarix – Three doses at 0, 1 and 6 months. 
 Gardasil – Three doses at 0, 2 and 6 months. 
As HPV infection is not a nationally notifiable disease in Australia, surveillance is 
conducted as a component of the Program outside of the National Notifiable Disease 
Surveillance System (NNDSS). The surveillance of HPV is conducted through a 
number of mechanisms, and aims to monitor the effectiveness of the HPV vaccination 
on circulating HPV genotypes in the Australian male and female populations.  
One of these mechanisms is the National HPV Vaccination Program Register 
(NHVPR). Established in 2007, the NHVPR is a confidential database that supports the 
Program by collecting data on HPV vaccinations administered in Australia. Data are 
provided to the NHVPR by jurisdictional health departments, local government councils 
(school-based Program), General Practitioners (GP), nurses, Aboriginal health works 
and other immunisation providers.(14) Data on HPV vaccinations are provided to the 
register under the provisions of the National Health Amendment 2007(National HPV 
Vaccination Program Register).(15)  
To determine the baseline prevalence of HPV in the female population, the Women’s 
HPV Indigenous Non-Indigenous Urban Rural Study (WHINURS) compared the 
prevalence of genotype-specific HPV among unvaccinated non-Indigenous and 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations in urban and remote areas of 
Australia.(16) Whilst the study found no difference in the rates of HPV genotypes 16 or 
18 between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and non-Indigenous women, it 
identified risk factors for HPV infection, such as smoking, higher fertility rates and lower 
participation rates for cervical screening were higher amongst Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander women. (17) 
Following WHINURS, the HPV Vaccine Impact in the Australian Population (VIP) study 
examined the impact the HPV vaccine on the prevalence of HPV genotypes largely in 
non-Indigenous women following, the roll out of the Program. Initial results from this 
study showed reductions in vaccine related genotypes of HPV in unvaccinated 
women. (13)   
Whilst WHINURS and VIP provide early insight into the potential effectiveness of the 
HPV vaccines, there is still a need to assess the vaccination coverage within the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander female population.(18) The burden of cervical 
cancer is higher in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women than non-
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Indigenous women. (18) From 2005 to 2009, the incidence rate of cervical cancer among 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander was 21.4 new cases per 100,000 population and 
the mortality rate was at 9.0 deaths per 100,000 population.(18) These rates are 
significantly higher compared with non-Indigenous woman, at 8.6 new cases per 
100,000 population and 1.9 deaths per 100,000 population. (18,15) As the incidence of 
cervical cancer and the risk profile is higher amongst Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander women, it is important to examine and monitor vaccination coverage in these 
high risk populations. 
Although vaccination coverage estimates for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
women has been calculated in the past, due to under-reporting of Indigenous status in 
the NHVPR they have been limited to Queensland and the Northern Territory. (19) The 
lack of completeness Indigenous status in Australian healthcare datasets is a common 
issue. Whilst best practice guidelines have been developed to encourage the 
systematic and consistent collection of Indigenous status, (20) underreporting is still 
prevalent.(21-27) The purpose of this study is to identify the barriers to the collection of 
Indigenous status in the NHVPR and provide recommendations to reduce these 
barriers in the future. As the male HPV vaccination Program did not commence until 
2013, male HPV data has not been examined for this study. 
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4. Methods 
4.1 Collection of HPV vaccination records in the NHVPR 
HPV vaccination data are collected through the HPV school-based vaccination 
programs (local councils and jurisdictional health departments) and private providers 
(GPs, nurses, Aboriginal healthcare workers and other vaccine providers). Data are 
collected via a number of different mechanisms, including electronic transfers, direct 
entry to the NHVPR web portal and paper forms which are mailed or faxed to the 
Victorian Cytology Service (VCS) for data entry. 
HPV vaccine consent forms are used to collect data through the school-based 
vaccination programs and are provided electronically by jurisdictional health 
departments or Local Government Councils (LCG) (Figure 1).  
Data of HPV vaccinations administered through private providers are collected through 
direct entry into the NHVPR web portal and on vaccine notification forms or GP 
practice software printouts. Private providers in the Australian Capital Territory, New 
South Wales, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia fax or mail notifications 
forms or software printouts to VCS or directly enter data into the NHVPR web portal 
through a secure website.(14)  
Private providers in the Northern Territory and Queensland are asked to send HPV 
vaccination records directly to the jurisdictional health department, where the data are 
collated with the school-based program collection and electronically transmitted to the 
NHVPR. 
 Figure 1: Flow of data inputs into the NHVPR web portal for private and school based 
vaccinations, Australia 
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notification form 
sent via mail or 
fax  
School Based Vaccination
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department electronic 
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4-8 
 
Data elements collected in the register include mandatory and optional fields. 
Mandatory fields include: date of birth; name; address; state; postcode; vaccine brand; 
vaccine provider number; vaccine dose number; and date of vaccination. Optional 
fields include: consumer reference number; middle and given names; previous 
surname; sex; Indigenous status; Medicare number and reference; country of 
residence; consent date (on school-based HPV consent forms); name and contact 
details of consenting parent or guardian (on school-based HPV consent forms); school 
details (on school-based HPV consent forms); and provider contact details. 
Information collected in the NHVPR is used for a range of functions including:  
 providing completion of vaccination statements to consumers; 
 reminding vaccine consumers of overdue vaccine doses; and 
 using de-identified data to monitor and evaluate the participation in the Program 
to inform policy and research. (14) 
Currently, Indigenous status is an optional field in the NHVPR. To accommodate 
differences in how this information is collected within each jurisdiction the NHVPR 
accepts: 
 A  - Aboriginal 
 T - Torres Strait Islander 
 AT - Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
 Y  - Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  
 N - Neither 
 U - Unknown or Not Stated 
 None (blank) 
4.2 Project analysis 
To analyse the completeness of Indigenous status in the NHVPR and identify the likely 
barriers to its collection a mixed methods approach was used. This approach included: 
 a review of the literature; 
 consultations with jurisdictional health departments; and 
 analysis of  NHVPR data from 2007 to 2012. 
Human Ethical approval was provided by the Australian Government Department of 
Health Human Research Ethics Committee (DEC) on 21 January 2014 and the 
Australian National University Science and Medical Delegated Ethics Review 
Committee (DERC) on 3 March 2014. 
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4.2.1 Literature review 
I searched the literature using Medline and PubMed search engines. Peer-reviewed 
journal articles and grey literature dated from 1979 to 2013 available in English were 
included. Letters, editorials, comments and clinical trials were excluded from the 
analysis. 
To ensure relevant articles and grey literature were identified, I conducted two 
searches (Appendix Figure 1). The first search focussed specifically on articles and 
reports relating to HPV, while the second expanded used broader terms to identify 
other relevant literature. The search terms for this review are listed below: 
First search terms: 
 ‘HPV’ or  ‘Human Papillomavirus vaccination’ were used as the Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH) with either ‘Indigenous’, ‘Indigenous & Australia’, ‘Indigenous 
status & healthcare’ as subheadings. 
Second search terms: 
 ‘Indigenous status’ used as the MeSH heading with either ‘healthcare collections’, 
‘health system’, ‘recording’, ‘recording & Australia’,  ‘recording & HPV’, ‘recording 
& improving’, ‘Human Papillomavirus’, ‘vaccinations’ and ‘missing’ as 
subheadings. 
4.2.2 Consultations 
Consultations with key stakeholders were conducted in two stages. The first stage was 
conducted over 2 weeks in August 2013 and the second between July and August of 
2014. This two stage consultation process was used to gain an in-depth understanding 
of the current processes used to collect and report Indigenous status in each 
jurisdictions, the barriers they encountered collecting this information and the actions 
they have been taken to improve Indigenous status completion. 
The first stage consultations were un-structured conversations conducted over the 
phone with immunisation program areas in each jurisdictional health department and 
an immunisation program co-ordinator based in the Northern Queensland public health 
unit. These consultations focused on: 1) understanding how jurisdictions collected HPV 
vaccination data from the schools-based programs; 2) the barriers they believed 
affected the completion of Indigenous status; and 3) what actions could be taken to 
improve the collection of Indigenous status.  
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Second stage consultations were used to follow-up on information and were conducted 
over the phone using a semi-structured interview.  These interviews focused on:  
 the collection of school-based HPV vaccination consent forms and GP HPV 
notification records within each jurisdiction; 
 how data from the school-based HPV vaccination consent forms are collated, 
stored and transmitted to the NHVPR; 
 what data are provided  to the NHVPR; and 
 how missing Indigenous status is managed in each jurisdiction (i.e are the data 
followed up, left as missing or imputed).  
4.2.3 Statistical analysis 
4.2.3.1 NHVPR data extract 
I requested de-identified line-listed data of all female vaccination records from 2007 to 
2012 in the NHVPR. The data included: 
 first implied dose1 administered between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 
2012; 
 All subsequent doses (2nd and 3rd) to the first implied dose administered between 
1 January 2007 and 31 December 2012;  
 Implied dose number; 
 All non-terminated doses for a consumer; 
 Consumer postcode; 
 Age at implied dose number; 
 Indigenous status; 
 State/territory; and  
 Date of vaccination 
The data excluded terminated doses2 and information on consumers who opted to be 
removed from the NHVPR. 
  
                                                
1 Implied dose number is the number allocated by the NHVPR information system (HVRIS) and is based on dose date 
and episode status. An implied dose number of zero is allocated if a dose is too close to another dose or if more than 
three doses have been reported. 
2 A terminated dose is any doses removed from the NHVPR. These can include duplicate records or doses reported in 
error. 
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In order to extract and clean the data, the following rules were applied by VCS: 
 implied dose number is the number allocated to a dose based on the date and 
episode status. For records with doses administered too closely together (i.e. 2nd 
dose was administered within 1 month of the 1st dose) or had more than three 
vaccination doses reported, the implied dose number of those doses was coded 
to zero.  
 if data for earlier doses was missing, subsequent dose data was used.  For 
example, if a consumer’s doses are recorded as; dose-number-1, dose-number-2 
and dose-number-4; the order of these doses was changed to implied-dose-
number-1, implied dose-number-2 and implied dose-number-3. 
To comply with ethical approval, the following steps were conducted to de-identify the 
NHVPR data: 
 VCS consumer reference number was replaced with a project specific unique 
identifier. To ensure the unique identifier did not match the VCS consumer 
reference, vaccination records were randomized by age and the VCS consumer 
reference number was permanently removed from the dataset; and 
 postcode was replaced with an Australian Statistical Geography Standards 
(ASGS) and postcode information permanently removed from the dataset. 
4.2.3.2 Australian Statistical Geography Standards (ASGS)  
The Australian Statistical Geography Standards (ASGS) was used to examine the 
geographical distribution of HPV vaccine records. The ASGS consists of five 
remoteness areas; Major Cities, Inner Regional, Outer Regional, Remote and Very 
Remote. For the purposes of this report these areas were grouped into Major Cities, 
Regional (inner and outer regional combined) and Remote (remote and very remote 
combined). ASGS was mapped using the ABS ASGS correspondence files and the 
cases’ residential postcodes. If a postcode was mapped to more than one ASGS area, 
the postcode was allocated to the area with the highest geographical proportion as per 
the ABS correspondence files. If a residential postcode could not be mapped to an 
ASGS area (such as post office or business centre) the ASGS of the case was 
classified as unknown.  
4.2.3.3 Data analysis 
I analysed the data using Stata™ version 13.1 (StataCorp, USA) and Microsoft 
Excel™. The analysis included all female HPV vaccination records with an implied-
dose number 1 administered between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2013. 
Vaccination coverage estimates were calculated as the number of valid HPV vaccine 
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doses by Indigenous status, divided by the 2006 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
single year of age experimental Indigenous population estimates and expressed as a 
percentage. Age of consumers, is the age they were in 2006, to correspond with the 
experimental Indigenous population estimates. Indigenous status for the vaccine was 
defined as: 
 Indigenous – records containing the values; ‘A’,‘T’, ‘AT’ and ’Y’  
 Non-Indigenous – Records containing the values ‘N’ 
 Unknown or missing – Records containing the values; ‘U ‘& ‘None’ 
I conducted univariable analyses to examine the relationship between unknown 
Indigenous status and ASGS, age group, jurisdiction and provider. An unknown 
Indigenous status was defined as records whose Indigenous status values were ‘U’ or 
‘None’. A known Indigenous status was defined as records whose Indigenous status 
values were ‘A’,‘T’, ‘AT’ ,’Y’ and‘ ‘N’.   
Pearson’s Chi-square statistic was used to examine the relationships between the 
unknown Indigenous status and ASGS, age group, jurisdiction and provider, and the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum nonparametric test for trend was used to analysis the changes in 
unknown Indigenous status over time. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Focused literature review 
Whilst there is an abundance of literature examining the level of underreporting of 
Indigenous status in healthcare datasets (26, 28-30), and how administrative datasets can 
be used to correct this missing information, (25, 27, 31-34) there is limited information about 
the barriers encountered with its collection.  
I identified four unique peer-reviewed articles and three grey literature reports which 
met the parameters of the review. The peer-reviewed articles consisted of two cross-
sectional studies, a hospital census and an interviewer-administered survey. The grey 
literature included reports on the collection of Indigenous status in communicable 
disease reporting systems, hospital databases and in general practitioners settings. 
The information from of each document is summarised in Appendix Table 1 and 
highlights the varied approach to examining the accuracy of Indigenous status within 
Australia healthcare datasets.  
5.1.1.1 Peer-reviewed literature 
The two cross-sectional studies conducted by Adams et al (35) and Kohoe and Lovett (36) 
investigated what barriers existed to the completion of Indigenous status by staff in 
medical practices. Both studies surveyed staff attitudes towards asking a person their 
Indigenous status and found staff were often apprehensive to ask about Indigenous 
status as they feared offending patients.(35, 36) Adams et al (2004) further examined if 
Breast Screen Victoria (BSV) was complying with the National Best Practice Guidelines 
for Collecting Indigenous Status in Health Datasets (the Guidelines) developed by the 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) and the Australian Bureau of Statistic 
(ABS).(35) They found that BSV were not compliant, as they did not include a category 
for ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander’ or ‘not stated’. They also did not enable 
women who were born overseas to identify as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander.  
The reluctance of staff in healthcare facilities to ask Indigenous status was echoed in a 
study conducted in Brisbane.(37) The study found that some staff in the hospital thought 
questions regarding Indigenous status were sensitive and felt uncomfortable asking 
patients. Some staff admitted to guessing or omitting this information on hospital 
admission forms. Unlike the previously discussed studies, this study included a survey 
of patients within the hospital complex. This survey was broken into two sections, a five 
minute survey and a semi-structured interview with patients identifying as Indigenous. 
Results from the five minute survey indicated that the majority of patients felt 
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comfortable with being asked about their Indigenous status, but were unsure why the 
question was being asked. 
Results from the semi-structured interview found Indigenous patients were not 
offended when asked about their cultural identity, instead stated they were proud to 
answer questions about their culture and heritage. This study highlighted the 
juxtaposing attitudes of staff and patients with regards to questions about Indigenous 
status. The study suggested misconceptions by staff about patient reactions toward 
these types of questions has led to poor administration processes and underreporting 
of Indigenous status within the hospital records. Just over half the participants who self-
identified as Indigenous had been incorrectly identified in the hospital records. 
In 1999, Jackson Pulver et al (2003) interviewed women who had recently given birth 
at King George V (KGV) hospital in Sydney, to determine if the hospital documentation 
accurately reflected Indigenous status reported by the patients.(38) The investigation 
found there was significant under-reporting of Indigenous women in the KGV hospital 
system. When asked by investigators, two thirds of the study population indicated they 
were comfortable with staff asking if they identified as an Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait 
Islander. An interesting finding from this study was the difference in accuracy of 
Indigenous status between women who self-referred to the hospital compared to those 
who were transferred from other medical facilities. Women who were transferred were 
significantly more likely to be correctly identified compared to the women who self-
referred. Investigators found hospital staff often relied on clues from transfer 
documentation to identify the Indigenous status of a woman rather than asking them 
upon admission. 
Whilst these studies identified a number of barriers with the collection of Indigenous 
status, there were a number of limitations. All surveys and interviews were subject to 
volunteer and selection bias. In particular the Jackson Pulver (2003) study only 
sampled women who had delivered live, healthy infants and those who could speak 
sufficient English. These exclusion criteria may have resulted in the under-
representation of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander women. 
Additionally, the generalizability of all these studies limited to medical practice or 
hospital settings. I was unable to find any studies that considered the collection of 
Indigenous status outside of healthcare settings, such as school-based vaccination 
programs. Finally, there are some information gaps in reporting. One study did not 
provide the sample size of the staff interviewed. By not knowing the number and 
employment categories of interviewed staff, questions are raised as to whether the 
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data truly reflects the healthcare provider population, and if it could be generalised to 
other healthcare settings. 
In 2005, Lovett investigated if the attitudes of staff in hospitals in the Australian Capital 
Territory, at admission and discharge, affected the accuracy of Indigenous status 
information in hospital data.(39) This study found there were negative attitudes towards 
the collection and recording of Indigenous status by hospital staff. In particular, staff 
stated they feared asking a patient if they identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander due to anecdotal reports of people becoming aggressive when asked. 
Additionally, the study found a number of staff perceived asking for Indigenous status 
to be associated with funding and thought the collection of this information was 
irrelevant, as all patients should be treated equally regardless of their background. 
However due to the issues in gaining access to staff and the low response rate to 
interviews, results from the study are limited.  
5.1.1.2 Review of grey literature 
A review of the collection of Indigenous status in communicable disease reporting 
systems released in 2004 identified a number of limitations in the collection of this 
information. (40) These limitations included: the perceived reluctance of Aboriginal 
and/or Torres Strait Islander people to disclose their Indigenous status; the inconsistent 
or incorrect use of the standard Indigenous status question; the lack of public 
awareness regarding the importance of reporting this information; and the limited 
amount of training available regarding the collection and value of Indigenous 
information in healthcare datasets. This paper suggested a number of 
recommendations to improve Indigenous identification including making the collection 
of Indigenous status mandatory; introducing incentives to improve the quality of 
information; and including Indigenous status as part of the standard demographic data 
collection. While the report broadly outlines some of the most common barriers faced in 
collecting Indigenous in administrative datasets, it main purpose was to provide 
particular recommendations for communicable disease reporting systems.  
In 2012, ABS conducted a number of focus groups to explore attitudes to Indigenous 
identification in census and survey contexts in urban areas. (41) This study conducted 
focus groups in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Darwin and Hobart, with 
Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people were asked about their propensity to 
provide Indigenous status. These focus groups found participants were unlikely to 
provide their Indigenous status on survey forms as it: 
 could result in negative repercussions to an individual and/or the wider 
community; 
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 could lead to racism, discrimination or differential treatment; 
 may offended in certain contexts; or  
 they did not understand why this information was relevant to the collection 
The study found that younger Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people were 
more likely to disclose their Indigenous status compared to older participants, and that 
identifying Indigenous status on behalf of another person is considered to be 
inappropriate unless the identification is made by an immediate family member. (41)  
In evaluating the implementation of the Guidelines, the AIHW conducted a project that 
examined the identification of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status in General 
Practice (GP). (22) Undertaken between January 2011 and December 2012, the project 
investigated what information on Indigenous identification is available in the GP sector, 
the barriers to identification and the measures taken to improve identification. The 
project found a number of barriers had been addressed since the implementation of the 
Guidelines, but GP attitudinal issues contributed to low rates of routine identification 
and high levels of reporting variability. One of the identified barriers to raising 
awareness of the importance of Indigenous status within the GP sector was the lack of 
coordination between agencies involved in general practice setting.   
5.2 Consultations 
All eight jurisdictional health departments and one immunisation program co-ordinator 
participated in the consultations. There were three major topics discussed during the 
consultations: 1) how vaccination data are collected; 2) the barriers encountered in the 
collection of Indigenous status; and 3) actions taken to improve the reporting of 
Indigenous status through the school-based programs. 
5.2.1 Data collection through the school-based programs 
All stakeholders indicated HPV consent forms were collected by vaccine providers and 
either provided directly to the Local Government Councils (LGC), public and population 
health units or jurisdictional health departments for data entry and transmission to the 
NHVPR. However, this flow of data varied considerably by jurisdiction (Table 1). In 
South Australia, Tasmania, and Victoria, the LGCs are responsible for the data entry 
and transmission to the NHVPR. Although the jurisdictional health departments receive 
a copy of all NHVPR transmissions, the frequency and responsibility for the data and 
its completeness resides with the LGCs.  
Data from the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, 
Queensland and Western Australia, is collated and transmitted by the jurisdictional 
health departments at varying frequencies. For New South Wales and Western 
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Australia data are transmitted to the NHVPR on a yearly basis. During the course of the 
consultations I asked if the frequency of data transmission to the NHVPR could be 
increased. Both these jurisdictions indicated this would not be possible as the data are 
not uploaded into their databases until the all school-based programs have been 
completed for the year.  
Table 1: School-based Program HPV vaccination consent form collection, data entry 
and data transmission to the NHVPR, by jurisdiction, 2013 
Jurisdiction 
Collected 
by 
Data entered 
by 
Transmission to NHVPR 
Transmission 
frequency 
ACT 
Vaccine 
providers 
ACT Health ACT Health Weekly 
NSW 
Vaccine 
providers 
Scanned in by 
external 
contractor for 
NSW health 
NSW Health Yearly 
NT 
Vaccine 
providers 
NT Health NT health Monthly 
QLD 
Vaccine 
providers 
QLD Health QLD health Daily 
SA 
Vaccine 
providers 
Local councils 
Local councils 
Copy of extract provided to SA health 
Subject to Local 
council 
TAS 
Vaccine 
providers 
Local councils 
Local councils 
Copy of extract provided to TAS health 
Subject to Local 
council 
VIC 
Vaccine 
providers 
Local councils 
Local councils. 
VIC health access data via IMPS 
Subject to Local 
council 
WA 
Vaccine 
providers 
Population 
health units 
WA Health. Yearly 
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5.2.2 Collection, transmission and management of Indigenous status in 
the school-based programs 
In 2010, the AIHW and the ABS released the Guidelines. This document provides a 
systematic national approach for collecting and recording accurate information on the 
Indigenous status in administrative health datasets. The collection of Indigenous status 
on HPV vaccine consent forms varied between jurisdictions. New South Wales, the 
Northern Territory, Queensland and Victoria were the only jurisdictions using the 
Guidelines’ recommended format in 2013 (Table 2).  
Stakeholders from the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and Tasmania 
stated they were unaware of the Guidelines and suggested that the binary responses 
and single tick boxes being used on consent forms were a reflection of how these data 
are currently collected on other jurisdictional healthcare forms. After the first stage 
consultations, the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and Tasmania reviewed 
their HPV consent forms and updated the request for Indigenous status to reflect the 
Guidelines.  Changes to the forms took effect in 2014.  
Western Australia stated that the collection of Indigenous status is governed by the 
Aboriginal Cultural Respect Framework. This framework specifies that: 
“Within Western Australia, the term Aboriginal is used in preference to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander, in recognition that Aboriginal people are the original inhabitants 
of Western Australia. No disrespect is intended to our Torres Strait Islander colleagues 
and community.” (42, 43) 
Due to this framework, Western Australia is currently unable to change how Indigenous 
status is collected within their in healthcare data. 
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Table 2: Question about Indigenous status on HPV vaccine consent forms, by 
jurisdiction, Australia, 2013 to 2014 schools 
Jurisdiction Question asked on form Changed Question changed on form to 
ACT Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander Yes, 2014 
Is your child of Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander origin? 
 No 
 Yes, Aboriginal 
 Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
 Yes, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander 
NSW 
Indigenous status:  
 No 
 Yes, Aboriginal 
 Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
 Yes, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander 
 
  
NT 
Ethnicity: 
Non-Aboriginal 
Aboriginal 
Torres Strait Islander 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
  
QLD 
Aboriginal 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
(TSI)  
TSI 
Not Aboriginal or TSI 
Not stated/unknown 
  
SA Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander Yes, 2014 
Is your child of Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander origin? 
 No 
 Yes, Aboriginal 
 Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
 Yes, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander 
 
TAS 
Is your child of Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander origin?     
 
Yes           No 
Yes, 2014 
Is your child of Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander origin? 
 No 
 Yes, Aboriginal 
 Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
 Yes, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander 
 
VIC 
Is the person of Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander consent?  
No 
Aboriginal 
Torres Strait Islander 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
  
WA 
Aboriginal    
Yes           No 
No  
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Indigenous status information has been collected on HPV vaccine consent forms in all 
jurisdictions, except New South Wales since 2007 (Table 3). The transmission of 
Indigenous status to the NHVPR began in 2007 for all jurisdictions except the 
Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Tasmania, where transmission did 
not occur until 2012. 
Table 3: The years Indigenous status was first collected on HPV consent forms and 
provided to the NHVPR, by jurisdiction, Australia 2014 
Jurisdiction 
Year Indigenous 
status first collected 
Year Indigenous 
status information 
first transmitted 
NHVPR 
ACT 2007 2012 
NSW 2011 2012 
NT 2007 2007 
QLD 2007 2007 
SA 2007 2007 
TAS 2007 2012 
VIC 2007 2007 
WA 2007 2007 
 
The completion of Indigenous status on consent forms is not mandatory in any 
jurisdiction. Follow-up of missing Indigenous status is completed by the vaccine 
providers in all jurisdictions. During consultations, five jurisdictions indicated they 
actively encourage the follow-up of missing Indigenous status. These jurisdictions used 
workshops and consultations to promote the collection of Indigenous status, identified 
and highlighted records with missing information and conducted cross checks with 
other health databases to complete missing information. Table 3 outlines how each 
jurisdiction manages missing Indigenous status on HPV consent forms. 
Victoria was the only jurisdiction that indicated they impute missing Indigenous status. 
Stakeholders from Victorian Department of Health and Human Services stated that if a 
HPV vaccine consent form is provided to the LGC without Indigenous status the record 
should be coded to ‘no’. However, they were unsure if this practice is conducted 
consistently across all LGCs in Victoria. 
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Table 4: Follow up and management of missing Indigenous status on HPV vaccine 
consent forms, by jurisdiction, Australia, 2007-2014 
Jurisdiction Mandatory 
field 
Follow up actions Missing value changed 
ACT No None   
NSW No 
New South Wales health has been 
emphasizing the importance of recording 
of Indigenous status to the Public Health 
Units.  Consent forms scanned into the 
NSW Register without Indigenous status 
recorded are being highlighted to enable 
the capture of this information at the next 
immunisation visit. 
The NSW Health school protocol has 
been amended to require the immuniser 
to ask the child about their Indigenous 
status if the information is incomplete on 
the form. 
 
NT No Cross check with the NT whole of life database  
QLD No 
The school-based program has no 
targeted resources to follow up missing 
Indigenous status. However, QLD health 
has been promoting the collection of this 
field for a number of years to health staff. 
 
SA No None  
TAS No Workshops to encourage vaccine providers to collect Indigenous status.  
VIC Yes 
New vaccination records cannot be 
created unless Indigenous status is 
completed.  
A new value of ‘To Be Advised (TBA)’ has 
been created in the vaccine notification 
system to encourage LGCs to follow up 
missing Indigenous status data. 
-  Missing data 
reclassified to ‘No’ for 
years 2007 to 2013. 
From 2014- missing 
reclassified “to be 
advised”  
WA No None  
5.2.3 Barriers to collecting Indigenous status 
During the consultations I asked jurisdictions about the barriers they believed impacted the 
completion of Indigenous status in school-based programs and for private providers.  
5.2.3.1 School-based Program 
All stakeholders thought Indigenous status was acceptable field on the HPV consent 
forms, as they had not received complaints from parents or schools about the question. 
The main barriers identified by stakeholders for the school-based programs were 
classified into two groups: 1) social and knowledge; and 2) consent form format. 
There were three main barriers identified through consultations that were classified as 
social and knowledge: 1) awareness of the use of Indigenous status; 2) self-
identification of the parent or guardian; and 3) literacy capabilities. 
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Seven stakeholders thought the most common barrier to collecting Indigenous status 
was misconceptions about why the question is being asked. They suggested 
parents/guardians may not see Indigenous status as relevant to vaccinations and may 
neglect to answers the question. Two stakeholders stated the completion of Indigenous 
status is dependent on which parent/guardian completes the consent form. They 
suggested if one parent/guardian identifies as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander 
and the other does not, whoever fills in the form may complete the question based on 
their own self-identity. 
Three stakeholders suggested a potential barrier may lie with literacy capabilities of the 
parent/guardian. If a parent/guardian is illiterate or English is not their primary language 
they may not understand how to answer the question. These stakeholders suggested 
consent forms should be available in different languages (as required) or vaccination 
providers should engage with local communities and verbally explain the form. This 
would of course need to be addressed at a local level and would rely heavily on 
resources available. 
There were three main barriers identified with the consent form format: 1) the layout; 2) 
number of questions; and 3) how Indigenous status is requested. 
Five stakeholders suggested the layout of the form, such as the font size and 
positioning of questions may be confusing, while three stakeholders suggested the 
number of questions on consent forms may be overwhelming. Both barriers could 
result in the question about Indigenous status being overlooked, misunderstood or 
ignored by the parent/guardian. 
The last barrier identified in this category related to how Indigenous status is 
requested. Four of the nine stakeholders suggested single tick responses (for example 
Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander) or the use of binary responses (such as ‘are you 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander’ YES/NO) inadvertently excludes a person who 
identifies as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander or both. Not being able to identify with 
the population groups listed the parent/guardian may skip or ignore the question. 
5.2.3.2 Completion of Indigenous status by General Practitioners 
Consultations revealed stakeholders thought barriers in private settings were a result of 
the perceptions and attitudes of healthcare providers. All stakeholders thought of GPs 
and practice staff may be reluctant to ask a person’s Indigenous status as they either 
perceive the question to be of little relevance, feared it could be considered racist or 
would invoke an aggressive response from the patient.  
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Five stakeholders suggested that GPs and practice staff may also assume the 
Indigenous status of a person based on their appearance or previously formed 
assumptions. These predetermined opinions may have led to the misclassification of a 
person’s Indigenous status as it had been determined without consulting with the 
patient.  
5.2.3.3 Actions taken to address Indigenous status underreporting 
During the follow up consultations I asked stakeholders if they had taken any actions to 
improve Indigenous status since the first stage consultations. All jurisdictions indicated 
they were working towards improving the collection of Indigenous status within the 
school-based programs and have undertaken actions including linking data from other 
databases, active follow up of missing information and changes to vaccination 
database collection tools. The actions undertaken by each jurisdiction are outlined in 
Appendix 11.3. 
5.3 Data analysis 
Due to the potential of the force cleaning of Indigenous status by Victoria, which may 
have led to misclassification of Indigenous status of NHVPR records from this 
jurisdiction. For this reason, data from Victoria was not been included in the below 
analysis. 
There were 1,448,388 female HPV vaccination records provided to the NHVPR from 
2007 to 2012 from all states and territories excluding Victoria. Of these 3% were of 
Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander origin, 44% were non–Indigenous and 53% did 
not have a valid Indigenous status reported. By age the largest number of records were 
from the 12 to 13 years age group (31%, 447,989/1,448,388) followed by 14 to 15 
years (16%, 231,506/1,448,388) and 16 to 17 years (10%, 151,202/1,448,388)  
(Table 5), consistent with the target age groups of the Program. The median age was 
16, with a range of 0 to 112 years. 
Fifty-nine percent (858,072/1,448,388) of HPV vaccination records were provided to 
HPV consumers through school-based programs. Most of which were provided to 
females aged 0 to 17 years. Geographically, 59% (991,822/1,448,388) of HPV 
vaccines were provided to females who resided in major cities, 29% 
(413,000/1,448,388) to females who resided in regional areas and 3% 
(42,305/1,448,388) to females who resided in remote areas. By jurisdiction, 41% of 
HPV consumers resided in New South Wales, 29% in Queensland, 13% in Western 
Australia, 10% in South Australia, 3% in Tasmania, 2% in the Australia Capital Territory 
and 2% in the Northern Territory.  
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Table 5: Details of female HPV vaccine records in the NHVPR as of 14 March 2014, 
2007 to 2012, Australia 
Indigenous status n % 
Known 683,948 47.22 
Unknown or missing 764,440 52.78 
Age group 
0-11 years 57,257 3.95 
12-13 years 447,898 30.92 
14-15 years 231,506 15.98 
16-17 years 151,202 10.44 
18-19 years 109,692 7.57 
20-26 years 439,889 30.37 
27 years and over 10,944 0.76 
Provider 
Schools program 858,072 59.24 
Non-schools program 590,316 40.76 
ASGS 
Major Cities 991,822 68.48 
Regional 413,000 28.51 
Remote 42,305 2.92 
Unknown or missing 1261 0.09 
Jurisdiction 
ACT 34,415 2.38 
NSW 602,360 41.59 
NT 24,051 1.66 
QLD 417,329 28.81 
SA 137,080 9.46 
TAS 43,485 3 
WA 189,503 13.08 
Unknown or overseas 165 0.01 
Note: Data from Victoria is not included.  
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5.3.1 Completion of Indigenous status 
Fifty-three percent (764,440/1,448,388) of female HPV vaccinations records were 
reported with unknown Indigenous status between the years 2007 and 2012 (Table 5). 
While there were small declines the proportion of unknown Indigenous status from 
2008 to 2011, the most notable changes occurred in 2012, with the proportion of 
unknown Indigenous status dropping from 54% in 2011 to 25% in 2012 (Figure 2). This 
drop was the result of the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and 
Tasmanian school-based programs providing Indigenous status data to the NHVPR for 
the first time.  
Figure 2: Proportion of female vaccination records in the NHVPR with and without 
Indigenous status records, by year, 2007 to 2012, Australia 
 
Note: Excludes data from Victoria 
5.3.1.1 Age distribution  
The proportion of unknown Indigenous status by age was highest in the 0 to 11 years 
age group at 69%, followed by the 14 to 15 years age group at 62% and the 16 to 17 
year age group at 60% (Figure 3). The 18 to 19 years age group and the 26 to 26 years 
age group had the lowest proportions of unknown Indigenous status, at 43% and 45% 
respectively.  
When I examined the proportion of unknown Indigenous status by age group over time, 
I found from 2009 to 2012 the proportions of unknown Indigenous status declined in the 
4-26 
 
0 to 11, 12 to 13, 14 to 15 and 16 to 17 years age groups. For all other age groups 
small variations occurred over the period, with no distinct trend. 
Figure 3: Proportions of female HPV vaccine records in the NHVPR, by vaccination 
age group and stated Indigenous status, 2007 to 2012, Australia  
 Note: Excludes data from Victoria 
5.3.1.2 Jurisdiction  
The proportion of HPV vaccination records with unknown Indigenous status varied by 
jurisdiction (Figure 4). Overall, the Northern Territory had the lowest proportion with 
only 4% of records reported without Indigenous status. For Queensland, this proportion 
was less than a third, while for South Australia it was almost half (49%) and for WA is 
was 63%. As the school-based programs for the Australian Capital Territory, New 
South Wales and Tasmania did not provide Indigenous status until 2012, they have not 
been included in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Proportion of female HPV vaccination records, by jurisdiction and Indigenous 
status, 2007-2012, Australia 
Note:  
1. Excludes data from ACT, NSW and TAS as Indigenous status information was not provided to the NHVPR 
until 2012. 
2. Excludes data from Victoria 
5.3.1.3 School-based Program 
For the vaccinations provided as part of the school-based programs consumers 
residing in Western Australia displayed the highest proportion of unknown Indigenous 
status (Table 6). Peaking at 91.6% of all female records in 2008, this proportion 
declined from 2009 to 13.2% in 2012. The Northern Territory and South Australia 
displayed similar trends, but the magnitude was substantially smaller. South Australia 
was the only jurisdiction in which these changes over time were significant. 
Queensland was the only jurisdiction that showed considerably increases in the 
proportion of unknown Indigenous status during the period. Queensland displayed an 
upward trend in the proportion of unknown Indigenous status, rising from 13.3% in 
2010 to 49.5% in 2012. However, the displayed rise in unknown Indigenous status in 
Queensland is thought to be a result of a change from manual to automated data 
reporting. This change in reporting began in 2012 and resulted in difficulties with the 
transfer of Indigenous status to Queensland Health’s HPV vaccination database.  
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Table 6: Proportion of female HPV vaccine records from school-based vaccination 
programs without Indigenous status, by year and jurisdiction, 2007 to 2012, Australia 
Jurisdiction 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 p value 
ACT* -- -- -- -- -- 97% - 
NSW* -- -- -- -- -- 11.2% - 
NT 2.6% 4.5% 3.2% 3.9% 1.6% 2.5% >0.05 
QLD 13.5% 12.7% 16.8% 13.3% 21.2% 49.5% >0.05 
SA 21.9% 23.0% 14.9% 10.6% 9.8% 9.6% <0.05 
TAS* -- -- -- -- -- 47.5% - 
WA 81.1% 91.6% 82.2% 49.9% 26.1% 13.2% >0.05 
Notes: 
1. * Indigenous status information was not provided to the NHVPR until 2012. 
2. Excludes data from Victoria 
5.3.1.4 Private providers 
The proportion of unknown Indigenous status reported by private providers declined 
from 2010 in all jurisdictions except in the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania. 
The proportion of unknown indigenous status reported by private providers in 
Tasmania increased to 85% in 2011 before declining in 2012 to 74%, while for the 
Australian Capital Territory changes were more varied, with increases the proportion of 
unknown indigenous status occurring in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012. Consistent with 
the findings for the school-based programs, the changes over time were only significant 
for South Australia. 
However, changes in the proportions of unknown Indigenous status for private 
providers from 2010 onwards should be interpreted with caution. The number of 
vaccinations provided privately declined substantially in 2010 coinciding with the 
cessation of the HPV vaccine incentives for GPs. In 2010, 2011 and 2012 the number 
of HPV vaccinations administered by private providers each year was less than 5,300 
nationally. 
Table 7: Proportion of female vaccination records from private providers without 
Indigenous status, by year and jurisdiction, 2007 to 2012, Australia 
Jurisdiction 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 p Value 
ACT 53.7% 48.3% 50.3% 60.7% 43.8% 69.2% >0.05 
NSW 46.1% 44.2% 41.7% 52.9% 27.1% 18.9% >0.05 
NT 7.1% 11.6% 13.6% 0.0% 4.3% 2.5% >0.05 
QLD 24.8% 26.6% 29.0% 31.5% 25.0% 27.0% >0.05 
SA 95.8% 93.7% 92.6% 83.5% 51.4% 26.9% <0.05 
TAS 40.0% 43.2% 47.6% 78.3% 85.0% 74.0% >0.05 
WA 51.5% 58.0% 60.9% 74.3% 48.1% 43.9% >0.05 
Notes: 
1. * Indigenous status information was not provided to the NHVPR until 2012. 
2. Excludes data from Victoria 
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5.3.1.5 Australian Statistical Geographic Standard (ASGS) 
Major cities had the highest proportion of unknown Indigenous status (55%), followed 
by regional areas (49%) and remote areas (29%). From 2007 and 2011 each ASGS 
area displayed steady declines in the proportion of unknown Indigenous status. In 
2012, the proportion of HPV vaccination records with unknown Indigenous status in 
each ASGS area declined markedly, falling to 24% in major cities, 26% in regional 
areas and 11% in remote areas (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Proportion of unknown Indigenous status female HPV vaccine records by 
ASGS and year, 2007 to 2012, Australia 
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6. Discussion 
Accurate vaccination coverage estimates are considered essential in assessing the 
effectiveness of the HPV vaccine in the population. To calculate these estimates, high-
quality and complete data are required. Although my analysis found some improvement 
over time in the collection of Indigenous status in NHVPR data, overall the collection of 
remains poor in the NHVPR. From 2007 to 2012 just under half of female HPV vaccine 
records were reported to the NHVPR without a valid Indigenous status.  
The insufficient reporting of Indigenous status is ubiquitous in many Australian 
healthcare datasets (21-23, 25-27) and is not unique the NHVPR. This project sought to 
identify the barriers which impede the collection of Indigenous status for females in the 
NHVPR and provide recommendations to reduce the effect of these barriers and 
improve Indigenous status identification. 
In analysing, data by jurisdiction, I identified that the Northern Territory and 
Queensland were the only jurisdictions in which there has been sufficient reporting of 
Indigenous status to calculate vaccine coverage estimates. This is consistent with 
previous review of the data.(19) The insufficient reporting of Indigenous status data by 
jurisdiction makes it difficult to estimate, with any level of accuracy, the HPV 
vaccination coverage by Indigenous status nationally. This is a concern given the 
importance of maintaining high HPV coverage rates in Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait 
Islander women.(16, 18)  Although my stratification by age, ASGS and provider identified 
gaps in the completion of Indigenous status, it was unclear from this analysis why 
these gaps are occurring.  
A review of the literature and the results of the consultations identified there are 
potentially a number of barriers affecting the collection of Indigenous status in the 
NHVPR. The three main barriers identified were: misconceptions about Indigenous 
status; the layout and presentation of Indigenous status questions on consent forms; 
and variations in data collection methodology and administration of school-based HPV 
vaccination programmes. 
Misconceptions about the purpose and implications of Indigenous status reporting were 
found to be the principle barrier to data collection. At the consumer level, 
underreporting of Indigenous status may arise when a parent/guardian is disinclined to 
disclose the Indigenous status of their child as they do not understand the relevance of 
the question. It has been suggested that a person’s propensity to disclose Indigenous 
status is associated with previous experiences of racism, the belief healthcare will be 
provided differently if disclosed, or not knowing why this information is relevant to 
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healthcare. (37, 41) Providing information about the importance and use of Indigenous 
status to parents/guardians may counter these misconceptions. 
Misunderstandings at the healthcare provider level about the collection and use of 
Indigenous status data also appears to be contributing to the underreporting. The 
literature and consultations suggested healthcare providers actively avoid asking a 
patient’s Indigenous status as they perceive it is either irrelevant to providing 
healthcare, may provoke an aggressive response or is only being asked to regulate 
funding. (37, 38) These perceptions are thought to have developed due to the lack of 
information and training provided to healthcare providers about the relevance and use 
of Indigenous status in healthcare data. (36, 37) 
In addition to these misconceptions, specific barriers to data collection through the 
school-based programmes were identified, including poor or confusing layouts of the 
HPV consent forms, the way in which Indigenous status is requested, and variations in 
data collection methodology and administration. 
Upon reviewing each of the jurisdictions’ HPV consent forms, I found the layout, 
number of questions and the positioning of the Indigenous status question varied 
considerably. It is possible that the differing structure of HPV consent forms has 
contributed to the variations in the completion of Indigenous status identified in the 
data. This concept was supported by the consultations, with stakeholders suggesting 
that parents/guardians may overlook, ignore or misunderstand what they are being 
asked, as the consent forms are overcrowded, hard to read and/or difficult to interpret. 
Another barrier relating to the layout of the forms was the varying terminology used to 
collect Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander data between jurisdictions. I found that 
in 2013 four jurisdictions were not collecting Indigenous status as recommended in the 
Guidelines. The need for national consistency regarding the inclusion and wording of 
Indigenous status on school-based vaccination program consent forms has been 
identified previously.(44) Inconsistencies in terminology used for define Aboriginal and/or 
Torres Strait Islander people could partially explain why some jurisdictions had a higher 
numbers of records with missing Indigenous status compared to others.  
As a result of my consultations, in 2014 three jurisdictions updated the Indigenous 
status question on HPV consent forms to align with the Guidelines.  I was unable to 
find evidence to suggest that changing the way in which Indigenous status is requested 
improves its reporting. As these three jurisdictions have changed the way in which they 
request Indigenous status, there is an opportunity to examine if standardising 
Indigenous status on healthcare forms improves the likelihood of the data being 
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completed. Future analyses of data from these three states should include provision to 
analyse the impact this change has had on completion rates of Indigenous status.  
Finally, inconstancies in way the data are collected and managed for school-based 
programs could also explain the differences in the Indigenous status completion. 
Although a number of jurisdictions have undertaken actions to improve the collection of 
Indigenous status, follow up of missing information is at the discretion of the vaccine 
provider. At the time of writing this report it is not clear to what extent these actions 
have had on the completion of Indigenous status. 
There are a number of activities that could be undertaken to minimise the impact of the 
barriers discussed in this report. Firstly providing information explaining why 
Indigenous status is collected, its uses and benefits through improved vaccination 
policies for the Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander communities should be included 
on vaccine consent forms or provided on an information sheet. Currently, none of the 
jurisdictional school-based consent forms provided information to consumers or 
healthcare providers explaining why Indigenous status is collected. Adding a short 
explanation about the collection of Indigenous status promotes cultural safety and 
ensures the healthcare being provided is respectful of person’s culture and beliefs, and 
free from discrimination.(39,45) 
Secondly, there is a need to provide education promoting better awareness of 
Indigenous status collection amongst vaccination providers (both schools and private). 
Whilst some jurisdictions have already undertaken these steps, it needs to be 
considered in all jurisdictions and potentially standardised at a national level.  
Finally, there is a need to gather information and evaluate the collection methodologies 
of HPV vaccination data in each jurisdiction. Having a better understanding of how the 
data are collected and managed within each jurisdiction will enable actions to be 
targeted towards specific barriers affecting the completion of Indigenous status at the 
source of collection. 
A major limitation with this study was the exclusion of vaccine providers, general 
practitioners, parents/guardians and Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people 
from the consultation process. Limiting consultations to jurisdictional health 
departments is likely to result in confirmation bias, seeking or interpreting evidence that 
are partial to an individuals or institutions existing beliefs.(46) Undertaking broader 
consultations would have provided support for the barriers identified in the literature 
and/or identified other barriers that have not been considered in the analysis. 
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Limitations also lie with errors in data provided to the NHVPR. From the consultations it 
became apparent that some local areas and/or jurisdictions may have been imputing 
Indigenous status on records with missing information. The extent of this imputation 
was not able to be determined as part of this study, leading to the possibility that the 
data presented in the analysis may have under-represented the degree of missing 
Indigenous status in the NHVPR.  
7. Conclusion 
Understanding the barriers encountered when collecting Indigenous status for the 
NHVPR is complex. The findings of my report has identified some of the barriers 
affecting Indigenous status reporting to the NHVPR, but as this is issue is often 
impacted by a vast range of factors, it has only scratched the surface. Working towards 
improving statistical information about Indigenous health not only requires national 
standards to guide information collection but also requires research into issues that 
prevent the disclosure or request of Indigenous information. To completely understand 
the issues relating the completion of Indigenous status in the NHVPR, broader 
consultations with vaccine providers and consumers and ongoing review and 
evaluation of collection methodologies needs to be undertaken. 
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8. Recommendations 
Based on the analysis outlined above, I recommend the Department of Health and the 
Victorian Cytological Service consider the following recommendations: 
 Develop, in consultation with jurisdictions, standard wording that can be used to 
explain the purpose of the collection of Indigenous status for HPV vaccine 
administration and how the data are used in healthcare statistics. 
 Develop a national dataset that could be used for other immunisation databases. 
To ensure standardisation in the collection of data across Australia, this should 
include a data dictionary which defines what the terms ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘Unknown’ and 
‘blank’ mean for Indigenous status. 
 Liaise with the General Practitioners (GP) Round Table to identify ways to 
promote/remind GPs to report HPV vaccine and Indigenous status to the 
NHVPR.  
 Undertake qualitative studies to gather better information about the propensity to 
disclose or not disclose Indigenous status information from the parent/guardians, 
general practitioners and other private providers and Aboriginal and/or Torres 
Strait Islander people. 
 In line with the recommendations of the Guidelines, and in consultation with the 
jurisdictions, consider making Indigenous status a mandatory field for HPV and 
other immunisation data collections. 
 Implement and conduct annual reviews of Indigenous status completion for both 
female and male HPV vaccination records held in the NHVPR. These analyses 
should be stratified by jurisdiction and provider, to assess the changes in 
completeness over time, identify gaps and improvements in reporting, and 
develop, in consultation with jurisdictions, strategies to maintain adequate 
reporting levels. 
 Evaluate if making changes to the way Indigenous status is requested in the 
Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and Tasmania have had any effect 
on the completion of Indigenous status in these jurisdictions. 
 Review the results of the pilot study conducted in Victoria to improve the 
completion of Indigenous status by Local Government Councils. 
 Work with New South Wales and Western Australia to increase frequency of 
transmission of school-based program data to the NHVPR.  
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11. Appendices 
Appendix 10.1 – Details of the literature search  
Appendix Figure 1: Flow chart depicting the search criteria, review process and final document number, by search tier  
PubMed 
Primary search HPV or human 
papillomavirus vaccination (MeSH 
heading) AND [Indigenous OR 
Indigenous & Australia OR 
Indigenous status & healthcare 
(subheadings)] 
Secondary search Indigenous status 
(MeSH heading) AND [healthcare 
collections OR health system OR 
recording OR recording & Australia 
OR recording & HPV OR recording & 
improving OR Human papillomavirus 
OR vaccinations OR missing 
(subheadings)] 
Medline 
Primary search HPV or human 
papillomavirus vaccination (MeSH 
heading) AND [Indigenous OR 
Indigenous & Australia OR 
Indigenous status & healthcare 
(subheadings)] 
Secondary search Indigenous status 
(MeSH heading) AND vaccination 
OR healthcare collections OR [health 
system OR recording OR recording 
& Australia OR recording & HPV OR 
recording & improving OR Human 
papillomavirus OR vaccinations OR 
missing (subheadings)] 
44 articles 
71 articles 
Scanned titles & abstracts 
Removal of duplicates 
19 articles 
207 articles 
28 articles 
Limits 
English Articles 
Humans 
No reviews/ letters/ 
comments/ clinical trials
LIMITS
Humans 
English Articles 
Primary studies 
No reviews/ letters/ 
comments/ clinical trials
78 articles 12 articles 
5articles 
31 articles 
20 articles 
8 articles 
5 articles 
12 unique 
documents 
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Appendix Table 1: Summaries of the eight unique documents reviewed  
Author, 
year (Ref) 
Study 
design Setting Population 
Data source(s) & 
measurement Study size Results 
Adams, 
Kavanagh 
& Guthie, 
2004   
(35) 
Cross-
Sectional 
Hybrid 
Victoria 
March 2002 
BreastScreen(BS) 
Victoria Staff in 
eight regional 
areas. 
 
Survey completed 
by staff members 
assisting clients 
with completion of 
BS1 forms before 
screening. 
 
Audit of 
Indigenous status 
at first and last 
visit by a client at 
the 8 regional BS 
centres. 
Self-administered 
structured questionnaire 
returned via mail. Fishers 
exact was used to compare 
difference in employment 
categories of BS staff and 
regions. 
 
Audit 
Random sample- records 
with Indigenous on their 
last visit. Discrepancies 
were identified by 
comparing Indigenous 
status at first visit and last 
visit. 
 
Best practice 
AIHW  and  ABS guidelines 
Response rate 
92%(n122) 
 
 
 
Audit 
200 records 
Staff survey
 34% not following best practice guidelines. 
 45% felt something prevented them asking Indigenous status. 
Statistical significance p=0.001 between 8 regions. 
 16% left Indigenous status blank. 
 7% received informal and formal training to seek Indigenous status. 
Audit 
 25% Indigenous status not recorded at first visit. 
 4% recorded as unknown. 
 29% discrepancies from first to last visit. 
Review of best practice guidelines 
 not meeting the best practice recommendations. 
 unable to record Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. 
 born overseas could not identify as Indigenous. 
 No not stated category. 
Australian 
Bureau of 
Statistics, 
2012 
(41) 
Focus 
Groups 
All Australian 
Capital Cities 
except  
Canberra and 
Adelaide in 
2012 
Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander people 
located in Sydney, 
Melbourne, 
Brisbane, Perth, 
Darwin and 
Hobart 
Focus groups were 
conducted in 2012 
explored the concepts of  
 Reasons for identifying 
and not identifying as 
Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander or both; 
 Impact of collection 
mode; 
 Identifying in behalf of a 
third party (or the 
experience of having 
ones identity disclosed 
by a third party); 
 Changes in identification 
behaviours overtime. 
 
203 Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait 
Islander people 
 
18 focus group 
sessions 
 Factors which encouraged identifying as of being Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander included : 
 A sense of pride and confidence in their identity; 
 The perception disclosing the identity leads to benefits for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people; and 
 The perception disclosing the identity promotes recognition for 
issues relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. 
 Factors which discouraged identifying as of being Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander included : 
 The belief and experience that identifying: 
  may lead to negative consequences for an individual or 
they wider community; and 
 May lead the racism, discrimination or differential 
treatment. 
 Learned behaviour as a result of past experiences 
 Being offended at being asked the identity questions in some 
contexts;  
 Needing more information about the reason why identity is 
being asked; and 
 Concerns about privacy and confidentiality of information; and 
 Young Aboriginal people not raised in a community setting 
less likely to identify. 
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Author, 
year (Ref) 
Study 
design Setting Population 
Data source(s) & 
measurement Study size Results 
 Other factors that discouraged disclosure of identity included: 
 Who was conducting the survey; 
 The content, purpose and relevance; 
 Perceived relevance of the identity question; 
 Access to information being collected; and 
 Practical considerations such as timing, durations and setting. 
 Other notable findings included: 
 Propensity to identify was the same regardless of how a 
survey is enumerated; 
 Younger participants were more likely to disclose identity then 
older participants; 
 It is unacceptable to provide another person identity unless the 
person was an immediate family member (for example child). 
 Identification can promote issues relating to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people; 
 Need for more accurate statistics  for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people; 
Australian 
Institute of 
Health and 
Welfare, 
2013 
(22) 
Self-
administered 
survey 
Australia 
December 
2003 to 
January 2004,  
Randomly 
stratified sample 
of General 
Practitioners 
nationally  
Two part questionnaire 
was mailed to GPs. 
 
Part 1: all GPs- asked 
recommendations for 
vaccinations , the NPII 
program, promotional 
activities, methods of 
Identifying Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander 
people; how many patients 
were of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander origin 
 
Part 2: GPs who 
immunised Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander 
adults – asked how many 
vaccinations episodes by 
age and type; ease of 
access to vaccines; models 
of immunisation; 
collaboration with other 
sectors 
 And methods of patient 
data collection 
1,653 (701 
responded, 
response rate 
43%) 
 
Asking a patients Indigenous status:
 32% of GPs thought Indigenous status routine for every patient; 
 Of the remaining 68% - 56% of GPs asked only if they thought the 
patient was Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander; 42% did not 
routinely asked; 33% rely on patients to self-identify; 
Reasons for not asking for Indigenous status: 
 Of the 42% of GPs who did not routinely ask for Indigenous status; 
19% indicated it was too difficult to ask and 64% stated Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander patients rarely attend they practice. 
Barriers to immunisations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people 
 60% were unsure if they were the sole health care providers; 
 8% indicated difficulty in accessing vaccine supplies 
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Author, 
year (Ref) 
Study 
design Setting Population 
Data source(s) & 
measurement Study size Results 
Brough, 
Shannon & 
Haswell-
Elkins, 
2001 
(37) 
Hospital 
Census 
 
 
Brisbane, QLD 
Mid 1996 
Patients and staff 
at the Royal 
Brisbane, 
Women’s and 
Children’s 
Hospital (Major 
Brisbane public 
hospital complex) 
Mid 1996 wards in the 
hospital complex randomly 
selected for patients. 
 
Interviewer conducted 
structured 
questionnaire with patients 
in 2 parts- Part 1 all 
patients; part 2 semi-
structured questionnaire 
only for patients that 
identified as Indigenous 
patients 
 
Interviewer conducted 
structured questionnaire 
with staff 
451 patients 
Royal  children’s 
and  Brisbane 
hospitals 
 
Number staff 
interviewed not 
provided 
 
Staff interviews:
 Nursing and clerical staff indicated difficulties in asking indigenous 
status of patients. 
 Ethnicity question was sensitive as patients as they don’t see this 
question relevant to their treatment. 
 Ambiguity surrounding ethnicity question irritated patients. 
Patient interviews: 
 5.5% identified as Indigenous. 
 59.2% recalled filling in admission form. 
 44% of identified as Indigenous on admission forms. 
 Discrepancies in hospital records. 
 6.4% in study compared to 3.6 in hospital records @ children’s 
hospital. 
 2.7% in study compared to 0.96% in hospital records @ royal 
Brisbane. 
 36.6% all participants asked about ethnicity. 
 Of Indigenous patients 32% asked about ethnicity. 
 50.8% all participants knew why ethnicity was asked. 
Jackson 
Pulver, 
Bush & 
Ward, 
2003 
(38) 
Interviewer-
administered 
survey. 
Sydney,  
May to July 
1999. 
Consecutive 
sample of women 
who delivered live, 
well infants  
Interviewer-administered 
survey was divided into two 
parts.   
 
Part one included all 
participants. 
 
Part two asked questions 
only of women who 
identified as Aboriginal 
and/or Torres Strait 
Islander asked an 
additional 6 questions 
536 women  
 29 (5%) self-disclosed as being Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander; 
 Only 10 identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander in hospital 
records. 
  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women referred by another 
organisation significantly more likely than those who self-referred to 
KVG Hospital to be correctly identified.  
 Nine of the 29 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women recalled 
being asked either by a staff member. 
 1% of non-Aboriginal women indicated they would have objected to 
being asked if they were Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander by staff. 
 Two thirds of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women in 
the study stated they would  feel more comfortable if there were 
more Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander staff working at the 
hospital. 
Lovett, 
2006 
(39) 
Interviewer-
administered 
survey. 
Calvary 
Hospital, 
Canberra, 
2005 
 
Hospital staff 
based in  Public 
Hospitals in 
Canberra, the 
Austrian Capital 
Territory 
Presentation to staff at the 
admissions and discharge 
office. Information sheet 
and  
Self-administered survey 
provided after presentation. 
 
Follow up visits to collect 
questionnaire 
17 of 40 staff 
(response rate 
43%) 
 
7 responding staff 
were ward clerks 
and 9 were 
administrative 
officers 
 Limited understanding as to why Indigenous status is collected. 
 Staff feared asking people accessing hospital about their 
Indigenous status as they anticipated they would receive an 
aggressive response from both non-Indigenous and Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people. 
 May staff though the purpose of asking was related to funding. 
 Most staff were aware of and used the ABS standards question for 
Indigenous status. 
 Staff justified not colleting Indigenous status as they believed that 
we are all Australians and should be treated equally, implying they 
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Author, 
year (Ref) 
Study 
design Setting Population 
Data source(s) & 
measurement Study size Results 
believed ethnic groups within Australian received preferentially 
treatment. 
 There appeared to be relationship between education levels of staff 
and their attitudes towards collection Indigenous status, with those 
with education levels higher than year 12 more likely to think 
collecting the information was important. 
Public 
Health 
Information 
Developme
nt unit, 
University 
of 
Adelaide, 
2004 
(40) 
Data 
analysis 
review 
Data collected 
through 
communicable 
disease 
surveillance 
systems 
across 
Australia. 
 
Survey of relevant 
literature from 1997 
 
Consultations with 
jurisdictional health 
departments 
 
Interviews and surveys 
with identified key 
stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
Completion of Indigenous status in the jurisdiction communicable 
disease notification system in 2002: 
 26% NSW, 44% IN Vic, 26% QLD, 55% WA , 72% SA, and 92% 
in NT; 
 TAS results were not available; 
 ACT had very few notifications with Indigenous status completed. 
The review found  the limitations with current Indigenous status 
information included: 
 Differences in jurisdiction in legislation, notification and reporting 
systems; 
 Regional reporting structures; 
 Core business viewpoints; 
 Concerns about data sharing; 
 Limited capacity to engage with Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander populations; 
 Deficiencies in systems such a pathology and services, and 
resources; 
 Deficiencies in primary data collection and baseline information 
(population numbers); 
 Data not being transferred specially for pathology based services; 
 National information of on-communicable disease not readily 
available; 
 Data is incomplete and of dubious quality; 
 Not collected at the national standard; 
 Data collections lack quality assurance and do not account for 
population mobility or cross-border issues; 
 Lack of training to collect and value the information; 
 Lack of public health awareness; and 
 Information is not non-integrated.  
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Appendix 10.2- List of activities being taken to improve Indigenous 
status data in the NHVPR by jurisdictional health departments 
1. Tasmania, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have updated their HPV 
consent forms to reflect the national standards provided by AIHW on how to ask 
Indigenous status in health collections. These changes took effect in 2014. 
2. New South Wales health has been emphasizing the importance of recording of Indigenous 
status to the Public Health Units. The NSW Health school protocol has been amended to 
require the immuniser to ask the child about their Indigenous status if the information is 
incomplete. Consent forms scanned into the NSW Register without Indigenous status 
recorded are being highlighted to enable the capture of this information at the next 
immunisation visit. The recording of Indigenous status has improved significantly in the last 
year.  
3. Northern Territory encourages all school based vaccine providers to ask Indigenous status 
at the time of vaccination if it is incomplete on the consent form. 
4. Queensland Health has been encouraging their staff to follow up missing Indigenous status 
information since the vaccine program was introduced. However this is not consistent 
across the state as not all school vaccines are administered by Queensland Health staff. 
5. Tasmania has been holding consultations with vaccination providers and GPs. These 
consultations have been used to educate and encourage vaccine providers and GPs about 
the need to complete the Indigenous status field. These consultations have also been used 
to inform GPs about providing HPV notification forms to the NHVPR. 
6. Victoria is running a pilot study to improve the completion of Indigenous status by Local 
Government Councils (LGC). In selected LGCs they are trialling the use of a new function 
in the jurisdictional database. New vaccination records cannot be created unless 
Indigenous status is completed. A new value of ‘To Be Advised (TBA)’ has been created to 
allow the record to be entered but encourage the follow up of missing Indigenous status 
information. Victoria is hoping to have this new function rolled out across the state in 2015. 
7. In 2013, Victoria changed Its HPV vaccination legislation to enable schools to provide 
personal information about students to LGCs. 
8. Western Australia has been monitoring the completion of Indigenous status on HPV 
vaccination forms. It has seen a marked improvement in the completion of this field since 
the program began in 2007. 
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Appendix 10.3 - Summary of consultations with key jurisdictional 
stakeholders  
Summary of consultations with key jurisdictional 
Summary notes of consultations with key jurisdictional 
stakeholders regarding the collection of Indigenous status 
for HPV vaccinations 
Project background 
In conjunction with the Victorian Cytology Service, the Department of Health (Health) is 
investigating the completion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Indigenous) status in the 
National HPV Vaccination Program Register (NHVPR). Using data from the NHVPR and 
information collected via consultations with jurisdictional health departments, the aims of the 
project are to identify if Indigenous status of females is underreported in the NHVPR and what 
barriers exist that could be impeding its collection. 
As part of the project, consultations were conducted with all jurisdictions from August 2013 to 
July 2014 and focused on two areas: 1) what barriers they believed impede the collection of 
Indigenous status; and 2) what actions could be taken to improve the collection of this variable. 
Results of consultations 
Below are the aggregated responses from the consultations. They have been divided into two 
topics; 1) barriers to collecting Indigenous status and 2) actions already taken by jurisdictions to 
improve Indigenous status collection. 
1. Barriers to collecting Indigenous status 
The consultations asked jurisdictions about the barriers they believed impacted the completion 
of Indigenous status. The most common barriers identified by the jurisdictions include: 
School based program: 
These barriers relate to collection of Indigenous status through the HPV vaccination consent 
forms provided through the school-based National HPV Vaccination Program. 
1.1. Parents, guardians and students may not understand why the question is being 
asked: This particular barrier was identified by all jurisdictions and was considered to 
be the most common reason as to why Indigenous status was not provided. Some 
jurisdictions suggested that providing information to explain why the question is asked 
may help improve Indigenous status completion. This information could be provided on 
the consent forms or as a separate information sheet. 
1.2. The completion of the Indigenous status depends on who fills out the HPV 
vaccine consent form: This barrier was identified by two jurisdictions. Completion of 
Indigenous status on the consent forms may vary depending on whether the student 
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or the parent has completed the consent form. Some jurisdictions suggested providing 
information about the importance of collecting Indigenous status, as outlined above, 
may help reduce this barrier. However it would be difficult to determine whether this is 
occurring and if the provision of information has any impact. 
1.3. Indigenous is status not thought to be a high priority in the provision of 
healthcare. All jurisdictions identified this as a barrier to collection Indigenous status. 
They indicated that the question may be accidently or internally missed as it is not 
considered to be as relevant to the healthcare being provided. This barrier leads back to 
1.1, in which there is a misunderstanding as to the importance of collection of this 
information in healthcare settings. 
1.4. The parent(s) of the child may not want the school to known their ethnicity. One 
jurisdiction identified this as a barrier and is considering conducting a pilot study to 
assess if this barrier exists. As part of the study, a reply-paid envelope will be provided 
with each vaccination consent form to enable parents to send forms back to the vaccine 
providers without going through the school. 
General Practitioners: 
The barriers outlined below relate to the completion of Indigenous status on the HPV 
notifications forms, which are provided to GPs by jurisdictional health departments when they 
request a HPV vaccine dose. 
1.5. General Practitioners and practice staff are reluctant to ask Indigenous status as 
they feel it is either not relevant to healthcare or considered asking the question 
to be racist. This was the most common barrier identified by jurisdictions as to why 
Indigenous status may be incomplete on the HPV notification forms. Whilst all 
jurisdictions identified this barrier, some indicated they believe this issue is declining 
within their jurisdiction. 
1.6. General Practitioners and practice staff may assume the Indigenous status of a 
person based on appearance. Six jurisdictions identified this barrier and highlighted it 
is likely to result in Indigenous status being incorrectly completed on notification forms. 
Jurisdictions were unsure how this barrier could be addressed. 
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Other barriers: 
The barriers outlined below were identified by a number of jurisdictions, but relate to the 
construction of the HPV consent and notification forms and social issues. 
1.7. Structure of how Indigenous status is asked on the consent or notification forms. 
Four jurisdictions thought that the way in which Indigenous status is asked on consent 
forms may result in its incompletion. If the form uses the below responses, Indigenous 
status may be incomplete as it does not enable individuals who identify as only an 
Aboriginal or as a Torres Strait Islander or both to choose a relevant category. 
Single tick box 
Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander  
Binary response  
“Is your child of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin?”  YES/NO 
1.8. The placement of the question on consent forms. Three jurisdictions noted that if 
the placement of the Indigenous status question is not prominent on the form it could be 
overlooked. 
1.9. Too many questions on the notification or consent forms. One jurisdiction 
suggested if there is a large amount of information requested in the form, than 
Indigenous status may be overlooked. To address this issue the jurisdiction suggested 
either reducing the number of questions on the form or moving Indigenous status to a 
more prominent position. 
1.10. Literacy issues – This barrier was identified by one jurisdiction and relates to parents 
who may be functionally or medically illiterate or for whom English is not their primary 
language. This Jurisdiction suggested that providing forms in a number of different 
languages and/or have vaccination providers engage local communities and verbally 
explain the vaccination form may reduce this issue. However, this would need to be 
addressed at a local level and would rely heavily on available resources. 
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2. Actions already taken by jurisdictions to address Indigenous status 
reporting 
2.1. Tasmania, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have updated their HPV 
consent forms to reflect the national standards provided by AIHW on how to ask 
Indigenous status in health collections. These changes took effect in 2014. 
2.2. New South Wales health has been emphasizing the importance of recording of 
Indigenous status to the Public Health Units. The NSW Health school protocol has been 
amended to require the immuniser to ask the child about their Indigenous status if the 
information is incomplete. Consent forms scanned into the NSW Register without 
Indigenous status recorded are being highlighted to enable the capture of this 
information at the next immunisation visit. The recording of Indigenous status has 
improved significantly in the last year.  
2.3. Northern Territory encourages all school based vaccine providers to ask Indigenous 
status at the time of vaccination if it is incomplete on the consent form. 
2.4. Queensland Health has been encouraging their staff to follow up missing Indigenous 
status information since the vaccine program was introduced. However this is not 
consistent across the state as not all school vaccines are administered by Queensland 
Health staff. 
2.5. Tasmania has been holding consultations with vaccination providers and GPs. These 
consultations have been used to educate and encourage vaccine providers and GPs 
about the need to complete the Indigenous status field. These consultations have also 
been used to inform GPs about providing HPV notification forms to the NHVPR. 
2.6. Victoria is running a pilot study to improve the completion of Indigenous status by Local 
Government Councils (LGC). In selected LGCs they are trialling the use of a new 
function in the jurisdictional database. New vaccination records cannot be created 
unless Indigenous status is completed. A new value of ‘To Be Advised (TBA)’ has been 
created to allow the record to be entered but encourage the follow up of missing 
Indigenous status information. Victoria is hoping to have this new function rolled out 
across the state in 2015. 
2.7. In 2013, Victoria changed Its HPV vaccination legislation to enable schools to provide 
personal information about students to LGCs. 
2.8. Western Australia has been monitoring the completion of Indigenous status on HPV 
vaccination forms. It has seen a marked improvement in the completion of this field 
since the program began in 2007. 
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1. Prologue 
1.1. Role 
I was the lead author investigator in this evaluation. I formulated and developed the 
survey instruments used to undertake consultations with four key stakeholder groups: 
two via telephone interviews and two completed electronically by stakeholder. I 
extracted, cleaned and analysed laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications from the 
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), influenza-like-illness 
general practice presentations from the Australian Sentinel Practices Research 
Network (ASPREN) and influenza hospitalisations from the Influenza Complications 
Alert Network (FluCAN) to evaluate key attributes of the NNDSS as an influenza 
surveillance system. I also developed a project proposal and requested laboratory 
testing data to investigate if influenza testing data could be utilised for national 
reporting activities.  
1.2. Lessons learnt 
By completing this evaluation I have learnt about the structure, purpose and objectives 
of the NNDSS and how it relates to communicable disease surveillance in Australia. I 
have learnt how to use and interpret laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications from 
the NNDSS and understand the limitations of using notification data for this disease. 
From my review of the literature and consultations with the influenza epidemiologists I 
have expanded my understanding of influenza biology, epidemiology, illness and its 
impact internationally and within Australia. I have also gained a comprehensive 
knowledge of the systems used to in the surveillance of influenza nationally and how 
the NNDSS fits into this structure. 
A key lesson I learnt in undertaking this evaluation, is to always go back to the basics 
and plan, plan, plan. During the course of this evaluation I had underestimated the 
need to plan the data analysis component. Assuming the statistical analyses for this 
evaluation were pretty straight forward, I inadvertently overlooked some key steps. This 
evaluation has taught me that no matter how small the analysis or how organised you 
think you are, you should always have a written plan of attack. 
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1.3. Public health implications 
This evaluation is the first to review the surveillance of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
collected through the NNDSS. Outcomes of this study have provided the Department of 
Health with recommendations to improve the analysis and use of laboratory-confirmed 
influenza surveillance in Australia. Results of this evaluation are to be presented to the 
National Influenza Surveillance Committee in 2015 and will provide the basis for 
decisions to improve the data quality, reporting and analysis of laboratory-confirmed 
influenza from the NNDSS.  
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2. Abstract 
The Australian National Influenza Surveillance Scheme combines reporting of influenza 
activity from sentinel general practice consultations for influenza-like illness (ILI), 
consultations rates for ILI presentations at hospital emergency departments, influenza 
hospitalisations, laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications, community based data 
collections and mortality data. These data are used to guide the appropriate public 
health responses to influenza, including the development of guidelines on vaccination, 
antiviral treatments and the assessments of additional medical resources. The National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) is one of the primary influenza 
surveillance systems used in Australia. Collecting data for all laboratory-confirmed 
influenza, it provides information on circulating viruses, demographic details and 
characterises the Australian seasonal and inter-seasonal periods.  
The Australian Government Department of Health initiated this evaluation of laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS to assess the utility of notifications in 
meeting the national influenza surveillance objectives. This evaluation was conducted 
using the Updated Guidelines for Evaluating a Public Health Surveillance Systems 
developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta. These 
guidelines provided the framework to described and evaluate the attributes of the 
system. To understand the usefulness of laboratory-confirmed influenza in the NNDSS 
four primary stakeholder groups were surveyed: (a) the National Influenza Surveillance 
Committee, (b) jurisdictional heath department data managers, (c) the Department of 
Health influenza epidemiologists, and (d) NNDSS data managers. 
The evaluation revealed the NNDSS is an acceptable, simple and useable system, 
providing high quality data for the national surveillance of laboratory-confirmed 
influenza in Australia. The system is perceived by stakeholders to be highly valuable 
and was found to contribute to four of the six national objectives for influenza 
surveillance in Australia.  
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3. The public health importance of influenza in Australia 
Influenza is an acute viral disease that is highly contagious and can affect large 
numbers of people in a limited space of time. (1) Clinical symptoms of influenza include 
fever (38-39°C), myalgia, cough, sore throat, headaches, coryza, vomiting, nausea, 
diarrhoea and prostration.(2, 3) Symptoms normally onset suddenly, and infection is 
communicable for 3 to 5 days in adults, and 7 to 10 days in children. Disease severity 
of influenza ranges from asymptomatic to mild-upper respiratory tract illness and 
severe complications including pneumonia.(4) This severity is determined by features 
intrinsic to the virus, including its similarity to previous circulating strains, vaccine 
strains, and host factors such as the presence of chronic conditions, pregnancy and 
smoking.(5) Influenza is predominantly transmitted via large droplets (other modes of 
transmission include nuclei and contact transmission) and its incubation period is 
estimated to be on average 2 days.(2, 6)  
There are three types of the influenza virus: influenza A, influenza B and influenza C. 
Influenza viruses A and B are the most common virus seen in humans and are the 
cause of significant morbidity and mortality worldwide.(7) While infections with influenza 
C viruses occur in humans, they are less common and often associated with a milder 
disease.(6)  
Influenza A is divided into subtypes based on two proteins on the virus’s surface: the 
haemagglutinin (H) and the neuraminidase (N). There are 18 different H subtypes and 11 
different N subtypes. The subtypes of influenza A viruses currently circulating widely 
amongst humans include A (H1N1) and A (H3N2).(2) The primary reservoir of influenza A 
viruses is aquatic birds, but these viruses can also circulate in other animals including pigs, 
horses and seals.(2) Influenza A viruses are the most likely to develop into pandemic 
based strains, and have been responsible for four pandemics in the 20th century: 1918 
“Spanish influenza”; 1957 “Asian Flu”;1968 “Hong Kong” H3N2 virus; and 2009 H1N1 
“Swine Flu”.(7-9) Influenza B is not divided into subtypes, but assigned two antigenically 
distinct lineages that have been in circulation worldwide since 1983; B/Yamagata and 
B/Victoria.(10) Humans are the primary reservoir for influenza B viruses.  
Both influenza viruses A and B cause annually reoccurring seasonal outbreaks in 
temperate regions, with activity peaking during the winter months; November  to April 
for the northern hemisphere and May to October for the southern hemisphere. (9) The 
circulating strains identified during the northern hemisphere influenza season are often 
mirrored in the subsequent southern hemisphere season.(1,7)   
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Depending on the strains circulating during the annual influenza season, attack rates 
can range anywhere between 2% to 10% in the general community, and to more than 
50% in closed population groups, such as nursing homes and schools.(2, 3, 11)  Global 
estimates suggest influenza results in three to five million cases of severe illness and 
between 250,000 to 500,000 deaths each year.(3,9) In 2013, influenza was the was 
reported as the underlying cause of death in 80 deaths in Australia, representing a rate 
of 0.1 per 100,000 population.(12) However, this rate is thought to be an 
underestimation of the influenza mortality as relatively few deaths are specifically 
coded as influenza. A study conducted in 2008 (13) found that the annual excess 
mortality attributed to influenza was 6.4 per 100,000 populations in those aged 50 to 64 
years and 116.4 per 100,000 population in those aged 65 years and over, suggesting  
the mortality burden of influenza is much higher in Australia than current statistical data 
indicates. 
The severity of influenza is unpredictable and whilst the majority of cases recover 
approximately one week after symptom onset, some people are either hospitalised or 
develop life threatening complications such as pneumonia.(3) In 2013, it was estimated 
that 5,400 hospital admissions were due to infection with influenza in Australia.(14) Of 
these, 68% were in persons under 65 years of age.  
Influenza infections result in an extensive socio-economic burden.(15,16) Estimations 
from the United States suggest that the total annual cost of influenza is $US87 billion, 
of which $US10 billion accounts for all direct medical costs, such as medical 
consultations and hospital fees. (3,17) In France and Germany, it is estimated that 
annually influenza costs from $US10 to $US15 billion, (11) and in Guangdong province 
China, the annual medical cost for influenza-like-illness (ILI) is estimated to be $US115 
million.(15) 
In Australia, the indirect costs associated with influenza, such as loss in working time 
and productivity, are considered to have the highest economic burden.(11,18,19) Per 
influenza episode, on average 3 to 5 days of work are lost, resulting in substantial 
losses in productivity and economic growth.(11,17) The cost of influenza to the Australian 
health care system is considerable. Between April 2000 and March 2006, influenza and 
ILI was attributed to 310,000 General Practitioner (GP) consultations and 18,400 
hospitalisations, with a combined estimated cost to the Australian health care system of 
$AUD115 million.(17)   
In order to allocate health care resources, determine public health interventions and 
develop cost effective programs, surveillance of influenza needs to be conducted 
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frequently and over time.(19) In Australia, the surveillance of influenza is conducted 
using information from community, primary and tertiary health care and laboratory 
based settings. This report details an evaluation of the laboratory confirmed influenza 
surveillance through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). 
4. Evaluation Framework 
4.1. Aims and objectives of the evaluation 
To evaluate surveillance of laboratory-confirmed influenza in Australia by: 
 systematically and objectively evaluate laboratory-confirmed influenza 
surveillance against the objectives of national influenza surveillance; and  
 providing recommendations to improve the collection and analysis of laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS. 
This evaluation was conducted using the Updated Guidelines for Evaluating a Public 
Health Surveillance Systems developed by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), Atlanta.(20) These guidelines provided the framework in which I will 
describe and evaluate the surveillance of laboratory-confirmed influenza in the NNDSS.  
4.2. System Description   
To describe the NNDSS I collected information from the Australia Government 
Department of Health (the Department of Health) website, the NNDSS annual reports 
and face-to-face consultations with the Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance 
(VPDS) epidemiologist responsible for influenza and NNDSS data managers in the 
Office of Health Protection (OHP) at the Department of Health.  
4.3. Evaluation of the attributes and usefulness  
Attributes of the NNDSS for influenza surveillance were defined and evaluated as 
follows: 
 Acceptability – the willingness of persons and organisations to provide to and use 
laboratory-confirmed influenza data from the NNDSS. 
 Data quality – the completeness and accuracy of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications in the NNDSS. This was measured by examining the completeness 
and accuracy of the National Surveillance Committee (NSC) priority data fields 
for influenza. These include: 
o sex; 
o age at onset; 
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o date of birth; 
o true onset date; 
o specimen date; 
o Indigenous status; 
o influenza subtype; 
o death; and 
o laboratory diagnosis method. 
 Flexibility – the NNDSS ability to adapt to the changing information needs or 
operating conditions for the surveillance of laboratory-confirmed influenza. 
 Positive predictive value – the proportion of notifications that truly have influenza 
infection.  
 Stability – the reliability (ability to collect, manage and provide data without error) 
and availability (ability to be operational when it is needed) of laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS. 
 Sensitivity – the ability for the NNDSS to capture laboratory-confirmed influenza 
in the community, measured by the NNDSS’s ability to: 
o detect and report the proportion of influenza occurring in the community by 
analysing the inter-seasonal laboratory-confirmed notifications numbers from 
2008 to 2013; and 
o  detect outbreaks of influenza. 
 Simplicity – the structure of the NNDSS and the ease in extracting notifications 
for surveillance activities. 
 Representativeness – the representativeness of laboratory-confirmed influenza in 
the NNDSS, measured by comparing the age distribution of NNDSS laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications with: 
o the age distribution of aggregated Australian Sentinel Practices Research 
Network (ASPREN) ILI presentations; and 
o the age distribution of laboratory-confirmed cases reported the Influenza 
Complications Alert Network (FluCAN), a sentinel Hospital surveillance 
system. 
 Timeliness – the ability of the NNDSS to receive laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications to produce timely accurate results and reports, measured by 
calculating the median number of days for laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications to be confirmed by a laboratory, sent to a jurisdictional health 
department and provided to the NNDSS.  
 Usefulness – the extent laboratory-confirmed influenza NNDSS notifications 
contribute to the understanding of the influenza picture in Australia. 
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4.4. Engagement with key stakeholders 
The key stakeholders for the surveillance of influenza in Australia were identified with 
the assistance of the Department of Health (Appendix 12.1). I conducted consultations 
with members of the National Influenza Surveillance Committee (NISC) (Appendix 
12.2a), the Department of Health influenza epidemiologists (Appendix 12.2b), 
jurisdictional data managers (Appendix12.2c) and NNDSS data managers 
(Appendix 12.2d).  
4.4.1. National Influenza Surveillance Committee (NISC) 
NISC is a sub-committee of the Communicable Disease Network Australia (CDNA). 
Membership comprises of the Department of Health influenza epidemiologists, 
jurisdictional surveillance officers and epidemiologists and other influenza surveillance 
systems (ASPREN, FluCAN, FluTracking) coordinators and managers. Members of 
this committee frequently use NNDSS data to assess influenza activity in Australia. 
NISC members, except the Department of Health epidemiologist, were contacted by 
email to partake in the consultations and semi-structured interviews were conducted by 
phone from April to August of 2014. 
4.4.2. Jurisdictional data managers 
Each jurisdiction has one or more data managers or surveillance officers that are 
responsible for the transmission of notification data from the jurisdiction’s database to 
the NNDSS. The role data managers and surveillance officers varies between the 
jurisdictions, with some performing all tasks relating to the storage, maintenance and 
transference of notification data, while others oversee the process conducted by a 
dedicated data team. Data managers and surveillance officers were contacted by email 
to partake in the consultations and semi-structured interviews were conducted by 
phone in May of 2014. 
4.4.3. Department of Health influenza epidemiologist and NNDSS data 
managers 
There are two influenza epidemiologist and two NNDSS data managers placed within 
VPDS in the OHP at the Department of Health. The roles of the epidemiologist are to 
monitor and report on influenza activity in Australia, co-ordinate national influenza 
surveillance and manage contracts for sentinel influenza surveillance systems. The 
roles of the NNDSS data managers are to monitor and maintain the NNDSS, run 
system diagnostics, conduct quality assurance checks and assist jurisdictions with the 
transmission of notification data to NNDSS. Consultations with the Department of 
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Health influenza epidemiologist and NNDSS data managers were conducted using a 
self-administered electronic survey developed in Survey Monkey™. Each participant 
was emailed a web link and asked to complete the survey over a 2 week period in May 
and June of 2014. 
4.4.4. Scope of consultations 
Consultations with NISC members and the Department of Health influenza 
epidemiologist focused on the usefulness, acceptability, flexibility, sensitivity and 
stability (Table 1). The consultations with the jurisdictional and NNDSS data managers 
focused on the practicalities of sending and receiving data, the flexibility of 
communicable disease notification systems and NNDSS data specifications. 
Information collected during the consultations were recorded, stored and analysed 
using Survey Monkey™. 
Table 1: List of attributes evaluated in stakeholder consultations, by stakeholder group 
and method of consultation 
Attribute Stakeholder Consultation method 
Acceptability NISC member 
Department of Health epidemiologist 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Data quality NISC member 
Department of Health epidemiologist 
Jurisdictional data manager 
NNDSS data manger 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Flexibility Jurisdictional data manager 
NNDSS data manger 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Stability NISC member 
Department of Health epidemiologist 
Jurisdictional data manager 
NNDSS data manger 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Sensitivity NISC member 
Department of Health epidemiologist 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Simplicity NISC member 
Department of Health epidemiologist 
Jurisdictional data manager 
NNDSS data manger 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Representativeness NISC member 
Department of Health epidemiologist 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Timeliness NISC member 
Department of Health epidemiologist 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
Usefulness NISC member 
Department of Health epidemiologist 
Phone consultation 
Electronic survey 
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4.5. Data analysis 
Notifications of laboratory-confirmed influenza with a diagnosis date between 1 January 
2008 and 31 December 2013 were extracted from the NNDSS on 18 August 2014 and 
analysed using Stata version 13™ and Microsoft Excel 2012™. Diagnosis date is a field 
derived by the NNDSS from date of onset, or where the date of onset is not known, the 
earliest of the specimen collection date, notification date (date when health 
professional signed notification or the laboratory issued results), or the notification 
received date (date the notification was received by jurisdictional health authority). Age-
specific notification rates were calculated using Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
mid-year populations from 2008 to 2013. 
5. Analysis of laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications in 
the NNDDS, 2008-2013 
There were 198,617 notifications from 2008 to 2013. Over this period, the seasonal 
pattern and timing of influenza notification activity remained relatively consistent, 
however each season’s and inter-seasonal duration and magnitude varied (Figure 1). 
The lowest notification numbers occurred in 2008 (n=9,175) and, as a result of the 
2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, the highest number of notifications occurred in 
2009 (n=59,028).  
Although the number of laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications declined 
substantially following the 2009 pandemic, notifications reported to the NNDSS 
increased from 13,468 in 2010 to 44,570 in 2012, before declining to 28,333 in 2013.  
Since the 2009 pandemic, annual influenza notifications have been substantially higher 
compared with previous seasons (2007 and 2008), which were considered at the time 
to be severe. (21, 22) While the increase in notifications since 2009 may imply that the 
2010 to 2013 seasons were severe, evidence suggest that since 2007, and particularly 
after 2009, there has been a steady increase in and more widespread testing of 
influenza in Australia. Increases in notifications from 2010 are more likely to be a 
reflection of a rise in testing being undertaken than an actual increase in disease or 
severity of illness. (24) 
Of the notifications reported over the surveillance period females accounted for 52.2% 
(n=103,622). Rates of notification were higher amongst females in most age groups, 
except for those aged less than 15 years, and those aged 84 years and over. The 
median age of notifications during this reporting period was 30 years, with a range of 0 
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to 113 years. The highest number of notifications occurred in the 0 to 4 years age 
group, which accounted for 13% of all notifications (Figure 2).   
Figure 1: Seasonality of laboratory–confirmed influenza notifications, by week and 
year, Australia 2008-2013 
 
Variations in rates of influenza by age group and time reflect the circulating influenza 
viruses. The 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013 influenza seasons were dominated by the 
pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus.(22) This particular strain is more likely to 
affect younger age groups and display a downward trend with increasing age.(23) In 
comparison, the 2012 season was dominated by influenza A(H3N2), which commonly 
affects those aged under 10 years and those aged 70 years and over.(24) 
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Figure 2: Age-specific notification rates of laboratory- confirmed influenza, Australia, 
2008 to 2013, by age group and year 
 
6. System description – National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System 
The NNDSS is one system used for the surveillance of influenza in Australia. 
Developed in 1990 under the auspices of the Communicable Disease Network 
Australia (CDNA), the NNDSS is used to collate information for 69 communicable 
diseases that have been agreed to be nationally reported. However, whilst these 
diseases are listed in the National Notifiable Disease List (NNDL), not all have been 
made a notifiable in each jurisdiction. 
The NNDSS collects a core dataset which includes five mandatory data fields: unique 
record reference number, notifying jurisdiction, disease code, date of notification to the 
jurisdictional health department and confirmation status (confirmed or probable case).  
Non-mandatory core data fields, collected as part of the national dataset, include age, 
sex, Indigenous status, postcode of residence, date of disease onset, death, and 
outbreak reference.  
If relevant, additional information is collected on species, serogroups/subtypes and 
phage types of organisms, and vaccination status of the case. The NNDSS also 
collects enhanced surveillance information for newly acquired hepatitis B and 
hepatitis C, invasive pneumococcal disease, donovanosis, gonococcal infection, 
syphilis infection less than 2 years duration and tuberculosis. Enhanced data fields 
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include but are not limited to country of birth, residency status, site of infection and risk 
factors for infection. 
The National Health Security Act 2007 provides the legislative basis for, and authorises 
the exchange of health information, including personal information, between 
jurisdictional health departments and the Australian Government.(26,27) The Act provides 
a legislative instrument to establish the National Notifiable Diseases List, which 
specifies the diseases for which personal information can be exchanged.(27) In order for 
data to be provided under the Act, the National Health Security Agreement 2008 was 
developed and provides the operational arrangements to formalise and enhance 
existing surveillance and reporting systems.(28) 
6.1. National surveillance of influenza in Australia 
There are six objectives of national influenza surveillance. They are to: 
 provide an early alert for the onset of influenza epidemics; 
 facilitate the characterisation of an epidemic; 
 evaluate the impact of clinical, laboratory and public health measures; 
 isolate and characterise circulating viruses; 
 assess the impact of influenza (health service demand, health impact, 
economic and social impacts); and 
 ensure accurate information is available in a timely manner.(29) 
The National Influenza Surveillance Scheme (the Scheme) combines the influenza 
activity reporting from community based data, sentinel general practice consultations 
for ILI, consultations rates for ILI presentations at hospital emergency departments, 
influenza hospitalisations, mortality data, laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications 
and virological surveillance. These data are used to guide the appropriate public health 
responses to influenza, including the development of recommendations on vaccination 
and antiviral treatments and the assessments of additional medical resources. Figure 3 
outlines the surveillance systems used to monitor influenza in Australia. 
The National Surveillance Committee (NSC) ensures the data quality and consistency 
of data collected in the NNDSS. NSC has prioritised the completion of the following 
data fields for surveillance of laboratory-confirmed influenza: subtype, date of birth, 
laboratory diagnosis method, Indigenous status, specimen date and death.  
6.2. Purpose of influenza surveillance using the NNDSS  
The NNDSS collects data on all laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications in 
Australia. This collection is directed by a nationally agreed case definition and national 
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core data specifications. Influenza notifications have been collected in the NNDSS 
since January 2001 and these data are used to provide information on circulating 
influenza viruses, demographic details and characterise the seasonal and inter-
seasonal periods. Whist the majority of jurisdictions have provided influenza 
notifications to the NNDSS since 2001, it wasn’t until 2008 that all jurisdictions were 
able to provide laboratory-confirmed influenza notifactions to the NNDSS. (30, 31)  
Figure 3: Levels of influenza surveillance operating in Australia, 2014 
 
6.3. National Surveillance Case definition for influenza  
The national surveillance case definition for influenza includes confirmed cases only. A 
confirmed case requires laboratory definitive evidence of either: 
 isolation of influenza virus by culture from appropriate respiratory tract 
specimen;  
OR 
 detection of influenza virus by nucleic acid testing from appropriate respiratory 
tract specimen; 
OR 
 laboratory detection of influenza virus antigen from appropriate respiratory 
tract specimen; 
OR  
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 IgG seroconversion or a significant increase in antibody level or a fourfold or 
greater rise in titre to influenza virus; 
OR 
 single high titre by CFT or HAI to influenza virus. 
6.4. Population under surveillance 
As a national system, the NNDSS provides surveillance data for laboratory-confirmed 
influenza notifications in the entire Australian population.  
6.5. Data sources  
Treating doctors, diagnostic laboratories and hospitals report notifiable communicable 
diseases to jurisdictional health departments under the provisions of the jurisdictions 
public health legislation. Under the National Health Agreement 2008, jurisdictional 
health departments forward de-identified notification data electronically to the NNDSS 
on a daily basis. This flow and use of notification data is depicted in Figure 4. 
NNDSS influenza notifications are analysed by the Department of Health influenza 
epidemiologists and provided fortnightly to the CDNA. These data are also provided 
through the Department of Health’s website and through the Communicable Diseases 
Intelligence journal (CDI). NISC and CDNA provide the forums in which influenza 
notifications are discussed by the jurisdictions and the Department of Health, along 
with other institutions, sentinel surveillance system managers and key stakeholders. 
NISC jurisdictional members have indicated that the majority of influenza notifications 
are provided by diagnostic laboratories. However, in some jurisdictions notifications are 
also provided by treating clinicians (57%, 4/7) and hospitals (30%, 2/7). To calculate 
influenza notification rates, ABS mid-year population data are used and updated 
regularly within the NNDSS. 
6.6. Transference and management  
Jurisdictional health departments transmit data for laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications through the Department of Health Data Acquisition system (DAS). Since 
2008 all jurisdictions have provided notification data using this system. Each jurisdiction 
has its own purpose built database that stores and manages notification data. The 
platforms used for these systems include Oracle™, Microsoft Access™ and MAVEN™. 
The NNDSS is operated on an Oracle™ platform. 
Six jurisdictions automatically transmit data to the NNDSS and two generate (require 
users to manually send the data) a notification extract. Transmissions to the NNDSS 
occur daily, and in some jurisdictions hourly. All jurisdictional data managers stated 
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their notification systems were highly reliable and all transmission to the NNDSS is run 
routinely without failure. Data managers indicated interruptions to transmission would 
only occur if there was catastrophic failure in an external server or DAS collapsed. 
Figure 4: Data flow of laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications in to the NNDSS  
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For data to be accepted in the NNDSS, the Department of Health’s DAS runs a number 
of business rules and data checks. Table 2 details the business rules used for all 
disease notifications to be accepted by the NNDSS. Data quality checks are not 
conducted on free text fields such as subgroup or the multiple entry fields such as 
laboratory diagnosis method. There are currently no logical data checks (i.e notification 
date occurs before specimen date) conducted by DAS. However, at the time of writing 
of this evaluation, work was being undertaken to identify where these logical rules are 
needed and how they can be implemented in the future. 
Table 2: Data rules relating to the all notified disease including laboratory-confirmed 
influenza uploaded into the NNDSS 
Data rule Data fields applied to Manual entry available 
Completion of mandatory field 
with accepted value for the 
disease as outlined in the 
NNDSS data specifications 
 Confirmation status 
 State code 
 Disease code 
 Notification received date 
 Notification ID 
 
Meets the values as specified 
by the NNDSS data 
specifications 
 Indigenous Status 
 Sex 
 Death 
 Age onset (0> & <103) 
 
Date is not in the future (i.e 
notification for 2017 when year 
is 2014) 
All date fields (birth, specimen, 
notification, notification 
received, & true onset) 
 
Date not before 1901 Date of birth 
Yes, on a case by case basis. 
Completed by NNDSS data 
managers 
Date not before 1960 Vaccination date  
Date not before 1991 
 True onset date 
 Notifications date 
 Specimen date 
 Notification received date 
Yes, for chronic conditions – 
hepatitis B & C, tuberculosis, 
syphilis unspecified, leprosy 
The Department of Health provides the NNDSS data specifications to all jurisdictional 
health departments. These specifications describe each of the data fields in the 
NNDSS providing the name, alias, description, type of field (i.e numeric, alpha and 
alpha numeric), accepted data values (if applicable) and if it is a compulsory field.  
All jurisdictional data managers indicated they had access to the NNDSS data 
specifications and found them to be useful. However, five suggested some fields, such 
as vaccination status, were confusing and required further clarification. One data 
manager suggested the history of changes to the specifications should be provided to 
enable jurisdictions to review their systems and ensure they meet the data 
requirements of the NNDSS.  
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6.7. Data analysis, reporting procedures and dissemination 
NNDSS influenza notifications are analysed for a variety of purposes. These include 
fortnightly summary tables and reports, annual reports, media and data requests. 
Influenza notifications received in the NNDSS are analysed by the Department of 
Health influenza epidemiologists every fortnight and provided to CDNA in a fortnightly 
summary table. This table provides the number of notifications received in the last 
fortnight and year-to-date (YTD) for each jurisdiction and nationally. To ascertain if any 
action is required, national YTD notifications are compared against the YTD five-year 
rolling mean plus or minus two standard deviations. The summary table is published 
fortnightly on the Department of Health’s website.  
NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications are analysed to determine when 
the start and peak of the annual Australian influenza season occurs. During the annual 
influenza season, NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications are analysed 
fortnightly in conjunction with other influenza surveillance systems and reported in the 
Australian National Influenza Surveillance Report. This report provides an update on 
influenza activity and is published fortnightly on the Department of Health’s website. 
The most comprehensive analyses of NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications are: (1) the Australia's Notifiable Diseases Status: Annual report of the 
NNDSS (NNDSS annual report), (2) the National Influenza Surveillance Scheme 
Annual Report and (3) the quarterly NNDSS summaries. The NNDSS annual report 
compares the historical trends of influenza with the current year’s data and provides 
information on the age and sex distribution of cases, number of notifications by 
jurisdiction, the seasonality of influenza infections and circulating strains. The Annual 
National Influenza Surveillance Scheme report is similar to the NNDSS annual report, 
but provides a more in-depth analysis of influenza in Australia using data from the 
NNDSS and other influenza surveillance systems. The quarterly NNDSS summaries 
provide the number of notifications reported by jurisdictions in the preceding quarter. All 
three reports are published in CDI.  
Finally, data are analysed to provide responses to data and media requests. Data 
requests are processed by the Department of Health influenza epidemiologists, and 
depending on their complexity, sensitivity and detail, may be reviewed by CDNA. Basic 
aggregated data, data caveats and in some cases de-identified line-listed data are 
provided. Data for media requests are completed by the Department of Health 
epidemiologist and require the clearance of OHP executives. 
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There are three problems that currently exist with the analysis of influenza notifications 
by the Department of Health. Firstly, there are often small discrepancies between 
NNDSS influenza numbers and the jurisdictional numbers. Although laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications are transferred daily from jurisdictional databases, 
delays in receiving the information may also occur when DAS rejects notifications that 
do not comply with the NNDSS business or data rules (Table 2). Rejected notifications 
may not be addressed by the jurisdictions for some time, causing discrepancies 
between the numbers in the NNDSS and jurisdictional databases. 
The second is the insufficient subtype information provided for the majority of influenza 
notifications. Forty-eight percent of influenza A notifications received by the NNDSS 
between the years 2008 to 2013 had incomplete or missing sub-typing information 
(Table 5). This issue was raised by NISC members and was considered to be one of 
the biggest weaknesses with NNDSS. These stakeholders considered sub-typing vital 
to understanding the current epidemiology of influenza, as it characterises circulating 
viruses. One NISC member stated: 
‘Laboratories should be encouraged by the Department of Health to complete sub-
typing of all positive influenza A results.’  
Finally, the dissemination of influenza notification data from the NNDSS data in reports 
is slow. Whilst the Department of Health is working towards improving this issue, at the 
time of writing this report, 2008 was the latest Annual National Influenza Surveillance 
Scheme Report and 2011 was the latest NNDSS annual report. To ensure the 
objectives of influenza surveillance are continued to be met, the Department of Health 
needs to work towards a more timely analysis and reporting of laboratory-confirmed 
influenza data. 
6.8. Accessing laboratory-confirmed influenza data in the NNDSS 
Summary data are available from the Communicable Disease Australia (CDA) website 
and reports for laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications are available on the 
Department of Health website. These provide the numbers or rates of influenza 
notifications by jurisdiction, month, year, age group and sex. Summary data outputs are 
also available through the reports previously described and noted in Figure 4.  Results 
of the stakeholder consultations indicated that the majority of NISC members accessed 
NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza data through the Australian Influenza 
Surveillance Report, online summary data and CDNA fortnightly reports (Table 3).  
Accessing NNDSS influenza notification data was considered to be relatively easy. 
Eighty-three percent of NISC members stated data is accessible and readily available. 
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However, 75% of NISC members stated that data publically available is too broad. 
These members suggested extending data available on the CDA website to either 
provide counts and rates as weekly aggregates or de-identified line-listed data. 
One member indicated they found it hard to access the data they required, suggesting 
the Department of Health should: 
‘Provide de-identified line listed data, weekly aggregates rather than monthly, 
data on sub-typing and develop a list of trusted data users who can readily access  
data when required.’ 
The Department of Health epidemiologists were more divided on the ease of accessing 
data. The primary system used within the Department of Health to access laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications is a web interface called “Discoverer”. One 
epidemiologist thought using “Discoverer” was difficult, as there are no training tools 
available and limited information about its functions and usability. In contrast, the other 
epidemiologist thought “Discoverer” enabled easy access to influenza notifications. 
Table 3: Current use of NNDSS influenza notifications by NISC members and the 
resource they use to access the data 
Accesses national influenza data 
through 
NISC 
jurisdictional 
member 
(n=8) 
NISC non-
jurisdictional 
member 
(n=5) 
Total 
Online summary data on the CDA 
website 5 (63%) 5 (100%) 10 
Australian Influenza  Surveillance 
Report and activity update reports 7 (88%) 5 (100%) 12 
CDNA fortnightly report 5 (63%) 3(60%) 8 
NNDSS and Influenza Surveillance 
Scheme Annual Reports (in CDI) 3 (38%) 4 (80%) 7 
Data requests 0 2 (40%) 2 
6.9. Resources and cost required to operate the system 
Two personnel are assigned full-time to the operation of the NNDSS and the 
management of all disease notifications: a data manager (Executive Level 1) and an 
assistant data manager (Australian Public Service (APS) level 6). Both are based 
within the VPDS section of the OHP and are responsible for the day to day operation of 
the NNDSS, assisting the jurisdictional data mangers with transmission and performing 
data quality checks.  
There are two main costs associated with the NNDSS; costs associated with the 
management and maintenance of the NNDSS IT servers and costs associated with the 
technical support requested from the Technology Group (TG).  
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Technical support and maintenance are provided by the TG located within the 
Department of Health. On request from the NNDSS data managers, this group 
performs updates to the NNDSS websites and make changes NNDSS system coding 
(such as data business rules). There is no annual cost associated with these services. 
Charges are applied after a request is made by data managers. For the 2013 to 2014 
financial year requests to TG cost $35,825. 
IBM is contracted by the Department of Health to manage and maintain all of the 
Department of Health’s IT platforms and servers. The services provided by IBM 
include: the physical housing, security and maintenance of the Department of Health IT 
server and maintenance and support the Department of Health’s IT platforms which 
include the NNDSS. The cost associated with these services for the NNDSS were not 
provided for this evaluation. 
7. Surveillance objectives of the NNDSS for laboratory-
confirmed influenza  
There were some difference in opinion between NISC members and the Department of 
Health epidemiologists on which influenza surveillance objectives were met by the 
NNDSS. Most stakeholders agreed the NNDSS enables the long-term epidemiological 
analysis of influenza, identifies trends and patterns of influenza infection and facilitates 
the characterisation of an influenza epidemic (Table 4). However, there was strong 
difference in opinions about the remaining objectives. Eight (67%) NISC members 
thought the NNDSS was not a useful system to provide influenza sub-typing 
information or identify the onset of an influenza epidemic. In comparison, both the 
Department of Health epidemiologists thought the NNDSS met all the objectives, with 
information enhanced by data collected in supporting sentinel surveillance systems. 
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Table 4: Surveillance objectives of laboratory confirmed influenza collected through the 
NNDSS, by stakeholder groups, Australia 2014 
Objectives 
NISC members 
(n=12) 
Department of Health 
epidemiologists 
(n=2) 
Facilitates the ability to identify patterns and trends of 
influenza 9 (75%) 2 (100%) 
Enables long-term epidemiological analyses 9 (75%) 2 (100%) 
Provides data for early alerts reading the onset of 
influenza epidemics 4 (33%) 2 (100%) 
Facilitates the characterisation of an epidemic 8 (67%) 2 (100%) 
Provides information on the subtype of the circulating 
influenza viruses 4 (33%) 2 (100%) 
8. Use of NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza notification 
data 
Influenza notifications are currently used for a number of different activities, which 
varied between stakeholders (Figure 5). Sixty-seven percent (8/12) of the NISC 
members indicated that they used the data to monitor national influenza trends and 
provide comparisons with other systems or across jurisdictions.  Forty-two percent of 
members (5/12) indicated they used the data for influenza reporting in their 
jurisdictions, 25% (3/12) for policy development, and 17% (2/12) for research and to 
inform influenza program management. One member indicated they used the data to 
evaluate influenza public health interventions. 
Both of the Department of Health epidemiologists stated they used NNDSS influenza 
data to monitor national trends, provide comparisons, develop influenza policy, inform 
project management and analyse the impact of influenza in each jurisdiction. One of 
these epidemiologists stated the data can also be used to conduct research and 
evaluate influenza public health interventions. Although both respondents stated the 
NNDSS is a useful indicator of influenza activity, both highlighted factors such as: 
testing practices, notification practices, over-representation of certain at-risk 
populations (children and the elderly) and the health-care seeking behaviours of 
individuals, need to be considered when interpreting laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications from the NNDSS. 
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Figure 5: Current use of NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications, by key 
stakeholders, 2014 
 
9. System performance 
9.1. Acceptability 
I found a major strength of the NNDSS is its high level of acceptability. As a notifiable 
disease in each jurisdiction, it is a legal requirement that all cases of laboratory-
confirmed influenza are reported to jurisdictional health departments. All NISC 
members, the Department of Health epidemiologists and data managers (NNDSS and 
jurisdictional) thought it is acceptable to provide laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications to the NNDSS. The NNDSS is considered by all stakeholders to be a 
primary surveillance system for influenza in Australia, complimented by other smaller 
sentinel systems. NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza data is published regularly on 
the internet, in government reports and commonly cited in research articles and other 
publications.  
9.2. Data quality 
Data quality was assessed by examining how many laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications were provided to the NNDSS with a valid feild entry according to the data 
specifications of the NNDSS. Notifications reported with an “unknown status” were 
considered to be complete in this analysis as they meet the criteria outlined in the 
NNDSS data specifications  
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Overall, I found the NNDSS provides good quality data for the NSC priority influenza 
data fields (Table 5). From 2008 and 2013 the completeness of these fields was high, 
with 60% (6/10) of fields completed in over 90% of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications. Of the incomplete fields, 47.7% of notifications were reported without 
subtype information for influenza A, 40.3% reported without true onset date, 25% 
without death and 19.3% without Indigenous status. Whilst the NSC has prioritised 
fields for Indigenous status and death, improving completeness of these variables is 
difficult. At present, laboratory request forms do not provide the opportunity to collect 
information for Indigenous status or recorded in the case died. Information on these 
variables, if provided to the NNDSS, is provided through a notification by the treating 
doctor or hospital.  
It is difficult to evaluate the accuracy of influenza notifications in the NNDSS. Designed 
to be a repository of information provided by eight individual notification systems, the 
accuracy of data in the NNDSS is heavily dependent on the business rules and data 
quality checks conducted by the jurisdictional health departments. Whilst I enquired 
about the data checks and assurance being conducted in the jurisdictions, there was 
not enough detail provided during the consultations to ascertain the accuracy of 
NNDSS influenza notifications. 
9.2.1. Perceptions of data quality 
NISC members, the Department of Health epidemiologists and data managers 
(NNDSS and jurisdictional) thought the majority of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications in the NNDSS were complete. However, stakeholders suggested the 
completeness of Indigenous status and sub-typing information could be improved.  
Table 5: Number and proportions of completion for core data fields for influenza 
notifications in NNDSS, 2008 to 2013, Australia 
NSC priority field Number of notifications 
Number 
missing data 
Proportion 
missing data 
Subtype for influenza A 161,356 76,952 47.7% 
True onset date* 198,617 80,005 40.3% 
Indigenous status 198,617 38,433 19.3% 
Death 198,617 49,593 25% 
Laboratory diagnosis 
method 198,617 6,587 3.3% 
Specimen date 198,617 3,289 1.8% 
Date of Birth 198,617 222 0.1% 
Age of onset 198,617 208 0.1% 
Residential postcode 198,617 57 0.03% 
Sex 198,617 12 0.01% 
*True onset date refers to the earliest date the case reported exhibiting symptoms to the treating doctor or was 
observed by the treating doctor. This date is provided by the doctor, laboratory or hospital as part of the notification 
made to the jurisdictional health department.  
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9.3. Flexibility 
The NNDSS is not considered to be a flexible surveillance system.  Seventy-five 
percent (6/8) of jurisdictional and both NNDSS data managers thought flexibility was 
the NNDSS weakest attribute as adding, removing and modifying data fields is difficult 
to undertake.  Adding, changing or removing data fields from the NNDSS requires 
agreement from CDNA, an analysis of the system performance needs, user 
acceptance testing and new data specifications. The NNDSS data manger indicated 
that these processes can take months to complete and are dependent on available 
resources and funding. 
Additionally, as data collected by the NNDSS is provided by eight individual 
surveillance systems, any modifications made to the NNDSS will have a flow on effect 
to the jurisdictional systems. Data managers in six jurisdictions stated it is very difficult 
to add, remove or modify data fields to their own notification systems. To make 
changes to these systems they would need to engage the original system developer, 
which is costly and can take months or years to complete. The remaining two 
jurisdictions did not think it would be difficult to add, remove or modify data fields to 
their systems, but also stated making changes would be time consuming and costly.  
9.4. Positive Predictive Value 
As the NNDSS only accepts laboratory confirmed cases of influenza, false positives 
would be notified, suggesting the positive predictive value of the influenza notifications 
in the NNDSS is relatively high. All NISC members and both Department of Health 
epidemiologists stated they thought the notifications in the NNDSS for influenza 
represent only true cases of influenza infection.  
While influenza notifications in the NNDSS are only reported if they are confirmed by 
laboratory testing, the inclusion of single high titre by CFT or HAI to influenza virus in 
the national case definition has raised concerns about “true” influenza incidence 
against the number laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications provided to the 
NNDSS. Notifications based on single high titre can represent high quality evidence of 
probable recent infection when they are combined with clinically compatible influenza 
like symptoms and periods of high influenza activity. If all these conditions are not met, 
single samples with a high titre are considered to be unreliable.(34) The examination of 
this issue is outside the scope of this evaluation, but should be considered in any future 
evaluation of influenza surveillance systems. 
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9.5. Stability 
The NNDSS is perceived to be a stable surveillance system. Data held within the 
NNDSS are able to be integrated easily and regularly to produce fortnightly, quarterly 
and annual surveillance reports. NNDSS data managers and the Department of Health 
epidemiologists indicated they use this system daily and thought it was reliable with 
had minimal down-time in operation. Stakeholders indicated the main weakness 
associated with the stability of the NNDSS are the lack of staff to enter data at the 
jurisdictions, staff turnover, loss of corporate knowledge, the reliance on external 
system developers, and costs in updating or changing the NNDSS.  
9.6. Simplicity 
The reporting of influenza notifications to the NNDSS is relatively simple, with both 
jurisdictional and NNDSS data managers stating the upload of notifications were a 
simple process. Positive laboratory results are provided by public and private 
laboratories in all jurisdictions, by general practitioners and clinicians in four 
jurisdictions and by hospitals in two jurisdictions. The majority of results in Queensland, 
South Australia, Western Australia and New South Wales are electronically transferred. 
In Tasmania, the Northern Territory, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria, 
results are provided by fax or secure printers and manually entered. At the time of 
writing this evaluation, Victoria was in the process of implementing an electronic 
system for laboratory notifications. 
9.7. Representativeness 
Opinions regarding the representativeness of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications in the NNDSS were divided between stakeholders. Eighty-three percent 
(10/12) of NISC members and both of the Department of Health epidemiologists 
thought the laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS did not represent 
the true occurrence of influenza throughout the community. As influenza notifications 
are reliant on laboratory confirmation, stakeholders suggested inherent biases in 
testing practices, health seeking behaviours and notification practices by jurisdictional 
health departments, limited the representativeness of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications in the NNDSS. One of the Department of Health epidemiologists stated: 
‘Our ability to improve representativeness is difficult. As data received in the NNDSS is 
dependent on health seeking behaviours of individuals, notification data is essentially 
opportunistic.’ 
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I examined the representativeness of influenza notifications in the NNDSS by 
comparing the age distribution of these notifications with ILI presentations from 
ASPREN and confirmed influenza hospitalisations from FluCAN.  
9.7.1. Comparing ASPREN and the NNDSS  
ASPREN is a network of sentinel general practices run through the Royal Australian 
College of General Practitioners and the University of Adelaide. This system collects 
de-identified information on ILI and other conditions seen in general practice. 
Established in 1991, it aims to provide an indicator of the burden of disease in the 
primary health care setting and to act as an early warning indicator in the event of an 
influenza pandemic. There are no age restrictions to data collected in this system.  
Overall the NNDSS and ASPREN display similar trends in age, suggesting the 
representativeness of laboratory-confirmed influenza corresponds with ILI 
presentations in general practice settings. In both systems the proportion of 
notifications increased from the 0 to 4 years age group, peaking in the 20 to 49 years 
age group. This trend was consistent from 2010 to 2013. There were small variations in 
proportions between the two systems. The NNDSS proportions were slightly higher in 
the younger age groups compared to ASPREN, while in ASPREN proportions were 
higher in the 50 to 64 years age group compared to the NNDSS. This analysis 
suggests influenza notifications in the NNDSS are representative of ILI presentations in 
primary health care, but perhaps reflect a tendency to test younger children. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of the NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications and 
ASPREN Influenza-Like Illness GP presentations, by age group and year, Australia 
2010 to 2013 
 
9.7.2. Comparing FluCAN and the NNDSS 
FluCAN is a real time hospital sentinel system that was established in 2009. It is 
designed to fill the gap in reliable, comprehensive, consistent and rapidly available data 
on adult influenza hospitalisations, including ICU admissions. (32, 33) Data are collected 
from April to November each year. Patients are selected to participate if they are 
diagnosed with influenza using nucleic-acid detection on respiratory samples. From 
2010 to 2013 the majority of FluCAN notifications were for adults. To increase the 
representativeness by age in the surveillance system, FluCAN began collecting data of 
influenza hospitalizations from paediatric hospitals in 2014. 
There were marked differences in the age groups represented in the NNDSS influenza 
notifications and FluCAN hospitalisations (Figure 7). From 2010 to 2012, the 
proportions of influenza notifications captured in FluCAN for the 0 to 4 years and 5 to 
19 years age groups was lower compared to the NNDSS. However, this difference is 
most likely due to the low representation people aged 0 to 19 years in FluCAN from 
2010 and 2012 (Appendix Table 1). 
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Figure 7: Comparison of the NNDSS laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications and 
FluCAN laboratory-confirmed influenza hospitalisations, by age group and year, 
Australia, 2010 to 2013 
 
In 2010, 2011 and 2013 both systems displayed a peak in notifications for the 20-49 
years age group, before displaying a decline in proportions for those aged 50 years 
and over. In comparison, the age distribution in 2012 was more varied, with FluCAN 
displaying higher proportions of confirmed influenza from those aged 50 years and over 
compared with the NNDSS. However, these variations can be explained by examining 
the dominating influenza viruses in each season. The 2010, 2011 and 2013 influenza 
seasons were dominated by the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, which is 
more likely to affect younger age groups. In comparison, the 2012 season was 
dominated by influenza A(H3N2), which particularly affects preschool-age children and 
older adults.(35) Influenza A (H3N2) is known to be more severe especially in the older 
populations,(36) which may resulted in higher numbers of hospitalisations identified in 
the FluCAN system. Whilst both surveillance systems only collect data for laboratory-
confirmed influenza, as FluCAN only collects data on patients who were hospitalized, 
the population under surveillance in this system are likely to be older and with more 
severe disease, and thus FluCAN would be expected to display higher proportions of 
influenza hospitalizations in the older age groups compared with the NNDSS. 
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9.8. Sensitivity  
The sensitivity of the NNDSS as a surveillance system for influenza is considered to be 
low, as data only represents a proportion (the ‘notified fraction’) of the total cases 
occurring in the community. However, I found that over time the sensitivity of 
laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS appears to have improved. 
Since 2008 the number of inter-seasonal1 influenza notifications received by the 
NNDSS has increased (Figure 8). The duration of the inter-seasonal period before and 
after the annual influenza season were similar from 2008 to 2013, expect for the inter-
seasonal period following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, which was markedly shorter. Inter-
seasonal notifications rose markedly from November 2010, suggesting influenza 
awareness and testing has increased, enabling the NNDSS to capture more 
notifications and potentially increase the NNDSS sensitivity. 
Whilst I have suggested that the NNDSS sensitivity may be improving, it is difficult to 
judge without taking into context the number of tests requested during the period of 
surveillance. Using only positive influenza notification data ignores the potential 
influence of testing patterns has on apparent influenza activity.  
9.8.1. Outbreak detection 
Just over half of NISC members (58%, 7/12) thought the NNDSS would not be able to 
detect geographically localised influenza outbreaks. Members indicated these health 
events are more likely to be detected using jurisdictional notification systems as 
notifications are processed by jurisdictional health departments before they are 
analysed in the NNDSS. Additionally, as NNDSS notifications are analysed fortnightly, 
the likelihood the Department of Health would detect an influenza outbreak before the 
jurisdictions would be low. Forty-two percent (5/12) NICS members thought the 
NNDSS would only be able to detect a multi-jurisdictional outbreak. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1The inter-seasonal period is defined as the period in which influenza activity has returned to baseline. 
Baseline is the usual or average level of influenza activity that occurs during a typical year and remains 
consistent for a period of time. The inter-seasonal periods defined in this evaluation reflect those report 
used by the Australian Government Department of Health which are based on the evaluation of influenza 
activity in the NNDSS and other supporting surveillance systems for each reporting year. These dates 
associated with the inter-seasonal periods for the evaluation report are described on the y-axis in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Number of influenza notifications provided to the NNDSS during the inter-
seasonal period (April to October), by year of diagnosis, Australia, 2008 to 2013 
 
9.9. Timeliness 
Notifications of influenza to the NNDSS play a role in describing the current 
epidemiology of the influenza season. Timeliness is essential to this surveillance 
system to ensure the start and end of the influenza season are detected quickly. To 
assess timeliness, I examined the median and inter-quartile ranges of four time 
intervals. These intervals are described in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Description of the date fields used for analysis of the attribute timeliness, 
evaluation of the laboratory- confirmed influenza in the NNDSS, 2009 to 2013  
Time 
interval description Date description Calculation 
Onset 
to 
Loaded 
The median number of 
days  between a person  
exhibiting symptoms and 
the notification being 
received by the NNDSS 
First loaded date- date the 
notification was first received 
by the NNDSS 
 
True onset date-  the earliest 
data person reported  or 
exhibited symptoms 
First loaded date - true onset 
date 
Notification 
received 
to 
Loaded 
The median number of 
days between the 
jurisdictional health 
department receiving a 
laboratory-confirmed 
influenza notification and 
providing this notification 
to the NNDSS 
First loaded date- date the 
notification was first received 
by the NNDSS 
 
Notification received date- 
date the notification of 
diseases was received by the 
communicable disease section 
of the jurisdictional Health 
authority 
First loaded date - 
notification received date 
Notification 
to 
Notification 
received 
 
Median number of days  
between the confirmation 
of influenza infection and 
the jurisdictional health 
departments receiving the 
notification 
Notification received date- 
date the notification of 
diseases was received by the 
communicable disease section 
of the jurisdictional Health 
authority 
 
Notification date -date when 
health professional signed the 
notification form or the 
laboratory issued the results 
Notification received date – 
notification date 
 
Specimen 
to 
Notification 
Median number of days 
between a specimen 
being provided and 
laboratory confirming 
influenza infection  
 
Notification date -date when 
health professional signed the 
notification form or the 
laboratory issued the results 
 
Specimen date - Date when 
first laboratory specimen was 
taken. 
Notification date- specimen 
date 
Onset 
to 
Specimen 
Median number of days 
between the person 
exhibiting symptoms and 
a specimen being taken 
by a treating doctor or 
hospital 
Specimen date - Date when 
first laboratory specimen was 
taken. 
 
True onset date-  the earliest 
data person reported  or 
exhibited symptoms 
Specimen date – true onset 
date 
Over the period of 2009 to 2013 the median number of days for an influenza 
notification to be uploaded into the NNDSS after the onset of influenza symptoms were 
reported or exhibited was 4 days (IQR 4 days) (Table 7). The median number of days 
for an influenza infection to be confirmed after a specimen was taken was 2 days (IQR 
2 days); for a notification to be reported to the jurisdictional health department after 
infection was confirmed by the laboratory was 0 days (IQR 1 day); and for a notification 
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to be uploaded into the NNDSS after it was received by the jurisdictional health 
department was 1 day (IQR 2 days).  
Table 7: Median, quartile 1, quartile 3 and inter-quartile range (IQR) in days of 
laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS by time interval, Australia 
2009 to 2013 
Time interval Median 
25th 
percentile  
75th 
percentile IQR 
Onset to Loaded 4 days 2 days 8 days 4 days 
Notification received to Loaded 1 day 0 days 3 days 2 days 
Notification to Notification 
received 0 days 0 days 1 day 1 day 
Specimen to Notification 2 days 1 day 4 days 2 days 
Onset to Specimen 0 days 0 days 2 days 2 days 
From 2008 to 2013 median number of days for each time interval remained relatively 
consistent (Table 8). The largest medians and IQRs for all time intervals occurred in 
2009 and 2010, which were approximately 2 to 4 days longer compared with 2011, 
2012 and 2013. These slight delays were a result of the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) 
pandemic.  
During the pandemic period a secondary surveillance system, NetEpi, was used to 
collect enhanced data. Preferring to report to one surveillance system instead of two, a 
number of jurisdictions only uploaded laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications into 
NetEpi during the pandemic period, and New South Wales continued to use NetEpi as 
its influenza reporting system in 2010. The use of this secondary system resulted in the 
NNDSS not receiving a large number of laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications 
from 2009 and 2010 until late 2010, resulting in the large IQR in 2010 (Table 8). 
9.9.1. Perceptions of timeliness 
Two thirds (66%) of the NISC members and both the Department of Health 
epidemiologists considered timeliness to be a strength of this system. One member 
stated that: 
‘Influenza data is provided to the NNDSS on a timely basis. For this reason I 
can use the data to take a quick snapshot of what is happening around the 
country and highlight any areas on concern.’ 
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Table 8: Median, quartile 1, quartile 3 and inter-quartile range (IQR) in days of 
laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS by time interval and year, 
Australia 2009 to 2013 
Year Time interval Median Q1 Q3 IQR 
20
09
 
Onset 5 3 11 8 
Loaded 3 1 11 10 
Notification received 0 0 1 1 
Notification 3 2 5 3 
Specimen 0 0 2 2 
20
10
 
Onset 5 3 11 8 
Loaded 3 1 235 234 
Notification received 0 0 3 3 
Notification 3 1 6 5 
Specimen 1 0 3 3 
20
11
 
Onset 3 2 6 4 
Loaded 0 0 1 1 
Notification received 0 0 1 1 
Notification 2 1 4 3 
Specimen 0 0 2 2 
20
12
 
Onset 3 1 6 5 
Loaded 1 0 2 2 
Notification received 0 0 2 2 
Notification 2 1 4 3 
Specimen 0 0 2 2 
20
13
 
Onset 4 2 9 7 
Loaded 1 0 1 1 
Notification received 0 0 1 1 
Notification 2 1 4 3 
Specimen 1 0 3 3 
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10. Discussion 
The national surveillance of influenza in Australia is complex. To adequately examine 
the impact infection with influenza has on the Australian community, data from a variety 
of surveillance systems, including community, primary and tertiary healthcare and 
laboratories, are required. In this chapter, I have evaluated one aspect of influenza 
surveillance, laboratory-confirmed infections captured by the NNDSS. Although there 
are six national objectives for the surveillance of influenza in Australia, it is unclear 
which of these the NNDSS is required to meet. For this reason I have discussed below 
the extent to which the NNDSS meets all six objectives. 
Objective 1: Provide data for early alerts regarding the onset of influenza 
epidemics 
As a passive surveillance system that relies on data collected through other notification 
systems, being able to detect early onset of illness is limited by the ability of 
laboratories, treating doctors, hospitals and jurisdictional health departments to process 
laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications efficiently. The NNDSS is limited in its 
ability to monitor rapid changes in disease incidence by the efficiency in which it 
receives notifications. Although notification data are uploaded daily, this evaluation 
found the median number of days for an influenza notification to be provided to the 
NNDSS after symptom onset was 4 days. Whilst this timeframe is appropriate for the 
routine surveillance of influenza, it is not appropriate to provided early alerts regarding 
the onset of influenza epidemics.  
However, it is not imperative for the NNDSS to meet this objective. Syndromic 
surveillance systems such as Flutracking and ASPREN, are more suited to this 
objective. As these systems monitor the ILI activity in the community, they have 
detected the onset of influenza seasons before increases in the laboratory-confirmed 
notifications have been identified. (37, 38)  
Objective 2: Characterise the nature of the epidemic  
As a stable, reliable and simple system that provides high quality data, the NNDSS can 
be used to characterise the nature of seasonal influenza epidemics in Australia. 
Universally accepted by stakeholders, notifications are provided routinely, which 
enables the fortnightly reporting of the trends and patterns in influenza activity across 
Australia.  
However, as noted in a previous generic evaluation of the NNDSS, (39) the system is 
relatively inflexible, limiting its ability to characterise the nature of epidemics due to 
novel influenza viruses and pandemics. Due to its design and reliance on data 
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collected in other communicable disease surveillance systems, it is unable to rapidly 
adapt to changing information requirements and cannot provide more detailed 
epidemiological information specific novel influenza viruses or pandemics. 
Additionally, using only positive influenza notification data ignores the potential 
influence of testing on apparent influenza activity. It has been argued that notification 
data alone cannot provide an accurate picture regarding the incidence of influenza, as 
the method ignores the influence of testing on apparent influenza activity. A study 
conducted in Queensland examined the utility of influenza-negative laboratory testing 
data and found using these types of data account for the regional or temporal 
differences for the number of tests performed for influenza, providing a more complete 
picture of influenza during seasonal and pandemic periods and improves our 
epidemiological knowledge of the disease. (40) 
As a result of this evaluation, a pilot project is being undertaken to evaluate if influenza 
laboratory testing data can be routinely obtained and utilised as seasonal and inter-
seasonal denominators for national reporting activities (Appendix 14.3).  
Objective 3: Evaluate the impact of clinical, laboratory and public health 
measures 
As laboratory-confirmed influenza has been collected in the NNDSS since 2001, it has 
the capacity to provide longer term epidemiological trends. This enables retrospective 
analyses to be undertaken to evaluate the impact clinical, laboratory and public health 
measures had on influenza epidemiology. 
Objective 4: Provide information on the subtype of the circulating influenza 
viruses 
At present data held within the NNDSS does not provide adequate sub-typing 
information for influenza A viruses. This evaluation found 48% of influenza A viruses 
notifications within the NNDSS are currently reported without a subtype.  To account 
for this missing information, subtyping data are collected from four sentinel laboratories 
located in Western Australia, New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania. However, as 
influenza samples sent to these laboratories are from sites across their respective 
states (on occasion they may process samples from a neighbouring state) results are 
not nationally representative. As a comprehensive national system for influenza 
surveillance, collecting a representative sample of sub-typing data from each 
jurisdiction through the NNDSS would provide a national sample of sub-typing data. 
This would provide further information on circulating influenza viruses and the 
relationship between the dominate virus and the annual season severity. (41)  
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However, as influenza A virus sub-typing is conducted at the discretion of the 
laboratory, to improve the quality of these data in the NNDSS, laboratories would need 
to commit to carrying out sub-typing for a proportion of positive influenza test results. 
This would be difficult to achieve, as testing practices of laboratories are determined 
based on their own resources, capacity and ability to complete this aspect of the 
testing. The Department of Health and NISC should consider engaging with the Public 
Health Laboratory Network (PHLN) of Australia to facilitate a representative sample of 
sub-typing being conducted in laboratories across Australia. 
Objective 5: Assess the burden of diseases (health service demand, health 
impact, economic and social impacts) related to influenza; 
Assessing the burden of disease associated with influenza is multifaceted and requires 
the aggregation of data collected through multiple surveillance systems. The NNDSS 
meets this objective by describing the epidemiology of influenza, detailing the broad 
geographical spread and the age and sex distribution, as well as providing 
comparisons over time, between influenza seasons and by jurisdiction. Used in 
conjunction with other surveillance system data, laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications in the NNDSS assist with health system planning and inform the 
development of longer term policy. 
Objective 6: Ensure accurate information is available to the appropriate people in 
a timely manner 
The simple electronic transmission of influenza notifications enables data sharing 
across jurisdictions and provides the ability to conduct national epidemiological 
analyses. Fortnightly reporting to CDNA ensures all jurisdictions are aware of the 
changes occurring in influenza nationally, allowing them to adjust their own state or 
territory public health responses and prepare for possible increases in disease activity. 
During the influenza season, NISC meets fortnightly to discuss the trends in influenza 
data, identify the populations at risk of infection, and define the severity of the season. 
This information is used to develop public health messaging, inform clinicians and 
hospitals about the current season and respond to media enquiries. Additionally, 
NNDSS data are retrospectively analysed to provide guidance in developing national 
health response plans and operations in the event of an influenza pandemic. 
As NNDSS can add new business rules without impacting the functionality of 
jurisdictional notification systems, it has the potential to provide an early alert for 
unusual changes in the number of influenza notifications. To achieve this, the 
Department of Health should consider developing an algorithm that notifies NNDSS 
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users when influenza notifications have reached or surpassed predefined thresholds 
within a given time period. 
There are several limitations with this evaluation. Firstly, whilst 75% of NISC members 
participated, not all jurisdictions and surveillance system managers or co-ordinators 
were represented. Additionally, if time had permitted consultations could have included 
other users and providers of the NNDSS such as laboratories, treating doctors, 
influenza specialist groups, other researchers and institutions. The analysis of 
representativeness could have included comparisons with other community influenza 
surveillance system such as Flutracking to strengthen the findings.  
Finally, the analysis of timeliness was unable to account for variations in the reporting 
of ‘true onset’ date.  As this data field is completed by the treating doctor, the date of 
the real onset of the disease could be interpreted as the date the person presented to 
the doctor or hospital, rather than the data they first displayed symptoms, which could 
have occurred days beforehand. This limitation would have influenced the result in the 
timeliness analysis, potentially underestimating the actual time it takes for a case of 
laboratory-confirmed influenza to be reported to the NNDSS. 
11. Conclusion 
The NNDSS serves an important function in the surveillance of influenza in Australia. In 
this evaluation, I found that the NNDSS is an acceptable, simple and useable system. It 
provides high quality data for the national surveillance of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
and is perceived as a highly valuable surveillance system by stakeholders. Laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS contribute to four of the national 
influenza surveillance objectives. Areas that could currently be strengthened are 
detailed in the recommendations below.  
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12. Recommendations 
Based on this evaluation, I recommend the Australian Department of Health consider 
the following:  
Influenza specific 
1. Review and improve the dissemination of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
reporting. Currently the annual influenza scheme report is five years out of date 
and the NNDSS annual report is two years. The annual reports should be made 
available no more than 10 months after the reporting year (for example the 
analysis of 2013 should be publically available by October 2015) 
2. Evaluate if laboratory testing data for influenza can be utilised for denominators 
for national reporting of influenza. 
3. Investigate applying an algorithm to notify when predetermined threshold of 
laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications are reached or surpassed within a 
defined time period.  
4. Investigate the representativeness of laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications sub-typed in Australia. If required, develop a strategy to improve 
the representativeness by engaging with PHLN and other key laboratory 
stakeholders. 
NNDSS System coordination and resources 
1. Review summary data available on the Communicable Disease Australia 
website to consider providing de-identified line listed data or aggregated data by 
week and include subtyping data for influenza A viruses. 
2. Review data specifications in consultation with jurisdictional data managers. 
3. Develop and circulate a document detailing the historical changes to the 
NNDSS. 
4. Clarify the purpose for collecting all requested data elements by explaining how 
they will be used, and periodically assess the needs of collecting the data 
against the burden of collecting it.  
5. Develop a user guide for analysing and extracting NNDSS information from the 
Discoverer interface for staff within the Department of Health. 
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14. Appendices 
Appendix 14.1- List of stakeholders 
National Influenza Surveillance Committee (NISC) 
Ms. Frances Birrell, Epidemiologist, Communicable Diseases Unit, Chief Health Officer 
Branch, Health Service and Clinical Innovation Division, Department of Health, 
Queensland Government 
Ms. Monique Chilver, Program Manager , The Australian Sentinel Practices Research 
Network (ASPREN), Discipline of General Practice, School of Population Health & 
Clinical Practice, The University of Adelaide  
Assoc Prof. Allen Cheng, Infectious Diseases Epidemiology, Department of 
Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, Monash University 
Mr. David Coleman, Surveillance Coordinator, Communicable Diseases Prevention 
Unit, Population Health Services, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Tasmania 
Ms. Robin Gilmour, Respiratory Epidemiologist Communicable Diseases Branch, 
Health Protection, New South Wales  
Mr. James Fielding,  Epidemiologist & Deputy Head, Epidemiology Unit, Victorian 
Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory, the Doherty Institute 
Ms. Lucinda Franklin, Epidemiologist, Communicable Disease Epidemiology and 
Surveillance, Health Protection Branch, Victoria 
Dr. Peter Markey, Head of Surveillance for the Centre for Disease Control, Department 
of Health, Northern Territory  
Dr. David Muscatello, Principal Epidemiologist and Manager, Rapid Surveillance 
Systems , Public Health Intelligence Branch, New South Wales 
Dr. Jane Raupach, Medical Epidemiologist, Communicable Disease Control Branch, 
Department of Health, South Australia 
Dr. Sheena Sullivan, Epidemiologist, World Health Organization Collaborating Centre 
for Reference and Research on Influenza, Australia 
Ms. April Witterveen, Epidemiologist, Communicable Disease Control, Health 
Protection Service, Australian Capital Territory 
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Jurisdictional data managers and surveillance information officers  
Mr. David Coleman, Surveillance Coordinator Communicable Diseases Prevention 
Unit, Population Health Services, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Tasmania 
Mr. Kym Columbine, Health Informatics Officer, Communicable Diseases Unit, Chief 
Health Officer Branch, Health Service & Clinical Innovation Division, Department of 
Health, Queensland Government 
Ms. Stephanie Flak, Principal Public Health Officer, Disease Surveillance and 
Investigation Section, Communicable Disease Control Branch, South Australia Health, 
Government of South Australia 
Mr. Trevor Lauer, Data Manager, Communicable Disease Epidemiology and 
Surveillance, Health Protection Branch, Department of Health Victoria  
Dr. Peter Marky, Head of Surveillance for the Centre for Disease Control, Department 
of Health, Northern Territory 
Mr. Paul Saunders, Research Officer, Communicable Disease Control, Department of 
Health, Western Australia 
Ms. Paula Spokes, Acting Manager of Surveillance, Communicable Diseases Branch, 
Health Protection, New South Wales 
Department of Health data managers  
Mr. Mark Trungrove, NNDSS Data Manager, Vaccine Preventable Diseases 
Surveillance, Office of Health Protection, Australian Department of Health 
Ms. Rachael Corvisy, NNDSS Assistant Data Manager, Vaccine Preventable Diseases 
Surveillance, Office of Health Protection, Australian Department of Health 
Department of Health influenza epidemiologists 
Ms. Kate Pennington,  influenza epidemiologist and Assistant Director, Vaccine 
Preventable Diseases Surveillance, Office of Health Protection, Australian Department 
of Health 
Dr. Rachel De Kluyver, virologist and influenza epidemiologist, Vaccine Preventable 
Diseases Surveillance, Office of Health Protection, Australian Department of Health
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Appendix 14.2- Additional table for representativeness 
 
Appendix Table 1: Number of confirmed influenza hospitalisations collected by FluCAN, ILI presentation collected by ASPREN and 
laboratory-confirmed influenza notifications collected in the NNDSS, by age group and year, Australia, 2010-2013 
Age group 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
ASPREN 
(n) 
FluCAN 
(n) 
NNDSS 
(n) 
ASPREN 
(n) 
FluCAN 
(n) 
NNDSS 
(n) 
ASPREN 
(n) 
FluCAN 
(n) 
NNDSS 
(n) 
ASPREN 
(n) 
FluCAN 
(n) 
NNDSS 
(n) 
1 - 4 years 1,915 38 1,915 4,569 1 4,569 7,306 83 7,306 3,512 20 3,512 
5 - 19 years 3,835 18 3,835 7,807 10 7,807 10,622 53 10,622 6,225 15 6,225 
20 - 49 years 6,458 143 6,458 12,109 254 12,109 16,239 383 16,239 11,216 203 11,216 
50 - 64 years 1,977 67 1,977 3,681 125 3,681 5,774 293 5,774 5,086 175 5,086 
65 - 74 years 567 18 567 1,429 78 1,429 3,146 256 3,146 2,053 100 2,053 
75 years and over 445 12 445 1,370 91 1,370 4,671 763 4,671 2,054 141 2,054 
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Appendix 14.3 - Survey Instruments 
Appendix 14.3a - National Influenza Surveillance Committee 
(telephone) 
Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the degree in which the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) meets the objectives of monitoring the impact 
of influenza on the Australian Community since becoming nationally notifiable in 2001. 
Whilst the NNDSS is a system that captures notifications for more than 60 diseases, 
the survey is only asking for responses in regards to influenza notifications.  
The survey has been designed to evaluate the NNDSS as a public health surveillance 
system. Questions in the survey are intended to capture information on the NNDSS’ 
ability to provide data for a range of influenza surveillance activities, its collection of 
notifications, the database structure and computer networks and its user interface. 
Name:  
Organisation:  
Position in organisation:  
email:  
Contact phone number 
  
Usefulness and acceptability 
Definitions:  
Usefulness is defined as a public health surveillance system contributing to the 
prevention and control of adverse health-related events, the evaluation of performance 
measures and determines if an adverse health event previously thought to be 
unimportant is actually important. 
Acceptability is defined as the willingness of persons and organisations to participate 
in the surveillance system. 
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1. Do you think NNDSS meets the following objectives for influenza surveillance in 
Australia? 
Yes No Objective 
  Facilitates the ability to identify patterns and trends of influenza 
  Facilitates early detection of illnesses  
  Enables long-term epidemiological analyses 
  Provides data for early alerts reading the onset of influenza epidemics 
  Facilitates the characterisation of an epidemic 
  Provides information on the subtype of the circulating influenza viruses 
 
2. For the objectives you marked YES, how do you think the NNDSS meets these 
objectives? 
 
 
 
 
3. For the objectives you ticked NO, why do you think the NNDSS does not meets 
these objectives? 
 
 
 
 
4. Do you use laboratory-confirmed influenza data from the NNDSS? 
Yes (go to question 5) 
 No  (go to question 8) 
 
5. What do you use these data for? 
Yes No  
  Monitoring national trends 
  Influenza surveillance reporting in your jurisdiction  
  Providing comparisons 
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  Research  
  Policy development 
  Inform program management 
  Evaluate public health intervention(s) 
 
6. How often do you use these data? 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Fortnightly 
 Monthly 
 Quarterly 
 Yearly 
 
7. How do you access these data? (go to question 9) 
Yes No   
  The publically available NNDSS data online 
(http://www9.health.gov.au/cda/source/cda-index.cfm)   
  The Australian Influenza Surveillance Report and activity update website  
  The Communicable Diseases Network Australia fortnightly surveillance reports 
  The National Influenza Surveillance Scheme Annual reports in the 
Communicable Disease Intelligence Journal 
  The NNDSS Communicable disease surveillance systems annual reports in  the 
Communicable Disease Intelligence Journal 
  Data request to CDNA 
 
8. Why don’t you use these data? 
(Please tick all that apply)  
 Difficult to access 
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 The data available are insufficient  
 National influenza data are not relevant to my work 
 Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
9. In relation to the surveillance of influenza, what are the strengths of the NNDSS? 
Yes No  
  Easy to use  
  Data are valid and complete 
  Is representative of influenza in Australia 
  Adjusts Ill to changing operation and/or information needs for influenza 
surveillance 
  Is a timely reporting system for influenza surveillance  
  Data on influenza  is easy to access 
 
 
10. In your opinion, are there any characteristics of the NNDSS that you think could be 
improved for the national surveillance of influenza? 
 
 
11. Overall, how would you rate the effectiveness of the NNDSS to provided data for 
national influenza surveillance? 
 Ineffective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
 Sometimes an effective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
 Neither ineffective or effective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
 Mostly an effective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
 An effective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
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Flexibility 
Definition: A flexible public health surveillance system can adapt to the changing 
information needs or operating conditions with little time, personnel or allocated funds. 
The system uses a standard format for electronic data exchange that can be easily 
integrated with other systems. 
12. Do you think the NNDSS is a flexible system? 
 Yes  
 No, please specify why 
 
Representativeness 
Definition: Accurately describes the occurrence of a health related event over time 
and its distribution in the populations by place and person. 
13. In your opinion, do you think laboratory-confirmed influenza data in the NNDSS is 
representative of influenza cases in Australia? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
 
 
 
14. In your jurisdiction, who provides laboratory-confirmed notifications of influenza? 
 General Practitioners and clinicians 
 Hospitals 
 Public and private laboratories  
  
5-51 
 
Sensitivity 
Definition: Sensitivity can be defined as 2 components. The first refers to case 
reporting and the proportion of case of a disease (or health related event) detected by 
the public health surveillance system. The second refers to the ability for the public 
health surveillance system to detect outbreaks, including the ability to monitor the 
changes in the number of cases over time. 
15. Do you think the NNDSS has the ability to detect influenza outbreaks? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
 
Stability 
Definition: Stability is the reliability (ability to collect, manage and provide data without 
error) and availability (ability to be operational when it is needed) of a public health 
system.   
16. In your opinion, does the NNDSS collect, manage and provide accurate data for 
laboratory-confirmed influenza surveillance? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
 
Simplicity 
Definition: The simplicity of the public health surveillance system structure and the 
ease of its operation.  
17. In your jurisdiction, what functions are performed for laboratory-confirmed influenza 
notifications? 
Yes No  
  Add new influenza notifications 
  Update information on existing influenza notifications 
  Delete duplicate or incorrect influenza notifications 
  Transmitting data to the NNDSS influenza notification System 
  Other, please 
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specify________________________________________________ 
  None of the above (got to question 23) 
 
18. On average, how much time (in hours) during the week do you spend on these 
influenza related tasks? 
__________hours 
 
 
19. Does your jurisdiction follow up cases of influenza? 
 Yes 
 No (go to question24 ) 
 
20. On average, how much time (in hours) does it take you to follow up a case? 
__________hours 
Data quality 
Definition: The completeness and validity of the data recorded in the public health 
surveillance system. 
21. In your opinion, the completeness of laboratory-confirmed influenza data in the 
NNDSS influenza notification system is: 
 Poor   
 Fair   
 Good  
 Very good   
 Excellent   
 
22. Thinking about the rating you chose for completeness, what led you to choose this 
rating? 
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23. In your opinion, accuracy of laboratory-confirmed influenza data in the NNDSS 
influenza notification system is: 
 Poor   
 Fair   
 Good  
 Very good   
 Excellent   
 
24. Thinking about the rating you chose for accuracy, what led you to choose this 
rating? 
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Appendix 14.3b - Health Influenza Epidemiologist (electronic)  
Purpose of the evaluation 
The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the degree in which the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) meets the objectives of monitoring the impact 
of influenza on the Australian Community since becoming nationally notifiable in 2001. 
Whilst the NNDSS is a system that captures notifications for more than 60 diseases, 
the survey is only asking for responses in regards to influenza notifications.  
The survey has been designed to evaluate the NNDSS as a public health surveillance 
system. Questions in the survey are intended to capture information on the NNDSS’ 
ability to provide data for a range of influenza surveillance activities, its collection of 
notifications, the database structure and computer networks and its user interface. 
Objectives of the survey 
The objectives of the survey are to: 
• Determine how useful of national influenza data collected by the NNDSS is for 
Commonwealth epidemiologists; 
• Evaluate if the NNDSS is accepted as a national surveillance system for 
influenza by the Commonwealth epidemiologists; 
• Identify the strengths and weakness of the NNDSS influenza notification system 
from the perspective of Commonwealth epidemiologists; and 
• Evaluate the systems data quality, flexibility, simplicity, sensitivity, 
representativeness  and its ability to collect, manage and provide data from the 
perspective of  Commonwealth epidemiologists. 
The survey is intended for epidemiologists responsible for influenza surveillance within 
Commonwealth. 
Consent for participation 
Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to participate. If you decide to 
participate in this survey, you may withdraw at any time. If you decide not to participate 
in this study or if you withdraw from participating at any time, you will not be penalized. 
The procedure involves filling in the following online survey that will take approximately 
20 minutes. Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can 
identify you will remain confidential, except as required by law. If you give us your 
permission to use your responses in our research by completing and submitting the 
survey, I plan to discuss the results with the Australian Department of Health and the 
Australian National University. In any publication, information will be provided in such a 
way that you cannot be identified. 
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 ELECTRONIC CONSENT: By clicking on the "agree" button below indicates that: 
• you have read the above information 
• you voluntarily agree to participate 
• you are at least 18 years of age  
 
If you do not wish to participate in the research study, please decline participation by 
clicking on the "disagree" button. 
AGREE 
DISAGREE 
 
Please fill in your contact information below 
Name:  
Organisation:  
Position in organisation:  
email:  
Contact phone number
  
Usefulness and acceptability 
Definitions: 
Usefulness is defined as a public health surveillance system ability to contribute to the 
prevention and control of adverse health-related events, provide data to evaluate 
performance measures and determine if an adverse health event previously thought to 
be unimportant is actually important. 
Acceptability is defined as the willingness of persons and organisations to participate 
in the public health surveillance system. 
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1. Do you think NNDSS meets the following objectives for influenza surveillance in 
Australia? 
Yes No Objective 
  Facilitates the ability to identify patterns and trends of influenza 
  Facilitates early detection of illnesses  
  Enables long-term epidemiological analyses 
  Provides data for early alerts reading the onset of influenza epidemics 
  Facilitates the characterisation of an epidemic 
  Provides information on the subtype of the circulating influenza viruses 
 
2. For the objectives you marked YES, how do you think the NNDSS meet these 
objectives? 
 
 
 
3. For the objectives you ticked NO, why do you think the NNDSS does not meets 
these objectives? 
 
 
 
4. What do you use laboratory-confirmed influenza data from the NNDSS for? 
Yes No  
  Monitoring national trends 
  Influenza surveillance reporting in your jurisdiction  
  Providing comparisons 
  Research  
  Policy development 
  Inform program management 
  Evaluate public health intervention(s) 
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5. How often do you use this data? 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Fortnightly 
 Monthly 
 Quarterly 
 Yearly 
 
6. In relation to the surveillance of influenza, what are the strengths of the NNDSS? 
Yes No  
  Easy to use  
  Data is valid and complete 
  Accurately describes influenza  by cases demographics, time and place 
  Collects, manages and provides data influenza surveillance Ill 
  Is representative of influenza in Australia 
  Adjusts Ill to changing operation and/or information needs for influenza 
surveillance 
  Is a timely reporting system for influenza surveillance  
  Data on influenza  is easy to access 
 
7. In your opinion, are there any characteristics of the NNDSS that you think could be 
improved to aid the surveillance of influenza nationally? 
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8. Overall, how would you rate the effectiveness of the NNDSS to provide data for 
influenza surveillance? 
 Ineffective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
 Sometimes an effective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
 Neither ineffective or effective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
 Mostly an effective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
 An effective tool in providing data for national influenza surveillance 
Simplicity 
Definition: The simplicity of the public health surveillance system structure and the 
ease of its operation.  
 
9. Do you think accessing laboratory-confirmed influenza notification data from the 
NNDSS is: 
 Very difficult  
 Difficult  
 Neutral  
 Easy 
 Very easy 
 
10. Why do you think this? 
 
 
 
11. With regards to influenza, what do you use the BSS Data warehouse (Discoverer) 
for? 
Yes No  
  Extracting data for analysis 
  Calculating rates and proportions 
  Producing graphs and tables 
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12.  In your opinion, do you think Discoverer is an easy system to use? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
 
 
Flexibility 
Definition: A flexible public health surveillance system can adapt to the changing 
information needs or operating conditions with little time, personal or allocated funds. 
The system uses a standard format for electronic data exchange that can be easily 
integrated with other systems. 
13. Do you think the NNDSS is a flexible system? 
 Yes  
 No, please specify why 
 
 
14. In your opinion, how easy do you think it is to for the following tasks to be 
completed in the NNDSS: 
 Very Difficult Difficult Neutral Easy Very Easy 
Add a field      
Remove a field      
Change a field      
 
Representativeness 
Definition: Accurately describes the occurrence of a health related event over time 
and it distribution in the populations by place and person. 
15. Do you think the data captured in the NNDSS for influenza is representative of all 
influenza case in Australia? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
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16. In your opinion, what do you think could be done to improve the representativeness 
of influenza notifications in the NNDSS? 
 
 
 
Sensitivity 
Definition: Sensitivity can be defined on 2 levels. The first refers to case reporting and 
the proportion of case of a disease (or health related event) detected by the public 
health surveillance system. The second refers to the ability for the public health 
surveillance system to detect outbreaks, including the ability to monitor the changes in 
the number of cases over time. 
17. In your opinion, what proportion of all influenza cases in Australia are captured in 
the NNDSS? 
 
 
 
18. Do you think the NNDSS has the ability to detect influenza outbreaks? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
 
Stability 
Definition: Stability is the reliability (ability to collect, manage and provide data without 
error) and availability (ability to be operational when it is needed) of a public health 
system. 
19.  In your opinion, does the NNDSS collect, manage and provide accurate data for 
national influenza surveillance? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
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Data quality 
Definition: Data quality is the completeness and validity of the data recorded in the 
public health surveillance system. 
20. In your opinion, the completeness of laboratory-confirmed influenza data in the 
NNDSS is: 
 Poor   
 Fair   
 Good  
 Very good   
 Excellent   
 
21. Thinking about the rating you chose for completeness, what led you to choose this 
rating? 
 
 
 
22. In your opinion, the accuracy of laboratory-confirmed influenza data in the NNDSS 
is: 
 Poor   
 Fair   
 Good  
 Very good   
 Excellent   
 
23. Thinking about the rating you chose for accuracy, what led you to choose this 
rating? 
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24. In your opinion, can laboratory-confirmed influenza data in the NNDSS be 
improved? Is so, how? 
 
 
 
25. In your opinion, which 3 fields listed below are the most complete for laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS: 
 Onset age 
 Birth date 
 Sex 
 Indigenous status 
 Vaccination status 
 Postcode 
 Died from disease 
 Serogroup/ subtype 
 Specimen date 
 
26. In your opinion, which 3 fields listed below are the most incomplete for laboratory-
confirmed influenza notifications in the NNDSS: 
 Onset age 
 Birth date 
 Sex 
 Indigenous status 
 Vaccination status 
 Postcode 
 Died from disease 
 Serogroup/ subtype 
 Specimen date 
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Appendix 14.3c - Jurisdictional data managers (telephone) 
The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the degree in which the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) meets the objectives of monitoring the impact 
of nationally notifiable diseases on the Australian Community.  
The survey has been designed to evaluate the NNDSS as a public health surveillance 
system. Questions in the survey are intended to capture information on the NNDSS’ 
ability to collect and store notifications and its database structure, computer networks 
and user interface. 
The objectives of the survey are to: 
• Determine the time taken to prepare NNDSS notifications for surveillance 
activities;  
• Evaluate if the NNDSS is accepted as a national surveillance system by 
jurisdictional  data managers; 
• Identify the strengths and weakness of the NNDSS from the perspective of 
jurisdictional data managers; and 
• Evaluate the systems data quality, flexibility, simplicity and its ability to collect, 
manage and provide data from the perspective of jurisdictional data managers. 
The survey is intended for data managers within jurisdictional and should take 15 
minutes to complete. 
Contact information  
Please fill in your contact information below 
Name:  
Organisation:  
Position in 
organisation: 
 
email:  
Contact phone 
number: 
 
Simplicity 
Definition: The simplicity of the public health surveillance system structure and the 
ease of its operation. 
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1. As a data manager, what are the main tasks you perform in relation to the data you 
send to the NNDSS? 
 
 
 
 
 
2. In your jurisdiction, what system do you currently use to collect and store notifiable 
disease notifications? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In regards to data you send to the NNDSS, please indicate what functions are 
completed in your jurisdictional system: 
Yes No  
  Update of records 
  Deletion of records 
  New records 
  Other, please specify 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Are there any additional functions you need to conduct to your jurisdiction data 
before it can be sent to the NNDSS? 
 Yes (please specify)  
 No  
 
 
 
5. On average how much time (in hours) do you spend each day preparing data to be 
sent to the NNDSS? 
________ Hours 
 
6.  Are data sent from your jurisdiction to the NNDSS through a : 
 Automated system 
 Generated system  
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7. In your opinion, are the data specifications used for the NNDSS useful? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
 
 
 
8. Do you think these data specifications could be improved? If so how? 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Is there any other information the Commonwealth could provide that would help 
you complete your tasks for data to be sent to the NNDSS? 
 
 
 
 
Flexibility 
Definition: A flexible public health surveillance system can adapt to the changing 
information needs or operating conditions with little time, personal or allocated funds. If 
the system uses a standard format for electronic data exchange that can be easily 
integrated with other systems. 
10. Do you think the NNDSS is a flexible system? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify) 
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11. With regards to your jurisdictions system, how easy is to: 
 Very Difficult Difficult Neutral Easy Very Easy 
Add a field      
Remove a field      
Change a field      
 
Stability 
Definition: Stability is the reliability (ability to collect, manage and provide data without 
error) and availability (ability to be operational when it is needed) of a public health 
system. 
12. In your opinion, does the NNDSS collect, manage and provide accurate data for 
national surveillance activities? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify) 
 
Data quality 
Definition: Data quality is the completeness and validity of the data recorded in the 
public health surveillance system. 
13. Do you receive NNDSS job reports? 
 Yes  
 No (go to question 17) 
 
14. Do you read/check the NNDSS job reports? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
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15. Do you use the NNDSS job reports to amend errors identified in records? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify why) 
 
 
16. Who amends the errors reported by the NNDSS job reports? 
 
 
 
17. What are the major issues your jurisdictions encounters when sending data to the 
NNDSS? 
 
 
18. In your jurisdiction, what risks exist that could interrupt or halt data transference 
to the NNDSS?   
 
 
19. For your jurisdiction, which three  fields listed below are the most COMPLETE for 
disease notifications: 
 Birth date 
 Sex 
 Indigenous status 
 Vaccination status 
 Postcode 
 Died from disease 
 Place of acquisition country 
 Serogroup/ subtype 
 Specimen date 
 Laboratory confirmation method 
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Appendix 14.3d - Health data managers (electronic) 
The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the degree in which the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) meets the objectives of monitoring the impact 
of nationally notifiable diseases on the Australian Community.  
The survey has been designed to evaluate the NNDSS as a public health surveillance 
system. Questions in the survey are intended to capture information on the NNDSS’ 
ability to collect and store notifications and its database structure, computer networks 
and user interface. 
The objectives of the survey are to: 
• Determine the time taken to prepare NNDSS notifications for surveillance 
activities;  
• Evaluate if the NNDSS is accepted as a national surveillance system by 
Commonwealth data managers; 
• Identify the strengths and weakness of the NNDSS from the perspective of 
Commonwealth data managers; and 
• Evaluate the systems data quality, flexibility, simplicity  and its ability to collect, 
manage and provide data from the perspective of Commonwealth data 
managers. 
The survey is intended for data managers within Commonwealth. 
Consent 
Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to participate. If you decide to 
participate in this survey, you may withdraw at any time. If you decide not to participate 
in this study or if you withdraw from participating at any time, you will not be penalized. 
The procedure involves filling in the proceeding online survey that will take 
approximately 15 minutes. Any information that is obtained in connection with this 
study and that can identified you will remain confidential, except as required by law. If 
you give us your permission to use your responses in our research by completing and 
submitting the survey, I plan to discuss the results with the Australian Department of 
Health and the Australian National University. In any publication, information will be 
provided in such a way that you cannot be identified. 
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ELECTRONIC CONSENT: Please select your choice below. 
Clicking on the "agree" button below indicates that:  
• you have read the above information 
• you voluntarily agree to participate 
• you are at least 18 years of age 
If you do not wish to participate in the research study, please decline participation by 
clicking on the "disagree" button. 
AGREE 
DISAGREE 
Contact information  
Please fill in your contact information below 
Name:  
Organisation:  
Position in 
organisation 
 
Contact phone 
number: 
 
Email address:  
Data manager tasks 
1. As a data manager, what are the main tasks you perform in relation to NNDSS 
data? 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Are there any additional database maintenance, management cleaning, collation or 
analysis that you need to conduct on data received by the NNDSS? 
 Yes (please specify) (Go to question 3) 
 No (go to question 4) 
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3. What system(s) do you use to perfume these tasks? 
 
 
 
Simplicity 
Definition: The simplicity of the public health surveillance system structure and the 
ease of its operation. 
4. On average how much time (in hours) do you spend each day preparing NNDSS 
data for use? 
________ Hours 
Flexibility 
Definition: A flexible public health surveillance system can adapt to the changing 
information needs or operating conditions with little time, personal or allocated funds. If 
the system uses a standard format for electronic data exchange that can be easily 
integrated with other systems. 
5. Do you think the NNDSS is a flexible system? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify) 
 
6. With regards to the NNDSS, how easy is to: 
 Very Difficult Difficult Neutral Easy Very Easy 
Add a field      
Remove a field      
Change a field      
 
7. What processes need to be completed before a NNDSS field can be added, 
removed or changed? 
 
  
5-71 
 
Stability 
Definition: Stability is the reliability (ability to collect, manage and provide data without 
error) and availability (ability to be operational when it is needed) of a public health 
system.   
8. In your opinion, does the NNDSS collect, manage and provide accurate data for 
national surveillance activities? 
 Yes  
 No (please specify) 
 
 
Data quality 
Definition:  Data quality is the completeness and validity of the data recorded in the 
public health surveillance system. 
9. In your opinion, the completeness of national influenza data in the NNDSS is: 
 Poor   
 Fair   
 Good  
 Very good   
 Excellent   
 
10. Thinking about the rating you chose for completeness, what led you to choose it? 
 
 
11. In your opinion, the accuracy of national influenza data in the NNDSS is: 
 Poor   
 Fair   
 Good  
 Very good   
 Excellent   
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12. Thinking about the rating you chose for accuracy, why did you choose it? 
 
 
 
13. What are the major problems you encounter with data that is transmitted to the 
NNDSS? 
 
 
 
14. What risks exist that could interrupt or halt the use of NNDSS data? 
 
 
 
15. In your opinion, which 3 fields listed below are the MOST COMPLETE for influenza 
notifications in the NNDSS: 
 Onset age 
 Birth date 
 Sex 
 Indigenous status 
 Vaccination status 
 Postcode 
 Died from disease 
 Serogroup/ subtype 
 Specimen date 
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Appendix 14.4 - Pilot project for influenza Seasonal and inter 
seasonal denominators for surveillance reporting in Australia- 
Potential to use laboratory testing data 
Background 
Influenza has an enormous impact and extensive socio-economic burden on the 
Australian health care system. (1-6) In order to effectively allocate health care resources, 
determine public health interventions and develop cost effective programs, the 
incidence of influenza in Australia needs to be continually monitored. (7) One of the 
main sources of influenza monitoring in Australia utilises laboratory-confirmed data 
(notification data) provided to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
(NNDSS). These data are used in conjunction with several other surveillance systems 
including sentinel influenza-like-illness reports from general practitioners, community 
services and emergency departments and influenza associated hospitalisations to 
provide a picture of the impact influenza has on the Australian population during and 
between influenza seasons. 
However this reliance on notification data for influenza reporting has been met with 
criticism. It is argued that notification data cannot provide an accurate picture regarding 
the incidence of influenza as the method ignores the potential influence of testing on 
apparent influenza activity significance.  It has been argued that notification data could 
be enhanced by analysing testing denominator data. Lambert et al (2010) examined 
the use influenza-negative laboratory testing data to provide dominators for reporting in 
Queensland. (8) They concluded that the testing data would account for the regional or 
temporal differences for the number of tests performed for influenza, provide a more 
complete picture of influenza during seasonal and pandemic periods and improve our 
epidemiological knowledge of the disease. (8)  
The Australian Department of Health (Health) is looking to extend on this project and 
evaluate if influenza laboratory testing data can be utilised as seasonal and inter-
seasonal denominators for national reporting activities. In order to assess if laboratory 
testing data can be utilised, Health is seeking to conduct a retrospective data analysis 
pilot project using laboratory testing data from Queensland (Qld).  
Aim 
To determine if influenza laboratory testing data can generate seasonal and inter-
seasonal denominators for national surveillance reporting in Australia. 
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Objectives 
The objectives of this pilot project are to identify: 
 Determine if  laboratory testing data in Qld can be provided to Health; 
 Determine the number of laboratories required for representative sample. 
 Determine if laboratory testing data can be utilised to inform influenza activity; 
and 
 Review the project’s outcome and provide recommendations. 
Methods 
Both the public and private laboratories will be approached to supply influenza testing 
data. Data will be collected and aggregated for the final analysis.  To determine the 
utility of laboratory data, Health intends to engage with the Influenza Surveillance 
Strategy Working Group (ISSWG) to devise methods to calculate the baselines and 
thresholds. This methodology will be evaluated at the end of the project.  
Data  
For this project, Health will ask Qld laboratories to provide influenza testing information 
for the years 2006 to 2012. This six year period has been chosen to understand testing 
practices that may have occurred in a moderate influenza season (2006), during and 
after a severe domestic influenza season(2007 to 2008) and during and after the 2009 
influenza pandemic (2009 to 2012).  
The type of data I will need for project will include: 
Weekly	data	
Weekly testing data is being sought to provide Health with the ability to establish 
denominators for influenza in both seasonal and inter-seasonal periods. This data will 
enable Health to understand changes in testing behaviour and any effect on 
interpretation of influenza notification data. Data that will be requested from 
laboratories includes: 
 number of non-reactive influenza  tests results per week from 2006 to 2012; 
and 
 number of  reactive  influenza tests  per week from 2006 to 2012. 
Annual	data	
Aggregated annual data is being requested to provide Health with a picture of hospital 
and community (eg GPs) testing patterns in Australia, the type of testing performed, 
and information regarding the capacity of Australian laboratories to subtype influenza A 
infections. Data that will be requested from laboratories includes: 
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• proportion of tests performed for cases presenting in the community or in 
hospital; 
• proportion of positive influenza A tests that were subtyped; and 
• proportion of tests performed as Nucleic Acid Amplification Tests (NAAT)  or 
serology. 
A template of the data request form can be found at Attachment A. 
Data storage and confidentiality 
All data used in the pilot project will be securely stored by Health in a restricted access 
directory file within the Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance (VPDS) Office of 
Health Protection. These data will not be provided to external stakeholders and will 
only be accessed by staff employed by the VPDS. Any information identifying 
laboratories and/or individual will be removed to maintain confidentiality.  
Funding and reporting 
Health will not able to provide any funding for this project. A final report will be provided 
to Queensland Health, PHLN, ISSWG, Communicable Diseases Network Australia, the 
Australian National University and the Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance 
section of the Office of Health Protection, Health 
Potential issues 
Health has identified a number of issues with the project. These issues include: 
 Laboratory information systems: Data for the project may not be available as 
extracting it from the laboratory information systems. This may restrict the 
number of laboratories able to participate in the project.    
 Respiratory panels: The use of respiratory panel test sets in some laboratories 
may underestimate or overestimate the number of laboratory tests reported for 
influenza. Health will need to determine if these types of laboratory test sets can 
be utilised for the project.  
 Representativeness of private laboratories: To achieve a representative 
sample, Health will need to obtain data from public as Ill as private laboratories. 
Issues already raised with the collection of data from private laboratories 
include: 
o Data and confidentiality of patients; 
o Commercial in confidence – not wanting to revel the number of test they 
conduct for influenza; 
o Limited resources required to extract and provide the data. 
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Using Medical Benefits Scheme (MBS) data as a substitute of laboratory testing 
data 
As the only items listed for influenza pathology services on the MBS are the general 
items (69384 and 69496). This item is described as the “quantitation of 1 antibody to 
microbial antigens not elsewhere described in the Schedule” and is not limited to any 
disease. 
The MBS division within Health have advised that data for these items cannot be 
extracted by disease or disease group from the MBS database. Therefore using MBS 
data as a substitute for laboratory testing data is not an option for this project. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The overall this project will determine if laboratory testing data can be utilised for 
influenza reporting activities. Recommendations about the utility of the data and how it 
can be integrated as a regular part of influenza surveillance reporting activities will be 
provided at the end of the project.  An evaluation will be conducted to identify the 
limitations of the project and how these could be addressed in future collections. 
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Emergency Management Branch for – Investigating if laboratory 
data can be used for influenza reporting 
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1. Overview 
Acquiring and imparting knowledge is essential when working in the field of 
epidemiology. The dissemination of information between healthcare workers, 
researchers, public health official and other epidemiologists improves, expands and 
enhances our knowledge, enabling the field to develop and grow. One of the key 
components of the Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE)program is to be able to 
impart knowledge. 
In this chapter, I briefly outline the tasks I undertook to impart knowledge during my 
MAE placement. I describe my involvement in two teaching exercises;1) Lessons From 
the Field and 2) teaching the 2014 MAE cohort, and outline my experiences in 
providing information whilst working within the Vaccine Preventable Diseases 
Surveillance section (VPDS) in the Office of Health Protection (OHP) at the Australian 
Government Department of Health (the Department of Health). 
2. Lessons From the Field 
The MAE Lessons From the Field (LFF) has two components. The first is to conduct a 
LLF on an issue you encountered during your field placement, and the second is to 
participate in the LFFs of your colleagues. 
2.1. Working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander data 
Whilst conducting my major epidemiological project, which examined the completion of 
Indigenous status in the National Human Papillomavirus Register (NHVPR), I 
encountered a number of issues in interpreting and reporting data using Indigenous 
status. For my LFF, I chose the topic of how to work with Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander data to encourage my fellow MAE colleagues to think about the issues often 
associated with interpreting and reporting Indigenous status information. 
To facilitate the LFF, I provided my colleagues with documents detailing the project’s 
background, tasks and resources (Appendix 6.1). I organised a teleconference for 7 
May 2014, and led discussions about: 
1. The standards used for the collection of Indigenous status in Australia; 
2. The barriers commonly associated with the collection of Indigenous status; 
3. How to analyses data and develop rates with missing Indigenous status; and 
4. How to interpret and effectively communicate these rates. 
Overall, my colleagues agreed that analysing Indigenous status is difficult, particularly 
when the accuracy and completeness of the data is low. My colleagues acknowledged 
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that interpreting Indigenous status needs to be done carefully, and researchers should 
ensure they understand all the issues relating to its collection when interpreting the 
data.  
After the teleconference, I provided my colleagues with standard answers to the 
questions raised in the LFF (Appendix 5a). 
Writing this LFF has taught me how to design clear learning objectives, articulate 
problems effectively and structure teaching projects. It also helped me better 
understand the issues surrounding the collection and reporting of Indigenous status in 
Australia, how these affect interpretation, and identified barriers to its collection, which I 
was able to incorporate into my major epidemiological project.  
2.2. Participation in LFFs  
I participated in six LFFs during my placement. These included: 
1. Writing for different audiences (Timothy Sloan-Gardner): 
2. Project management (Dina Saulo); 
3. Control selection (Tove Fitzgerald); 
4. Sample size calculations (Anita Williams); 
5. Data linkage (Kerryn Lodo); and 
6. Introduction to causal diagrams (Courtney Lane). 
For each of these, I provided responses, participated in discussions and gave feedback 
on the LFFs structure and content.  By participating in each of these LLF, I learnt how 
to address problems with my own work. In particular, the resources provided as part of 
the project management session helped me to design and monitor stakeholder 
consultations for my major epidemiological project and surveillance evaluation. The 
sessions on causal diagrams and sample size calculations introduced me to new 
concepts and software that assisted me in completing my own projects. 
3. Teaching the first year MAE cohort of 2014 
During the first semester course block conducted in March of 2014, the MAE cohort of 
2013 (second years) conducted a half day training session for the MAE cohort of 2014 
(first years). This teaching session aimed to provide the first years with knowledge and 
practical experience in four major epidemiological concepts. 
The second years developed 30 to 40 minute sessions on the following topics;  
1. Selection and measurement bias - Anna-Jane Glynn-Robinson and Courtney 
Lane; 
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2. Critical appraisals - Timothy Sloan-Gardner and Anita Williams; 
3. Interpreting time series data - Jason Agostino, Dina Saulo and Philippa 
Chidgzey; and 
4. Rapid risk assessments - Kerryn Loddo and Tove Fitzgerald. 
Working with Courtney Lane, we developed a 40 minute session that explored the 
concepts of selection and measurement bias. My role was to develop the teaching plan 
(Appendix 6.2a) and the presentation slides (Appendix 6.2b), contribute to the 
instructor guide (Appendix6.2c) and present information about measurement bias.  
Our session aimed to reinforce issues of selection and measurement bias by using a 
practical example. The objectives of this session were: 
 Describe selection and measurement bias; 
 Identify potential bias in practical situations; 
 Describe effects on measures of association; and 
 Identify strategies to minimise bias. 
Part of the teaching experience was to obtain feedback from the participants. I was 
asked, on behalf of the group, to develop a student feedback form, for the first years at 
the end of the half-day session. The overall results of the session conducted by 
Courtney and myself are provided in Appendix 6.2d. 
Undertaking this teaching exercise I developed a number of skills including time 
management and effective planning. As we only had 30-40 minutes to conduct the 
session, we needed to ensure the information we presented was relevant and useful. 
The most valuable lesson I learned from this experience was how to balance 
information to meet the expectations of an audience with varying knowledge 
backgrounds. I have also developed an appreciation for the amount of effort and time 
needed to develop teaching plans, presentation slides, participant documents and 
feedback forms.  
4. Dissemination of information  
4.1. Analysis of legionellosis for the 2012 and 2013 annual reports 
The VPDS section manages and co-ordinates data collected on communicable 
diseases in Australia, through the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System 
(NNDSS). Each year, a report on the status of Australia’s notifiable diseases is 
produced using these data. Chapters are managed by disease group and are reviewed 
6-4 
 
by external experts before being published in the Communicable Diseases Intelligence 
Journal (CDI). 
During my placement, I was responsible for the analysis of legionellosis in the 2012 
and 2013 Australia's notifiable diseases status: Annual report of the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System. I performed data cleaning and analysis in Excel, 
produced tables and graphs and wrote the final analyses (Appendix 6.3). At the time of 
completing my placement, the 2012 Annual Report had been published in CDI and the 
2013 was in press. 
Writing this section of the chapter developed my understanding of Legionella infection 
in Australia, and provided context to my data analysis project. By conducting the 
analysis for two annual reports, I became familiar with extracting, using and analysing 
NNDSS, data and writing for the Australian Government.  
4.2. Rotavirus Working Group (RWG) paper 
The Communicable Disease Network Australia (CDNA), convened a time limited 
working group to evaluate and improve of the performance and reporting of rotavirus 
surveillance activities in Australia. As the secretariat for this working group I was asked 
to produce and present a paper that described the rotavirus notifications within the 
NNDSS (Appendix 6.4). This paper outlined which jurisdictions provided rotavirus 
notifications to the NNDSS, what data were available and presented an 
epidemiological analysis of rotavirus in Australia.   
Working closely with this working group gave me the opportunity to strengthen my 
skills in data analysis, and improve my understanding of rotavirus. These activities also 
provided me with valuable secretariat skills and improved my understanding of the 
functions and capabilities of working groups at a national level. 
4.3. Presentation to a Bangladesh delegation 
In 2014, a delegation from Bangladesh visited the Department of Health to learn about 
Australia’s disease control systems and the MAE program. The delegation included 
representatives from the Ministry of Health, the Institute for Epidemiology Disease 
Control and Research, and the Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib Medical University. I was 
asked to present to the delegation and provide them with an overview of communicable 
disease surveillance in Australia, describe the NNDSS, outline the surveillance 
conducted by VPDS section, and describe my MAE experience (Appendix 6.5). 
This experience further strengthened my understanding of communicable disease 
surveillance in Australia and the surveillance activities conducted within VPDS section. 
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It also advanced my skills in presenting, providing me with the confidence to present at 
the Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA) 43rd Annual Conference in 
September 2014. 
5. Other Public Health Experiences 
5.1. Watch officer for the National Incident Room 
While working in the National Incident Room (NIR) as Watch Officer (WO), I analysed 
information provided by other federal departments, jurisdictional health departments 
and international National Focal Points (NFP), to inform the Health Emergency 
Management Branch (HEMB) about notifications of communicable disease and events 
of potential public health significance. I provided jurisdictional health departments with 
information to conduct contact tracing and informed International NFPs of travel-related 
communicable disease notifications relevant to their countries. 
In my role as WO, I learnt how the Australian Government responds to events of public 
health significance, the roles and responsibilities of federal, jurisdictional and local 
governments and developed skills in using event based information and management 
systems. 
5.2. Surveillance and reporting of the Avian Influenza A (H7N9) 
outbreak in China 
In March 2013, the Chinese Government informed the World Health Organization 
(WHO) that a novel Avian Influenza A strain (H7N9) had been identified in humans. As 
part of the response to this outbreak, VPDS section undertook international 
surveillance using information from WHO, ProMED, FluTrackers and other relevant 
sources of information. 
My role was to conduct this surveillance, create an Excel database to track confirmed 
cases, develop maps to display the geographical spread of infection and update 
epidemiological information. I produced epidemiological curves, tables and graphs and 
assisted in writing the daily situational reports and briefings to the Chief Medical 
Officer. I also assisted in writing travel advice for the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade Smartraveller website and updated the Department of Health’s Avian Influenza 
webpage. 
This experience taught me how to undertake international surveillance, develop a 
database to efficiently track cases of infection, and write to a range of audiences, 
including the general public, my colleagues and OHP executives.  
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6. Appendices 
Appendix 6.1 Lessons From the Field; Working with Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander data 
The LFF will be conducted by teleconference on 7 May 2014. Please save your 
response to the questions in a Word file and send to back to anna.glynn-
robinson@health.gov.au  by COB Wednesday 30 April 2014.  
Please also send me the telephone number you wish to be called on for the 
teleconference. 
Learning Objectives 
By the end of this LFF participants should be able to: 
 Understand the complexities of working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander data; 
 Describe the national standards of collecting Indigenous Status in health data 
sets; 
 Describe barriers in collection of Indigenous status in health data sets; and 
 Complete age-specific rates for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander females 
using the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Estimated Residential 
Population (ERP). 
Background 
It is estimated that 50% to 80% of genital Human Papillomavirus (HPV) transmission 
occurs after a person has engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with a person 
who has an active HPV infection.(1-3) Most infections of HPV resolve spontaneously in 
approximately 12 to 24 months. However, a small proportion (around 3% to 10 %) of 
infections persist, producing cellular abnormalities, precancerous disease and in some 
cases progressing to cancer.(4) 
Cervical cancer is the most common HPV-associated cancer in Australia.(5) It was 
estimated that prior to the introduction of the National HPV Vaccination Program (the 
Program) in 2007, the rate of cervical cancer in Australia was 6.8 per 100,000 
population, with a mortality rate of 1.8 per 100,000 population.(6, 7)  Early investigations 
have indicated that since the introduction of the Program in Victoria there has been a 
decrease of 0.4% in the incidence of high grade cervical lesion in female’s younger 
than 18 years of age.(8) 
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The Program was introduced in Australia for females in April 2007 and consisted of two 
components: an ongoing school based program for females enrolled in grade seven 
and eight; and a time limited catch-up program which ceased on 31 December 2009, 
for women aged 12 to 26 years. During the period of 2007 to 2009 around 83% of 
females aged 12 to 17 years were vaccinated with at least one dose and 70% 
completed all three doses.(9) In 2013, the Program was expanded to include males, with 
the vaccine available in schools for males enrolled in grade seven and eight; and as a 
time-limited catch up program for males aged 14 to 15 years, due to end in 2014. 
Evidence indicates that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander females have higher rates 
of cervical cancer than non-Indigenous females in Australia.(6) Recent analysis shows 
the incidence of cervical cancer in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander females is 
twice that of non-Indigenous women and the mortality rate is 5 times higher.(6) 
To reduce the burden cervical cancer amongst Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
females and prevent any further widening of the gap, equity in vaccination coverage is 
required.(7) To determine if this equity is being achieved we need to monitor HPV 
vaccination coverage by Indigenous status. 
National Human Papillomavirus Vaccination Program Register 
(NHVPR) 
The National HPV Vaccination Program Register (NHVPR) is a confidential database 
that supports the Program by collecting data on HPV vaccinations administered in 
Australia. Established in 2007, the NHVPR contains records of HPV vaccines to 
females from 2006 and for males from 2013. Data are provided to the NHVPR by 
jurisdictional health departments, local government councils (school-based Program), 
General Practitioners (GP), Nurses, Aboriginal health works and other immunisation 
providers.(10) Information on HPV vaccinations are provided to the register under the 
provisions of the National Health Amendment 2007 (National HPV Vaccination 
Program Register).(11)  
 
The information that is collected in the NHVPR includes:  name, gender, date of birth; 
address; vaccine brand; vaccine provider’s number; vaccine dose number; date of 
vaccination; consumer reference number; Indigenous status; Medicare number; 
country of residence; consent date (on school-based HPV consent forms); name and 
contact details of consenting parent or guardian (on school-based HPV consent forms); 
school details (on school-based HPV consent forms); and provider contact details. 
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Scenario 
You are working for the Australian Government Department of Health (the Department 
of Health) and you have been asked to provide an estimation of HPV vaccination 
coverage in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander females in 2009 using data from the 
NHVPR. These estimates will be used to assist the Immunisation Branch in their 
evaluation of the Program. 
Your director thinks this will be a good project as part of your MAE training. The 
Immunisation Branch has asked that the estimates of vaccine coverage be provided as 
age-specific rates. To ensure the data you provide to the Immunisation Branch is 
interpreted correctly, your director has asked that you provide a short explanation 
about how Indigenous status is collected in Australia and the barriers faced in 
collecting this information. 
She also mentions that Indigenous status is known to be underreported in the NHVPR 
and may affect the vaccine coverage estimates. She wants you to be very careful how 
you present these estimates, as the information could be misleading. 
Task 1: Investigate the standards used to collect Indigenous status in 
Australian Health data sets 
1. According to the Australian national standards, how should Indigenous status be 
asked?  (Hint-  see the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare website) 
‘Are you [is the person] of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin?’ 
 No 
 Yes, Aboriginal 
 Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
 Yes, Both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
If the fourth box is not included, then a respondent should be asked to tick both Yes 
boxes if they identify as an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander.  
2. Do all jurisdictions use the recommended national categories for Indigenous 
identification on their HPV vaccine consent forms? (these forms can be found on the 
HPV school programme website) 
No, questions for Indigenous status on the HPV vaccination consent forms vary 
amongst the jurisdictions. 
3. Which jurisdictions use different categories? 
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The Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. 
4. List the categories used by jurisdictions that differ from the recommended national 
categories. 
Jurisdiction Question asked on form 
ACT Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander 
NSW 
Indigenous status:  
No 
Yes, Aboriginal 
Yes, Torres Strait Islander 
Yes, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
NT 
Ethnicity: 
Non-Aboriginal 
Aboriginal 
Torres Strait Islander 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
QLD 
Aboriginal 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (TSI)  
TSI 
Not Aboriginal or TSI 
Not stated/unknown 
SA Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander 
TAS 
Is your child of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin?     
 
Yes           No 
VIC 
Is the person of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander consent?  
No 
Aboriginal 
Torres Strait Islander 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
WA 
Aboriginal    
Yes           No 
 
Task 2: Investigate the barriers associated with the collection of 
Indigenous status in Australian health data sets 
You now have a better understanding of how Indigenous status is collected on HPV 
vaccination consent forms in Australia. However you are still unsure why it is poorly 
reported to the NHVPR. If there are national standards for asking this question and 
every jurisdiction asks for Indigenous identification, then surely the data should be 
better than it currently is.  
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You decide you need to investigate what the barriers are that could affect the collection 
of Indigenous status in the NHVPR. 
5. What would be your research question to investigate the barriers in collecting 
Indigenous status? 
What barriers impede the collection of Indigenous status in the HPV vaccination 
consent forms? 
6. Find 2 resources (these can be research articles or grey literature) that provided you 
with information about some of the barriers in collecting Indigenous status in 
Australia. 
1. Adams K, Kavanagh A, Guthrie J. 'Are you Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait 
Islander?': improving data collection at Breast Screen Victoria. Australian and 
New Zealand journal of public health. 2004 Apr;28(2):124-7. PubMed PMID: 
15233350. 
2. Kehoe H, Lovett RW. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health assessment: 
barriers to improving uptake. Australian family physician. 2008;37(12):1033-38. 
3. Brough M, Shannon C, Haswell-Elkins M. To be or not to be: recording 
Aboriginal identity on hospital records. Pacific Health Dialog. 2001; 8(1):47-53. 
PubMed PMID: 12017836. 
4. Draper GK, Somerford PJ, Pilkington AS, et al. What is the impact of missing 
Indigenous status on mortality estimates? An assessment using record linkage 
in Western Australia. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health. 
2009 Aug; 33(4):325-31. PubMed PMID: 19689592. 
These are just a few of the resources available. There are many other resources 
including government reports, opinion pieces, and editorials. 
7. From these resources, list the main barriers that could be associated with the 
collection of Indigenous status in the NHVPR. This should be no more the half a 
page. 
 Not seen as relevant to providing or obtaining health care; 
 Fear of racial discrimination; 
 Healthcare staff assuming Indigenous status is too sensitive to ask; 
 Misconception as to why the question is being asked; 
 Failure to ask the question consistently; 
 Lack of appropriate categories for self-identification; 
 Best practice guidelines to ask Indigenous status are not followed; 
 Indigenous status is recorded based on appearance of the person; 
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 Distrust in how the data will be used and disseminated;  and  
 Healthcare staff don’t understand the value or need for the question to be 
answered. 
Task 3: Data analysis 
Now that you have a good understanding of how Indigenous status is collected and the 
barriers often encountered with its collection, you’re ready to calculate rates. Whilst you 
know how to calculate age-specific rates, you are aware that providing age-specific 
rates for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations requires careful 
interpretation as the Estimated Residential Population (ERP) numbers used as 
denominators for this group are often unstable. 
Lucky for you, there are only 50 females in 2009 who received a HPV vaccine, so the 
analysis shouldn’t be too difficult. However, you have just noticed the only population 
data you have available from the ABS to calculate the age-specific rates is the 2006 
ERPs for females in single year age groups by Indigenous status. You realise, this is 
going to be trickier than you thought. 
Using the information provided in the attached excel spread sheet answer the following 
questions. 
8. How can you use the 2006 ERPs to calculate the 2009 age-specific rates?  
There are two ways you could uses the 2006 ERP for calculation of age specific rates. 
First method- Baseline assumption 
This method assumes that the changes in the population structure have not varied 
significantly overtime (in this case 2006 to 2009).This method assumes, for example, 
the population structure of 12 year olds in 2006 is similar to the population structure for 
12 year olds in 2009.  
Using this method, the age-specific rate for 12 year old girls is calculated by: 
number of 12 year old girls vaccinated in 2009 
x 100,000 population of 12 year old girls in 2006 mid-year 
ERP 
 
Second method – Birth cohort analysis  
This method assumes that the number of people born in one year has remained 
relatively similar over time. For example the population of girls born in 1997 has 
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remained the same, thus this population is the same as the number of 12 year old girls 
in 2009 (these girls would have been born in 1997). Using this example age specific 
rates would be calculated as follows:    
population of girls born in 1997 with a vaccine dose 
population of girls born in 1997 
This method assumes that your denominator correspond to the year of birth.  So if 
your denominator is mid-year 2006 ERPs, your denominator would then be 9 year old 
girls, as this would have been the age of the 12 year old girls in 2006. 
To calculate the rate we use the following calculation: 
number of 12 year old girls vaccinated in 
2009 
x 100,000 
population of 9 year old girls in 2006 
mid-year ERP 
 
This method is commonly used in vaccination coverage estimates. As some vaccines 
are only required once in their lifetime for protection, this method provides a population 
coverage estimate. 
9. Calculate the age-specific rates for Australia and provide the results in a table 
similar to the one below. 
Table 1: Ages specific rates for female HPV vaccinations by Indigenous status, 
Australia, 2009 
Age Group Indigenous 
(n) 
Non-Indigenous 
(n) 
Total (n) 
5 – 9 Years 15.87 (3) 0.27 (1) 1.29 (5) 
10 - 14 Years 0.00 (0) 2.49 (16) 5.94 (40) 
15 - 19 Years 3.76 (1) 0.31 (2) 0.74 (5) 
An alternate way to provide the data in table 1 would be to consider those eligible for 
the HPV vaccination in the school and catch-up Programmes.   
Table 2: Age specific rates of female eligible for the school HPV vaccination per 
100,000 population and total number of vaccinated persons (N), by Indigenous status, 
2009 
 Age Group 
Rate per 100,000 population (n) 
Indigenous Non-Indigenous Total 
12-13 years 0.00 (0) 2.33 (6) 5.92 (16) 
14-15 years 8.16 (1) 1.92 (5) 6.96 (19) 
As part of these calculations, we could age-standardise the results to adjust for the 
difference in age structures between the two populations. I have provided the 
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methodology of direct standardisation below. I chose direct standardisation as it is the 
method recommended by the AIHW and ABS.  Whilst indirect could be used in this 
example, it is generally only used when the population is small and rates of disease are 
small, or the age-specific rates for the population being studied are not known. 
Direct standardisation: 
The following equation for direct standardisation is: 
SR= (SUM (ri * Pi))/SUM Pi       
Where: 
SR is the age-standardised rate for the population being studied 
ri is the age-group specific rate for age group i in the population being studied 
Pi is the population of age group i in the standard population 
To calculate the age-standardised rates we need to first calculate the expected 
numbers of each age group in the entire Indigenous and non-Indigenous female 
populations. Whilst we only have vaccination notifications for females aged 9-15 years, 
age-standardisation adjusts for the difference in the age across the entire population. 
Table 3: Calculations for age standardisation for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
females, Australia, 2009  
5-Year Age 
Group 
Observed 
Notifications 
Indigenous 
population Age specific rate 
Standard 
Population 
Expected 
Notifications 
0-4 0 31,673 0.0000000 1282357 0.0 
5-9 3 31,801 0.0000943 1351664 127.5 
10-14 0 31,433 0.0000000 1353177 0.0 
15-19 1 26,614 0.0000376 1352745 50.8 
20-24 0 22,122 0.0000000 1302412 0.0 
25-29 0 18,620 0.0000000 1407081 0.0 
30-34 0 18,546 0.0000000 1466615 0.0 
35-39 0 18,136 0.0000000 1492204 0.0 
40-44 0 15,734 0.0000000 1479257 0.0 
45-49 0 13,011 0.0000000 1358594 0.0 
50-54 0 10,196 0.0000000 1300777 0.0 
55-59 0 7,554 0.0000000 1008799 0.0 
60-64 0 5,115 0.0000000 822024 0.0 
65-69 0 3,576 0.0000000 682513 0.0 
70-74 0 2,430 0.0000000 638380 0.0 
75+ 0 3,173 0.0000000 1114641 0.0 
Grand Total 4 259,734 0.0000154 19413240 178.3 
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Table 3: Calculations for age standardisation for non-Indigenous females, Australia, 
2009  
5-Year Age 
Group 
Observed 
Notifications 
Non-
Indigenous 
Population 
Age specific 
rate 
Standard 
Population 
Expected 
Notifications 
0-4 0 637,648 0.0000000 1282357 0.0 
5-9 1 653,157 0.0000015 1351664 2.1 
10-14 16 681,239 0.0000235 1353177 31.8 
15-19 2 689,033 0.0000029 1352745 3.9 
20-24 0 723,531 0.0000000 1302412 0.0 
25-29 0 696,460 0.0000000 1407081 0.0 
30-34 0 748,090 0.0000000 1466615 0.0 
35-39 0 766,937 0.0000000 1492204 0.0 
40-44 0 771,590 0.0000000 1479257 0.0 
45-49 0 754,066 0.0000000 1358594 0.0 
50-54 0 684,947 0.0000000 1300777 0.0 
55-59 0 635,851 0.0000000 1008799 0.0 
60-64 0 493,166 0.0000000 822024 0.0 
65-69 0 395,284 0.0000000 682513 0.0 
70-74 0 327,264 0.0000000 638380 0.0 
75+ 0 757,184 0.0000000 1114641 0.0 
Grand Total 19 9,777,799 0.0000019 19413240 37.8 
To calculate the standard rate for each population using the direct method; 
Indigenous= 178.3/19,413,240*100,000 = 0.199 per 100,000 
Non-indigenous = 37.8/19,413,240*100,000 = 0.195 per 100,000 
Comparative Ratio = 1.99/1.95 = 1.02 
Interpretation: 
After controlling for the confounding effects of age, the vaccination coverage of 
Indigenous females was 2% higher than non-indigenous females in 2009. 
Note on standardisation: 
One thing to note with age standardisation, in some cases it is more informative to 
report the age-specific rates of the age groups of interest, rather than attempting to 
convey the differences through one or two figures.  Of course this will depended what 
your data looks like.  
If you are unsure if direct age standardisation is for you, check out “Principles on the 
use of direct age-standardisation in administrative data collections; for measuring the 
gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australian” by the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare. This document is very helpful in understanding how to do direct 
standardisation and when it is appropriate. 
10. What caveats would you need to provide with the table? (Hint use information 
from the ABS website) 
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Notes: 
1. Indigenous status has been self-reported. 
2. HPV Vaccination doses administered through general practice and in other 
community settings may be incompletely notified to the NHVPR. The extent of 
under notification differs by jurisdiction. 
3. Population is Estimated Resident Population (ERP) provided by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) requested as single year age groups by Indigenous 
status. 
4. Single year of age experimental Indigenous population estimates may be 
subject to errors that cannot be adjusted for in the population estimates 
compilation process. 
5. The Census Post Enumeration Survey adjusts for net undercount by Indigenous 
status by single year of age and sex. 
6. Excludes consumers who do not wish their details to be recorded on the 
NHVPR. 
7. HPV Vaccination doses administered through general practice and in other 
community settings may be incompletely notified to the NHVPR. The extent of 
under notification differs by jurisdiction. 
 
*Note this task can be completed in Excel or Stata.  If you use Stata please 
provide the Stata Do-file. If you use excel please provide the excel spread sheet 
and provide the formula you used to calculate the age specific rates. 
Task 4 – Bringing it all together 
You’re finally ready to provide the Immunisation Branch with the estimates they have 
requested. However you feel you can’t just provide the estimates without any context 
about the collection of Indigenous status for the NHVPR and potential issues with the 
data. 
To ensure the estimates are used and interpreted for the Program evaluation correctly, 
write a short paragraph for the Immunisations Branch that includes: 
 Estimated age-specific rates for vaccine coverage; 
 Caveats in interpreting the data; 
 Rationale as to why Indigenous status may be underreported in the NHVPR; and 
 If, in your opinion, this information should be used as part of the evaluation. 
The Human Papillomavirus Virus (HPV) Vaccination program was introduced in 
Australia for females in April of 2007. The program consisted of two components; 1) an 
ongoing school based program for females enrolled in grade seven and eight (12 to 13 
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years); and 2) a time limited catch-up program which ceased on 31 December 2009, 
for women aged 14 to 26 years. 
In 2009, the NHVPR received 50 female HPV vaccination notifications, whose ages 
ranged from 9 to 15 years. We compared vaccination coverage rates by Indigenous 
status and found rates for the school based Program (12 to 13 years) were higher in 
non-Indigenous females at 2.3 per 100, population compared to Indigenous at 0.0 per 
100,000 population. Inversely, rates for females in the catch up program (14 to15 
years) were considerably higher for Indigenous at 8.2 per 100,000 population, 
compared to the non-Indigenous at 1.8 per 100,000 population. However due to high 
number of notifications (63%) with incomplete Indigenous status, these rates should be 
interpreted with caution. 
There are many social reasons which may have contributed to low reporting of 
Indigenous status in 2009. Some of the most common include the willingness of 
individuals to provide the information, perception that the information is irrelevant to 
health, fear of discrimination and the perception of being racist by asking the question. 
Inconsistency in how the question was asked may have also played a role. Under half 
of all jurisdictions in Australia currently ask Indigenous status as it is recommended in 
the Australian National standards (AIHW 2009). 
Given the low completion rate of Indigenous status in 2009, the rates presented in the 
report will have underestimated the vaccination coverage in both the Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous female populations. For this reason we do not recommend using these 
estimates to evaluate the 2009 HPV vaccination programs. 
Resources for task 
Websites that will help you with your tasks 
 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare - www.aihw.gov.au/Indigenous-
australians/Indigenous-identification/  
 NHVPR - www.hpvregister.org.au/ 
 GP registration to NHVPR- www.hpvregister.org.au/health-professionals/how-to-
notify-hpv-doses 
 HPV School Vaccination Program- hpv.health.gov.au/the-program/#.U1cacW-i1cY    
 ABS Understanding Indigenous population data - 
www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4713.0Chapter12006  
 ABS explanatory notes for Indigenous population data- 
www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4713.0Explanatory%20Notes12006?Op
enDocument  
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 ABS – Explanatory notes for populations by age and sex, Australia, 2006 
www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/3235.0Explanatory%20Notes12006?Op
enDocument 
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2012. 
10. Gertig DM, Brotherton JM, Saville M. Measuring human papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccination coverage and the role of the National HPV Vaccination Program 
Register, Australia. Sexual Health. 2011;8:171-8. 
11. National Health Amendment (National HPV Vaccination Program Register) 2007. 
Australian Government; 2007 [cited 2014 1 June]; Available from: 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2007B00136/Explanatory%20Memorandum/T
ext. 
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Appendix 6.2a Teaching MAE - Session Outline 
Proposal of training for first year MAE students 
Selection and Measurement bias 
As part of the MAE program, scholars are asked to conduct teaching session. For the 
MAE cohort of 2013 this teaching session is to be presented to the 2014 cohort. This 
training session will be conducted over half a day and has been divided into 4 sections. 
The training plan below outlines the aims, objectives and teaching outline for the 
“selection and measurement bias” portion of the training session. The training will be 
conducted in March of 2014 and this section will run for approximately 40 mins. 
Background 
Developing and conducting epidemiological studies often requires a substantial amount 
of forethought and planning. One of the major aspects that need to be considered in 
any epidemiological study is the issue of bias. In order to produce results and reports 
that are as scientifically accurate as possible, bias needs to be identified, its effect on 
study outcomes recognized and strategies developed to minimise its impact. In this 
teaching session we will cover the concepts of selection and measurement bias.  
Proposed teaching plan 
Aim 
To define selection and measurement bias and identify issues with these biases 
associated with epidemiological study design and analysis, using practical examples. 
Learning objectives  
By the end of this session participants should be able to: 
 Describe selection and measurement bias; 
 Identify potential bias in practical situations; 
 Describe how bias can affect measures of association; and 
 Identify strategies to minimise bias in study design. 
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Teaching outline 
Section 1:  Introduction (5 mins) 
 Describe what selection and measurement bias are and how they differ; and 
 Identify selection and measurement bias in epidemiological studies. 
Section 1: Exercise (15 mins) 
Using a case study participants will be asked identify potential sources of bias including 
one source each of selection and measurement bias (10 mins). Class discussion will 
go through the sources of bias identified by individuals (5 mins). 
Section 2:  Effects and minimisation (5 mins) 
 Describe how selection and measurement bias affect measures of association; 
and 
 Outline the types of strategies commonly used to minimise bias.  
Section 2: Exercise (15 mins)  
Participants will be divided into groups and given a selection or measurement bias 
identified in section one. Participants will be asked to identify the effects of the bias 
allocated to the group and asked to identify potential minimisation strategies. Class 
discussion will go through what the groups identified as potential effects and 
minimisations strategies (10 mins for individual group discussion and 5 mins for class 
discussion). 
Conclusion- (2 Mins) 
 Review of major concepts; 
 Outline of session’s learning objectives; and 
 Questions. 
Case study  
The General Practice Sentinel Surveillance (GPSS) system will be used as the case 
study. This surveillance system is used to monitor the epidemiology of laboratory 
confirmed influenza in Victoria by describing the onset, duration and relative severity 
of annual influenza seasons, and providing samples to laboratories for the 
characterisation of circulating viruses in Victoria. 
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Appendix 6.2b Teaching MAE - Presentation Slides 
Courtney Lane1 and Anna-Jane Glynn Robinson2
MAE Scholars, National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health
1 Department of Health, Victoria, Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference         
Laboratory 
2 Australian Department of Health
Selection Bias
 
What is Bias?
 
Bias is….
• Systematic
• Incorrect measurement 
• Incorrect selection
• Errors in analytical epidemiology
• Errors in interpretation
• Results in inaccurate measures of 
frequency or association
 
Types of Bias in Epidemiology
• Measurement bias
– Systematic error in variables under study
• Selection bias 
– Systematic differences between those 
included & not included in a study
 
Framework for Identifying Selection Bias
Reference Population:
Population to whom the study results can be 
generalised
Source Population:
People who could be included in the 
study
Study Population:
Those from who we intend to collect data 
(respondents plus non-respondents)
Study Subjects:
The population in our study 
(respondents)
GPSS Participating Sites 2012
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Case Study Summary
• GPs volunteer in exchange for clinical audit 
points
• Patients must attend GP
• ILI patients; fever, cough and malaise/fatigue
• ILI patients swabbed at GP discretion 
• Swab influenza positive = case
• Swab influenza negative = control
 
Framework for Identifying Selection Bias
Reference Population:
Source Population:
Study Population:
Subjects:
People in Victoria
People attending participating general 
practitioners during the influenza season
People who present with influenza like 
illness within four days of symptom onset
People who provide; 
- A nasal or throat swab
- Onset date
- Vaccination status
 
Case Study
Exercise 1
• Identify potential sources of selection bias 
(15 mins)
 
Selection Bias – Internal Validity
Effect
• Biases estimate if 
participation 
depends on
• Risk factors 
• Exposure and 
outcome
Minimisation strategies 
• Accurate inclusion 
and exclusion criteria
• Selection of controls
• Statistical techniques
• Collect data about 
non-respondents
• Disclose especially 
where you can’t 
control!
 
Selection Bias – External Validity
Effects
• Reduces ability to apply 
results to the reference 
population
• Effect modification by 
selection and 
participation factors
Minimisation strategies
• Clearly define selection 
and eligibility criteria 
• Oversample if required
• Think it through
• Disclose especially 
where you can’t 
control!
 
Case Study
Exercise 2
• Discuss amongst your group the effects of this 
bias and and how you could minimise it (10 
mins)
• Report back to the class
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Take Home Messages
• Define your populations before 
you start 
• Think about
– Who’s in
– Who could be missing
• Plan for bias in your study design!
• Can be tricky, if unsure ask, ask ,ask!
• Always disclose identified bias
Resources to Help
• Bias in Occupational Epidemiology Studies –
Pearce N, Checkoway H & Krieble D; 2006, in 
Occupational Environmental Medicine, vol. 64 
• Field Epidemiology – Gregg M
• The ECDC Field Epidemiology Manual found at 
https://wiki.ecdc.europa.eu/Default.aspx
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Appendix 6.2c Teaching MAE – Case Study Instructors Guide 
 
 
Measurement and Selection Bias Case Study 
 
Calculations of Influenza Incidence using 
Victorian 
General Practice Sentinel Surveillance 
(GPSS) 
 
Instructors’ Guide 
Note: This case study is based on a real-life sentinel surveillance system in Victoria, Australia. 
However, aspects of the case study have been fabricated to assist in meeting the desired teaching 
objectives and place the events in an engaging and practical context for participants. 
 
The authors of this case study would like the acknowledge staff at the Victorian 
Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory (VIDRL) who co-ordinate the GPSS system 
and provided advice on this case study, especially Kristina Grant, James Fielding, 
Kylie Carville and Heath Kelly. 
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Learning Objectives 
After completing this study the participant should be able to: 
 
1.  Define selection bias; 
2.  Identify selection bias in a practical situation; 
3.  Describe how bias can affect measures of association; and 
4.  Identify strategies to minimise selection bias in study design 
 
Developed by Courtney Lane and Anna Glynn-Robertson, February 2014 National Centre for 
Epidemiology & Population Health (NCEPH), Australian National University 
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Background 
Instructor’s note: Students to read the background section as a group. Slide with the framework is 
to be up on the PowerPoint during this time. Students will have been told to keep this framework in 
mind when thinking about the following information. 
You have recently arrived back in Melbourne from your first MAE course block. In your 
absence your supervisor has identified the perfect project for you. She’d like you to 
calculate the incidence of laboratory confirmed influenza in Victoria during 2013. 
Your supervisor tells you that in Victoria, the General Practice Sentinel Surveillance 
(GPSS) system is used to monitor the epidemiology of laboratory confirmed influenza, 
identify the onset, duration and relative severity of annual influenza seasons and 
provide samples for characterisation of strains circulating in Victoria. (3) Your 
supervisor thinks you should be able to use the data collected by the GPSS in your 
study. 
However, you’ve been to course block and you know that before you jump into your 
analysis you should think about your study design and try to identify the potential 
sources of selection bias in your data. 
You decide that first thing you’re going to do is take a closer a look at how the GPSS 
system works, how people are selected into the study and who are likely to be your 
study participants! 
General Practitioner Recruitment 
General practitioners (GPs) are recruited to participate through advertisement in GP 
circulars and targeted recruitment in underrepresented areas.(1) In return for 
participation GPs receive continual professional development points from the Royal 
Australian College of General Practitioners and the Australian College of Rural and 
Remote Medicine.(2) 
Instructor’s note: Pause to put up map of the general practices. 
Influenza Like Illness Surveillance 
Throughout each influenza season participating GPs are asked to report the total 
number of patients they see each week and the number of these that presented with 
influenza like illness (ILI). (4) To be included as a case of ILI, a patient must meet the 
case definition of fever (reported or observed), cough and fatigue/malaise. 
Instructor’s note: Pause to put up syndrome pyramid. 
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ILI Patient Swabbing 
GPs are asked to obtain a throat or nasal swab from an unspecified number of patients 
presenting with ILI. These swabs are tested in the laboratory for the presence of 
influenza and other respiratory viruses. 
Selection of patients to swab is at the discretion of the GP. However, it is advised only 
for those presenting within four days of symptom onset, as the longer the delay 
between the onset of symptoms and swabbing, the less likely it is influenza virus will 
be recovered from the provided sample. 
The GP also provides information on the swabbed patient’s age, sex, symptoms and 
onset date, influenza vaccination status, date of vaccination, presence of comorbidities 
which predispose to severe influenza illness and, since 2011,the receipt of seasonal 
influenza vaccination in the previous year.(5) 
With this information in hand, you identify your populations; 
Instructor’s note: Once students have read this section – get them to identify populations in the 
diagram below then show our answers on the PowerPoint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Study Population: 
People who present with influenza like 
illness within four days of symptom onset 
during the flu season and have swab taken 
at the GPs discretion 
Source Population: 
People who attend a medical consultation 
at a general practice participating in the 
GPPSS system 
Reference Population: 
People in Victoria 
Study Subjects: 
Study population who provide onset 
data and receive influenza positive 
laboratory result 
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Exercise One: Identifying Potential Sources of Bias 
Using the diagram and information provided above, what potential sources of 
selection bias can you identify in your study? 
Selection bias; 
• The sampling frame may not be representative of the full spectrum of clinical disease 
due to influenza like illness (ILI) as those with severe or very mild disease are unlikely to 
present to general practitioners. 
• Selection of who is swabbed (and thus included in the study) is decided by the GP and 
is not systematic. 
• Selection of GP practices: GPs volunteer to participate, not geographically representative 
or randomly selected (size, patient compositions are all likely to vary). 
 
Present your findings to the class. 
You’re shocked at the number of selection biases you’ve identified, you’re not sure if 
you should continue. Is this really the project for you? You present your list to your 
supervisor. She is aghast. While impressed with your thoroughness and 
thoughtfulness, she had no idea there were so many potential sources of bias in your 
study! 
Your supervisor wants to know what the effects of the biases you identified might be 
and how you might minimise them in your analysis. She tells you that a very large sum 
of money has just become available to strengthen the GPSS system. She asks you if 
there are any changes that could be made to the design of the system in order to more 
accurately estimate the incidence of laboratory confirmed influenza in Victoria? 
Exercise Two: Bias Effects and Minimisation 
What are the likely effects of these biases on your incidence estimate and how are you 
going to minimise these in your analysis? Are there any changes you could make to 
system design in order to help address these biases? 
In your groups you will be allocated an identified selection bias. Describe what you 
think the effects on your estimates are likely to be and what could be done to minimise 
these effects in both the design or analysis phases. 
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The sampling frame may not be representative of the full spectrum of clinical disease due to 
influenza like illness (ILI) as those with severe or very mild disease are unlikely to present 
to general practitioners. 
o Effects: Limit the generalisability of the results to all manifestations of influenza 
illness. 
 NB: Disease severity, likelihood of presentation to GP may also vary by 
additional factors such as age and gender, which may further alter the 
effects of this bias. Working age adults likely to be overrepresented in the 
system – need to obtain GP certificates. 
o Minimisation: In an ideal world, extend the sampling frame to include severe 
cases by including cases presenting to hospitals and mild cases who wouldn’t 
present for health care (ie. Sampling non-ILI cases but this would require a 
complete redesign of the system). More realistically, collecting some measure of 
disease severity so it can be controlled  for in analysis. 
• Selection of who is swabbed (and thus included in the study) is decided by the GP and 
is not systematic. 
o Effects: As above – may limit generalisablity if certain age groups and/or disease 
severities are more likely to be swabbed. May also bias estimates if these factors 
are also related to vaccination status (which age, disease severity and presence 
of comorbidity may be). 
o Minimisation: Institute systematic selection of presenting ILI patients to be 
swabbed (random or exhaustive). Collection of covariates for comparison to 
presenting ILI patients that are not swabbed to ascertain extent of potential 
selection biases. 
• Selection of GP practices: GPs volunteer to participate, not geographically representative 
or randomly selected (size, patient compositions  a re  all likely to vary). 
o Effects – As above, may limit generalisability if patient characteristics  change. If 
not geographically representative and distribution of influenza strains varies 
geographically may over or under represent VE for all of Victoria. 
o Minimisation: Can be minimised by design. Stratifying by type of GP (say 
geographical area, size of clinic) may help identify effects of non-representative 
sample. 
 
Present your findings to the class. 
Your supervisor decides that while these selection bias minimisation steps are vitally 
important, any major study design changes certainly won’t be implemented before the 
end of your MAE. You are going to have to make do with the data you have. How you 
know this will be okay because you’ve thought about bias early, identified potential 
sources, minimised what you can and acknowledged the likely effect of those you 
can’t. 
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Further Reading: 
For further reading on GPSS and influenza surveillance in Australia consult the 
following publications (MAE graduates in bold): 
Clothier, H., Turner, J., Hampson, A., Kelly, H. Geographical representativeness for 
sentinel influenza surveillance: Implications for routine surveillance and pandemic 
preparedness. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health. 2006:30(4):337-
341. 
Clothier, H., Fielding, J., Kelly, H. An evaluation of the Australian Sentinel Practice 
Research Network (ASPREN) surveillance for influenza-like illness. Communicable 
Diseases Intelligence. 2005:29(3):231-247. 
References: 
1. The Victorian Influenza Vaccine Effectiveness Audit: 
https://http://www.victorianflusurveillance.com.au/. Accessed 28th February, 2014. 
2. Fielding J, Grant K, Tran T, Kelly H. Moderate influenza vaccine effectiveness in 
Victoria, Australia, 2011. Euro Surveill. 2012;17(11). 
3. Fielding J, Grant K, Papadakis G, Kelly H. Estimation of type-and subtype-specific 
influenza vaccine effectiveness in Victoria, Australia using a test negative case 
control method, 2007-2008. BMC infectious diseases. 2011;11(1):170. 
4. Fielding J, Grant K, Garcia K, Kelly H. Effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccine 
against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, Australia, 2010. Emerging infectious diseases. 
2011;17(7):1181. 
5. Sullivan S, Komadina N, Grant K, Jelley L, Papadakis G, Kelly H. Influenza vaccine 
effectiveness during the 2012 influenza season in Victoria, Australia: Influences of 
waning immunity and vaccine match. Journal of Medical Virology. 2013. DOI: 
10.1002/jmv.23847. 
Instructor’s notes for potential additional questions; 
VE% = (1 - Odds Ratio) x 100. Where the odds ratio is the odds of patients with 
laboratory confirmed influenza having been vaccinated divided by the odds of patients 
without laboratory confirmed influenza being vaccinated. 
Laboratory testing is conducted via respiratory multiplex PCR panel. Cases positive 
for influenza c are excluded.  
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Appendix 6.2d Teaching MAE - Evaluation Forms 
Master of Philosophy (applied epidemiology) Scholars 2013 Cohort 
Please take a few moments to answer the following questions about each of the 
teaching sessions conducted by the MAE scholars on 7 March 2014. There are 4 
evaluations tables and an overall training feedback page. Please ensure you fill in each 
table and the overall training evaluation. Once you have finished please place the form 
in the box provided. 
Session 1: Selection and Measurement Bias  
Please insert emoticon into the appropriate box:  for example       
Session  Hells yeah Sweet 
Can’t say 
could go 
either way 
Twas not 
so good 
I don’t 
speak Dutch 
 Information well presented   
6 
3    
 Meet sessions objectives  3 5 1   
 Speed was appropriate  3 4 2   
 Materials/Handouts were 
useful 5 3 1   
 Power‐point slides were 
useful 5 4    
 Case study useful 6 3    
Presenters Hells yeah Sweet 
Can’t say 
could go 
either way 
Twas not 
so good 
I don’t 
speak Dutch 
 Explained points clearly 4 5    
 Made the session interesting 5 4    
 Answered questions well 3 5 1   
 Knowledgeable in content 
areas 5 4    
 Presented well 6 3    
Overall rating  Excellent Very Good Good Fair Poor 
 Overall rating for the session 4 4 1   
Do you have any further comments regarding this session? 
 Great case study. 
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Appendix 6.3 Rotavirus working group paper 
Attachment C 
Data analysis of current rotavirus notifications held within the 
NNDSS 
This paper provides an overview of rotavirus notifications within the National Notifiable 
Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS) as of 25th July 2014. Data presented are from 
five jurisdictions; New South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), South Australia (SA), 
Tasmania (TAS) and Western Australia (WA). Rotavirus notifications are collected in 
the Northern Territory (NT) but were not available at the time of analysis. Victoria (VIC) 
and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) do not collect rotavirus notifications as the 
disease is not notifiable in their respective states. 
This data analysis has been prepared for the Rotavirus Working Group. 
Rotavirus data in the NNDSS  
Table one provides the year in which the NNDSS received rotavirus notifications from 
each reporting jurisdiction. QLD and WA have provided notifications since 2006, with 
the first notifications received from January for QLD and August for WA. Notifications 
for SA were received from May 2008, for TAS from February 2009 and NSW from April 
2010. 
Table 1: Year the commonwealth has received rotavirus notifications, by jurisdiction, Australia, 
2006 to 30 June 2014 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ACT 
NSW      
NT 
QLD         
SA       
TAS      
VIC 
WA         
Notes: 
1. Rotavirus is not notifiable in the ACT or VIC.  Current as of 25 July 2014. 
2. Rotavirus is notifiable in the NT, but no data had been transmitted to the NNDSS as at 25 July 2104. 
Completion of key rotavirus variables in the NNDSS 
Table two displays the completeness (valid code provide in the field) of three key 
variables in rotavirus notifications by reporting jurisdiction. Serogroup was the most 
incomplete variable in all jurisdictions. The completion of the vaccination status and 
Indigenous status differed by jurisdiction, with NSW having the lowest completion rates 
for both variables. 
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Table 2: Completion of key rotavirus variables in notifications, by jurisdiction, Australia, 2006 to 30 
June 2014 
Jurisdiction 
Indigenous 
status (%) 
Serogroup 
(%) 
Vaccination 
status (%) 
NSW 21.9 0.1 31.9 
QLD 100 0.0 100 
SA 100 0.0 67.5 
TAS 99.6 0.0 83.9 
WA 85.2 11.9 89.6 
Note: 
*Vaccination status includes fully vaccinated, partially vaccinated, not vaccinated for the disease, no vaccine given, not 
applicable, unknown and not recorded. 
 
Epidemiological analysis 
2010 was the first year in which all five jurisdictions (NSW, QLD, SA, TAS & WA) 
provided notified case of rotavirus to the NNDSS. Between the years 2010 and 2012, 
rotavirus notification numbers ranged from 3,170 in 2011 to 3,773 in 2012. In 2013 the 
numbers of rotavirus notifications dropped to 2,914. As of 25 July 2014, there have 
been 1,217 notified cases of rotavirus from the 5 reporting jurisdictions. 
Rotavirus notifications from 2010 to 2013 display a seasonal trend, with most cases 
notified during the winter and spring months. On average, notification numbers 
increased from July and peaked between August and November (Figure 1).  Across all 
the reporting jurisdictions, this trend was consistent with small variations occurring in 
2010 for QLD and 2013 for SA where notifications peaked later in the year. 
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Figure 1: Epidemiological curve of rotavirus notifications, by jurisdiction, 
diagnosis year and month, Australia, 2006 to 30 June 2014 
 
 
Table 3 provides the counts and notification rates of rotavirus for each reporting 
jurisdiction. Over the period of 2006-2013 the highest notifications rates for QLD were 
in 2006, WA in 2007, SA and TAS in 2010 and NSW in 2012. 
Table 3: Counts and rates per 100,000 of rotavirus notifications, by jurisdiction, Australia 2006 to 
30 June 2014 
  NSW QLD SA TAS WA Australia 
  n 
rate 
per 
100,000 n 
rate 
per 
100,000 n 
rate per 
100,000 n 
rate per 
100,000 n 
rate per 
100,000 n 
rate 
per 
100,000 
2006 0 0.0 2509 61.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 236 11.5 2745 44.6 
2007 1 0.0 1190 28.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 738 34.9 1929 30.6 
2008 1 0.0 1078 25.0 134 8.4 0 0.0 427 19.6 1640 20.3 
2009 12 0.2 899 20.8 435 27.0 52 10.3 418 18.7 1816 11.5 
2010 1379 19.3 815 18.5 837 51.4 121 23.8 618 27.0 3770 23.6 
2011 1060 14.7 1390 31.0 455 27.8 78 15.2 187 7.9 3170 19.6 
2012 1756 24.0 947 20.7 622 37.6 98 19.1 350 14.4 3773 22.9 
2013 492 6.6 1171 25.2 798 47.8 107 20.9 346 13.7 2914 17.4 
2014 202 2.7 376 8.0 423 25.3 41 7.9 175 6.9 1217 7.3 
Notes: 
*Australian rates calculated based on an aggregated total of reporting jurisdictions. Denominators for each year are as 
follows: 
a. 2006 and 2007- total population of QLD and WA. 
b. 2008 - Total population of QLD, SA and WA. 
c. 2009-2014 - total population of NSW, QLD, SA, TAS and WA. 
 
6-34 
 
From 2006 to 30 June 2014, notification rates were higher in children less the 1 year of 
age and 1 to 4 years of age compared with all other age groups. Rates for the less than 
1 year age group rose from 202 per 100,000 population in 2009 to 334 per 100,000 
population in 2011, before steadily declining from 2012. Notification rates for children 1 
to 4 years of age declined from 175 per 100,000 population in 2006 to 96 per 100,000 
in 2009. The rates then increased in 2010 to 183 per 100,000 population before 
steadily declining to 99 per 100,000 population in 2013. 
Figure 2: Crude rate of rotavirus notifications per 100,000 population, by age and year 
of diagnosis, Australia, 2006 to 30 June 2014 
 
Notes: 
1. 2006 and 2007 - includes notifications from QLD and WA. 
2. 2008 – includes notifications from QLD, SA and WA. 
3. 2009-2013- includes notifications from NSW, QLD, SA, TAS and WA. 
  
6-35 
 
Appendix 6.4 Presentation slides for the Bangladesh delegation 
National Communicable Disease 
Surveillance 
The National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System (NNDSS)
Anna Glynn-Robinson
Masters of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology(MAE) Scholar
Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance Section
Office of Health Protection
Department of Health
 
Outline
• Australia’s health system
• Regulations
• Why we conduct national surveillance 
• Communicable Disease Surveillance System 
(NNDSS)
• Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance 
• Masters of Applied Epidemiology placement
 
Public health
• States and Territories
– public health response and actions 
– all have public health legislation
• Australian Government
– monitor issues of public health concern
– coordination of the public health response
– compliance with international regulations and 
responsibilities. 
 
Legislation
• Quarantine Act 1908
• International Health Regulations 2005
• National Health Security Act 2007
• National Health Security Agreement 2008
 
The Public Health 
Framework 
• Prevention
– legislation
– infection control, immunisation program, 
– public communication
– surveillance systems
• Preparedness
– plans
– surveillance systems
– stockpiles
– legislation
– exercises and training
• Response
– activation
– surveillance systems
• Recovery
– returning to normal operations
– surveillance systems
 
Disease of Public 
Health Significance
State or Territory Health 
Department(s)
•Investigation of case(s)
•Contact tracing
•Infection control
WHO
Western Pacific 
Regional Office
Commonwealth 
(NFP)
•National coordination
•International reporting
National Incident 
Room
Surveillance 
areas
RAT and MIT
Communicable Disease Response
Events of Public Health Significance
AHPPC
CDNA
Surveillance
•Case report forms
•Case definition
•Data management
Response
•Infection control
•Border control
•Public health alerts
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What are we looking for?
• Early alert of emerging issues
• New diseases
• Changes in current diseases
• Incidence
– Variations on normal background disease levels
– Rare disease alerts
• Severity
• Demographics
• Circulating strains
• Sensitivity/resistance
 
Surveillance systems
• Routine passive surveillance systems - indicator based 
surveillance
– National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS)
– Hospital data from emergency presentations 
– GP sentinel data collection (ASPREN)
– Enhanced surveillance 
– Register data
• Routine active surveillance systems
– Paediatric hospital admissions for rare diseases or severe complications
– Sentinel hospital admissions for influenza - FluCAN
• Laboratory surveillance 
– Active, passive & sentinel
• Rumour surveillance 
• Outbreak management system - NetEpi
 
The NNDSS
• 69 diseases on National Notifiable Disease List (NNDL)
• 41 core fields (5 mandatory)
• Enhanced data eg. country of birth, residency status, site of 
infection, risk factors
• NNDSS data available on web
• Fortnightly to CDNA 
• Annual NNDSS reports published in CDI
• Data provided to other users
 
Notifiable Diseases
• Bacterial – Legionellosis, TB
• STI’s & BBV– Chlamydia, Hepatises C
• Traditional VPDs- Measles, Pertussis, Influenza 
• Gastrointestinal Diseases- Campylobacter, 
Listeria
• Quarantinable – Plague, Rabies
• Vector-borne- Chikungunya, Dengue
• Zoonoses- Q-fever, Australian Bat Lyssavirus
 
The NNDSS
Hospital or Doctor
Notifiable Disease
Laboratory
Report to State/Territory Health Department
Reported to NNDSS
Public Health legislation in 
each jurisdiction
69 diseases
National Health 
Security 
Agreement 
2008
 
incubation onset of symptoms consultation specimen lab result diagnosis notificationexposure
Specimen
date
Notification
date
Notification
receive
date
Onset
date
Detecting events: person, 
place and time
Confirmation status
Age
Sex
Indigenous status
Residential postcode
Outbreak link
Organism details, genotype
Place of acquisition
Vaccination status
Vaccine type
Date(s) of vaccination(s)
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What’s the data 
used for?
• International obligations
• Government Communications – media, briefings 
• Initiate public health response
– outbreak investigation
– media alert
• Inform public health response
– who, what , where, when
• Inform policy
– vaccine schedules, strains, recipients
• Inform research
– new vaccines
• Informing Government & Public
– National health status reporting
 
National Surveillance 
functions
• Data Collection
– who: Data managers
– with: S&T,  National Surveillance Committee, Case Definition 
Working Group
• Data Cleaning
– who: Data managers & epidemiologists
– with: S&T data managers and surveillance managers
• Data analysis
– who: Epidemiologists
– with: S&T surveillance managers, researcher groups
• Data Interpretation
– who: epidemiologists
– with: policy groups, research groups
 
National Surveillance 
functions (cont.)
• Reporting
– who: epidemiologists
– with: policy groups, research groups, expert groups
– NNDSS Annual Report
– Annual reports: Influenza, TB, IPD, STI/BBV (Kirby Institute)
• Data sharing
– who: data managers, epidemiologists 
– with: Research centres (Kirby Institute, NCIRS), researchers, 
students, vaccine companies, other Departments (AIHW), public
– Australia’s youth, Australia’s Health, NHA Indicators
 
Vaccine Preventable Diseases 
Surveillance (VPDS)
Bacterial 
• Antimicrobial 
Resistance  
• IPD
• Legionellosis
• Leprosy
• Tuberculosis 
STI and BBV 
• Chlamydia, 
• Donovanosis, 
• Gonococcal, 
• Hepatitis B, C & D 
(A/E foodborne)
• Syphilis
• HIV/AIDS
• HPV
Traditional VPDs
• Diphtheria
• HiB
• Measles
• IMD
• Mumps
• Pertussis
• Polio
• Rotavirus
• Rubella/ 
Congenital Rubella
• Tetanus 
• Varicella
Influenza
• Seasonal 
• Pandemic 
• Avian 
 
VPDS (Cont.)
STIs & BBVs 
• Post implementation – HPV national vaccination program (2007)
• National BBV and STI Strategies (2014-17)
• Antimicrobial resistance in gonococcal infections.
Influenza 
• Monitored year round
• Activity and severity monitored through variety of surveillance systems
Tuberculosis
• Monitor active TB cases
• identify at risk populations to prioritise interventions
• Latent TB infection screening
 
VPDS (Cont.)
Measles
• Measles elimination achieved by Australia
• All new cases are imported or related to an imported case
Poliomyelitis
• Assessment of risk transmission should an importation occur
• Review all polio related import permits
• New DIBP policy requiring most visa applicants to provide proof of 
vaccination from deemed to have active polio transmission
– Pakistan, Cameroon, Syria, Afghanistan, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel, 
Somalia and Nigeria
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My MAE Experience 
Anna Glynn-Robinson
Masters of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology(MAE) Scholar
Placement: Australian Department of Health
MAE Placement
• Vaccine Preventable Diseases Surveillance
• 2 year placement (2013 to 2014)
• 4 major projects
– Notified Legionellosis in Australia, 2001 to 2012
– Evaluation of  the NNDSS for influenza surveillance
– Gastroenteritis outbreak in the ACT
– Indigenous status in the HPV vaccine register
 
MAE Placement (cont.)
• Annual reports- Legionellosis 2012 and 2013
• Pilot investigating influenza laboratory testing data
• Rumour surveillance for H7N9
• International report for CDNA 
• CDI paper for gastroenteritis investigation 
• Secretariat for Rotavirus working group
• Teaching – MAE and surge capacity
• Watch Officer
Lesson from the MAE
• Concepts of national surveillance
• Using national data 
• Stata coding
• Planning effectively
• Engaging with a range of stakeholders
• Writing for a range of audience
 
List of resources
• NNDSS Data: http://www.health.gov.au/nndssdata
• CDNA fortnightly reports 
http://www.health.gov.au/cdnareport
• NNDSS Annual Reports:
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Cont
ent/cda-pubs-annlrpt-nndssar.htm
• CDI Annual reports : 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Cont
ent/annual+reports-1
• Australian Influenza Surveillance Report: 
www.health.gov.au/flureport
• Kirby Institute publications: 
http://kirby.unsw.edu.au/publications
Thank you
 
 
 
